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Articles

W. Wolfensberger 8 Some Thoughts on Citizen Advocacy Offices Recruiting Advocates for the Mentally Disordered or for Multiple Needy Classes

S. Thomas 14 Some Major Challenges & Dilemmas in SRV Training, Dissemination & Implementation

R. Lemay 31 Implementing Social Role Valorization Theory–It Is Not About Changing the World

S. Thomas 49 Reply to Raymond Lemay's "Implementing Social Role Valorization Theory–It Is Not About Changing the World"

Reviews & More

E. Barken 67 Film 'The True Meaning of Pictures' by J. Baichwal

K. Schwartz 70 Book 'A Brief Introduction to Social Role Valorization' by W. Wolfensberger

R. Ehrenreich & E. McClennan 73 Book 'A Brief Introduction to Social Role Valorization' by W. Wolfensberger

L. Higgs 75 Film 'Rory O'Shea Was Here' by Damien O'Donnell

D. Ferleger 80 Book 'The Limitations of the Law in Human Services' by W. Wolfensberger

J. Sandys 83 'A Critique of Wolfensberger's APPEAR Monograph & Some of the Issues It Raises'

93 List of Items to be Reviewed

Columns

M. Tumeinski 51 On a Role

J. Osburn 56 Training Notes

D. Race 59 Care Ethics–L'Arche, the World & Down Our Street: A Personal Reflection

S. Thomas 94 Social Role Valorization News & Reviews

Features

5 SRV Focus Question

The SRV JOURNAL

Editorial Board

Marc Tumeinski	Joe Osburn
Jane Barken	Judith Sandys, PhD
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Statement of Purpose

We believe that Social Role Valorization (SRV), when well applied, has potential to help societally devalued people to gain greater access to the good things of life & to be spared at least some negative effects of social devaluation.

Toward this end, the purposes of this journal include: 1) disseminating information about SRV; 2) informing readers of the relevance of SRV in addressing the devaluation of people in society generally & in human services particularly; 3) fostering, extending & deepening dialogue about, & understanding of, SRV; & 4) encouraging the application of SRV as well as SRV-related research.

We intend the information provided in this journal to be of use to: family, friends, advocates, direct care workers, managers, trainers, educators, researchers & others in relationship with or serving formally or informally upon devalued people in order to provide more valued life conditions as well as more relevant & coherent service.

The SRV Journal is published under the auspices of the SRV Implementation Project (SRVIP). The mission of the SRVIP is to: confront social devaluation in all its forms, including the deathmaking of vulnerable people; support positive action consistent with SRV; & promote the work of the formulator of SRV, Prof. Wolf Wolfensberger.†

Editorial Policy

Informed & open discussions of SRV, & even constructive debates about it, help to promote its dissemination & application. We encourage people with a range of experience with SRV to submit items for consideration of publication. We hope those with much experience in teaching or implementing SRV, as well as those just beginning to learn about it, will contribute to the *Journal*.

We encourage readers & writers in a variety of roles & from a variety of human service backgrounds to subscribe & to contribute. We expect that writers who submit items will have at least a basic understanding of SRV, gained for example by attendance at a multi-day SRV workshop, by studying relevant resources (see page 4 of this journal), or both.

We are particularly interested in receiving submissions from family members, friends & servers of devalued people who are trying to put the ideas of SRV into practice, even if they do not consider themselves as 'writers.' Members of our editorial boards will be available to help contributors with articles accepted for publication. The journal has a peer review section.

Information for Submissions

We welcome well-reasoned, clearly-written submissions. Language used should be clear & descriptive. We encourage the use of ordinary grammar & vocabulary that a typical reader would understand. The *Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association* is one easily available general style guide. Academic authors should follow the standards of their field. We will not accept items simultaneously submitted elsewhere for publication or previously electronically posted or distributed.

Submissions are reviewed by members of the editorial board, the editorial advisory board, or external referees. Our double-blind peer review policy is available on request.

Examples of submission topics include but are not limited to: SRV as relevant to a variety of human services; descriptions & analyses of social devaluation & wounding; descriptions & analyses of the impact(s) of valued roles; illustrations of particular SRV themes; research into & development of SRV theory & its themes; critique of SRV; analysis of new developments from an SRV perspective; success stories, as well as struggles & lessons learned, in trying to implement SRV; interviews; reflection & opinion pieces; news analyses from an SRV perspective; book or movie reviews & notices from an SRV perspective.

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A Brief Description of Social Role Valorization

From the Editor

In every issue we print a few brief descriptions of SRV. This by no means replaces more thorough explanations of SRV, but does set a helpful framework for the content of this journal.

The following is from: Wolfensberger, W. (2013). *A brief introduction to Social Role Valorization: A high-order concept for addressing the plight of societally devalued people, and for structuring human services* (4th ed.). Plantagenet, ON: Valor Press, p. 81.

> *... in order for people to be treated well by others, it is very important that they be seen as occupying valued roles, because otherwise, things are apt to go ill with them. Further, the greater the number of valued roles a person, group or class occupies, or the more valued the roles that such a party occupies, the more likely it is that the party will be accorded those good things of life that others are in a position to accord, or to withhold.*

The following is from: SRV Council [North American Social Role Valorization Development, Training & Safeguarding Council] (2004). A proposed definition of Social Role Valorization, with various background materials and elaborations. *SRV-VRS: The International Social Role Valorization Journal/La Revue Internationale de la Valorisation des Rôles Sociaux, 5*(1&2), p. 85.

> *SRV is a systematic way of dealing with the facts of social perception and evaluation, so as to enhance the roles of people who are apt to be devalued, by upgrading their competencies and social image in the eyes of others.*

The following is from: Wolfensberger, W. (2000). A brief overview of Social Role Valorization. *Mental Retardation, 38*(2), p. 105.

> *The key premise of SRV is that people's welfare depends extensively on the social roles they occupy: People who fill roles that are positively valued by others will generally be afforded by the latter the good things of life, but people who fill roles that are devalued by others will typically get badly treated by them. This implies that in the case of people whose life situations are very bad, and whose bad situations are bound up with occupancy of devalued roles, then if the social roles they are seen as occupying can somehow be upgraded in the eyes of perceivers, their life conditions will usually improve, and often dramatically so.*

If you know someone who would be interested in reading *The SRV Journal*, send us their name & address & we'll mail them a complimentary issue.

Resources to Learn about Social Role Valorization

From the Editor

• **A brief introduction to Social Role Valorization**, 4th expanded ed. Wolf Wolfensberger. (2013). (Available from the Valor Institute at 613.673.3583)

• **PASSING: A tool for analyzing service quality according to Social Role Valorization criteria. Ratings manual**, 3rd (rev.) ed. Wolf Wolfensberger & Susan Thomas. (2007). (Available from the Training Institute at 315.443.5257)

• **A quarter-century of normalization and Social Role Valorization: Evolution and impact.** Ed. by R. Flynn & R. Lemay. (1999). Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press. (Available from the Training Institute at 315.443.5257)

• **A brief overview of Social Role Valorization**. Wolf Wolfensberger. (2000). *Mental Retardation, 38*(2), 105-123. (Available from the Training Institute at 315.443.5257)

• **An overview of Social Role Valorization theory.** Joe Osburn. (2006). *The SRV Journal, 1*(1), 4-13. (Available at http://srvip.org/about_articles.php)

• **Some of the universal 'good things of life' which the implementation of Social Role Valorization can be expected to make more accessible to devalued people.** Wolf Wolfensberger, Susan Thomas & Guy Caruso. (1996). *SRV/VRS: The International Social Role Valorization Journal/La Revue Internationale de la Valorisation des Rôles Sociaux, 2*(2), 12-14. (Available at http://srvip.org/about_articles.php)

• **Social Role Valorization and the English experience.** David Race. (1999). London: Whiting & Birch.

• **The SRV Implementation Project website, including a training calendar** www.srvip.org

• **SRVIP Google calendar** http://www.srvip.org/workshops_schedule.php#

• **Blog of The SRV Implementation Project** blog.srvip.org

• **Twitter feed** @srvtraining

• **Abstracts of major articles published in *The SRV Journal*** https://srvjournalabstracts.wordpress.com/

• **Social Role Valorization web page (Australia)** http://www.socialrolevalorization.com/

• **SRV in Action newsletter (published by Values in Action Association) (Australia)** viaainc@gmail.com

• **Southern Ontario Training Group (Canada)** http://www.srv-sotg.ca/

• **Alberta Safeguards Foundation (Canada)** http://absafeguards.org/

• **Values Education and Research Association (UK)** http://vera-training.webs.com/

• **A 'History of Human Services' course taught by W. Wolfensberger & S. Thomas (DVD set)** http://wolf-wolfensberger.com/

• **Video of Dr. Wolfensberger teaching on the dilemmas of serving for pay** http://disabilities.temple.edu/media/ds/

SRV Focus Question

In each issue, we publish a focus question & invite our readers to submit a response to the question. Commentaries on the question, if accepted, will be published in the following issue.

In SRV theory, two broad strategies for valorizing social roles are enhancement of competencies & of images. In SRV, competency enhancement takes a developmental model approach. Given its importance, it can be helpful for the student, teacher &/or practitioner of SRV to work to clarify how the developmental model is understood & incorporated within SRV (e.g., as explained in leadership level SRV workshops & SRV texts, as incorporated within the PASSING tool). Since 'developmental model' is a fairly generic term, & since different fields may use the term in various ways, it may be even more necessary to clarify what it means within the context of SRV.

Some key assumptions of the developmental model explicated within SRV are: that development of competencies is the natural mode of growth for human beings, that all people–no matter their age or level of impairment–have the capacity to grow & learn, & that there are many means available for helping people to grow & learn.

The processes of the developmental model include aspects such as: physical & social settings; positive expectations; schedules and routines; social interactions & groupings; skilled teachers & servers; possessions, tools & equipment; the presence of role models; imitation; activities; etc.

Consider the possibilities for ***role-specific*** *competency enhancement. How can servers (paid or unpaid) & services (formal or informal) facilitate growth & competency enhancement tied to a particular societally valued role for one person or for a group of people? To take one example: how might servers support one or more persons in developing competencies that are instrumental to acquiring &/or carrying out the role of full-time worker? How about part-time worker? Consider this question in light of specific work roles.*

Regarding role-specific competency enhancement, take into account some related aspects of social roles, such as:

• role bandwidth: In what ways do we desire to grow into larger bandwidth roles? What additional factors in regard to competency enhancement come into play with larger bandwidth roles? How can we take advantage of this process (e.g., with role models, time in particular physical & social settings, increased expectations, etc.)?

• role domains: How might we capitalize on enhancement of basic competencies which are potentially more relevant to a broad range of roles, &/or across two or more role domains?

• role cascade (Lemay, Social Role Valorization Insights into the Social Integration Conundrum, *Mental Retardation, 44(1): 1-12, February 2006): How might competency enhancement facilitate role cascade? In what ways might we capitalize on the developmental model, & on the enhancement of competencies which are more universally relevant to a broad range of related or 'cascaded' roles?*

• role settings: how might we identify & take advantage of physical & social settings in order to facilitate competency enhancement around a specific valued role (cf. PASSING ratings R2111, R2112, R212, R213, R214, R215)? For a particular valued role, rank order physical & social settings for competency enhancement potential, e.g., in terms of time spent in the settings. How might we focus on role cues, learning opportunities, etc. which are typically available in these settings?

• culturally valued analog: Consider the range of competencies necessary to carry out a societally valued role. Is it possible &/or desirable to rank order these competencies, e.g., in order of priority of time spent exercising the competency, its centrality to role responsibilities, etc.? How do role-related learning & competency enhancement occur within culturally valued analogues associated with this particular role?

• role salience (see the 'role column' in this issue): Consider competency enhancement & the developmental model in light of highly salient roles & of roles of lesser salience. What are the advantages & disadvantages associated with competency enhancement of highly salient roles? of roles of lesser salience?

Announcing the availability of

APPEAR: OBSERVING, RECORDING & ADDRESSING PERSONAL PHYSICAL APPEARANCE BY MEANS OF THE APPEAR TOOL

a publication by Wolf Wolfensberger†

Personal appearance (including so-called 'self-presentation') is certainly one of the most immediate, and often also one of the most powerful, influences on how a person will be perceived and interpreted by others, and in turn, on how others will respond to and treat the person. Personal appearance is also one of the domains of social imagery, which is a big component of Social Role Valorization (SRV): the more observers positively value a person's appearance, the more likely they are to afford that person opportunities to fill valued roles, and thereby access to the good things in life. Unfortunately, the appearance of many members of societally marginal or devalued classes is far from enhancing, or is even outright repellent to many people, and increases the risk that bad things get done to them, or that good things are withheld from them.

This 2009 book explains all this. APPEAR is an acronym for **A** **P**ersonal **P**hysical Appearance **E**valuation **A**nd **R**ecord. It documents the powerful influence of personal appearance on attitudes, social valuation and social interactions. The book explains the many components of personal appearance and the ways in which these features can be changed for better or worse. It also includes a very detailed checklist, called the APPEAR tool, which identifies over **200 separate elements** of personal physical appearance, so that one can review a person's appearance features from head to toe, noting which are positive, which are neutral, which are negative–all this with a view to perhaps trying to improve selected aspects of a person's appearance about which something can actually be done. The book also explains how such an appearance review, or appearance 'audit,' would be done.

The book contains a sample APPEAR checklist at the back, and comes with three separate checklist booklets ready for use in conducting an individual appearance audit. Additional checklists may be ordered separately (see order form on next page).

Reading the book, and especially using the APPEAR tool, can be useful as a consciousness-raiser about the importance of appearance, and in pointing out areas for possible appearance improvement. An appearance audit using APPEAR can be conducted by a person's service workers, advocates, family members and even by some people for themselves. It could be very useful in individual service and futures-planning sessions, and in getting a person ready for a new activity, role or engagement (for instance, before entering school or going on a job interview).

Studying and applying the APPEAR tool can also be a very useful follow-up to Introductory SRV training, as it deepens one's understanding of image and appearance issues.

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Some Thoughts on Citizen Advocacy Offices Recruiting Advocates for the Mentally Disordered or for Multiple Needy Classes[1]

Wolf Wolfensberger[†]

NOTE: *As the founder of Citizen Advocacy (CA), Wolf Wolfensberger had always made it clear that CA could conceivably be a response to people with a wide range of identities & needs. For readers unfamiliar with Citizen Advocacy, it is a personal advocacy scheme in which the CA office establishes & supports typically one-to-one, unpaid, independent relationship commitments between people whose well-being is at risk (referred to as "protégés") & suitable other members of the community (referred to as "citizen advocates"). In the following article, hitherto unpublished but submitted some years ago to the now-defunct journal the* Citizen Advocacy Forum, *Wolfensberger nonetheless points out some pitfalls to the CA scheme in responding to various classes of protégés in need of advocacy, & not just to those with an intellectual disability.*

In underscoring the challenges inherent in recruiting advocates for protégés from different classes, including those who have a mental disorder, Wolfensberger touches on certain aspects of Social Role Valorization (SRV) teaching. In the context of advocating for someone who is wounded, perhaps deeply so, he refers to the importance of being (or becoming) familiar with a person's wounds, & concomitantly knowing the particular risk factors associated with the person or the class to which the person is assumed to belong. As well, Wolfensberger emphasizes the need for advocate fidelity and continuity–despite possible difficulties–in advocating for those whose disposition is apt to elicit rejection, & who may be rejecting of others, including the advocate. Indeed, the article serves as a reminder of the potential of personal advocacy commitments in addressing many of the wounds inflicted on devalued people. ~ Mitchel Peters

HISTORICALLY, THE VAST MAJORITY of Citizen Advocacy offices have recruited citizen advocates for mentally retarded persons. But there has always been debate in the Citizen Advocacy culture about the pros and cons of a single office recruiting advocates either for any needy person regardless of the source of the need, or for at least persons of more than a single needy class, such as the mentally retarded.

Of course, there is no obstacle within Citizen Advocacy theory itself to operating Citizen Advocacy offices either for only a specific needy class or even subclass, or for any kind of needy person. But there are many challenges and pitfalls in a single Citizen Advocacy office trying to accommodate more than one distinct class of protégés. Proponents of this kind of office are typically not aware of what these problems are, usually because they have not had any close-up experience with any such office, or even not with any kind of operating Citizen Advocacy office.

First of all, any needy class comes with certain identities and characteristic vulnerabilities with which one needs to be familiar. This brings with it the practical problem that Citizen Advocacy staff will have to be or become twice (or even more times) as knowledgeable and sophisticated if they

were to serve two or more classes than if only one class were at issue. In turn, this would mean that it would be extremely desirable for such a Citizen Advocacy office to be a larger one, so as to be able to employ several staff members who could each specialize on a particular class that such an office would serve, rather than to gamble on the likelihood that a single staff member would be equally knowledgeable and capable vis-à-vis each of the classes at issue. Of course, one big problem with this is that a larger office would need to be much better funded, but funding is always very difficult for any kind of Citizen Advocacy enterprise to come by.

One related rationale for not lightly taking on more than one class of protégés if one can afford only one Citizen Advocacy staff member is that when there is staff discontinuity, it would be easier to recruit a replacement for a staff member who had been working with only one class of advocatees than a member who had developed expertise in working with two or more.

Furthermore, there are a great many more specific difficulties and pitfalls in working with needy populations who, despite their neediness, are likely to be mentally competent at least part of the time. Classes of needy people that might fit this scenario are the imprisoned, the poor, immigrants, certain subclasses of elderly persons, and certain subclasses of the mentally disordered. This presents several challenges.

One is that persons who are not impaired in intelligence are likely to be able to acquire a better and faster understanding of what Citizen Advocacy is all about. They may request more such information, and become suspicious if they feel that any information is being withheld, especially if they are already of a suspicious mindset. In turn, Citizen Advocacy offices are more likely to be forthcoming with such protégés than with those of impaired intelligence. Staff of those Citizen Advocacy offices that only recruit advocates for people of limited mentality may not even be aware of the difference in information transmittal to the protégés that would typically take place if the protégés were of average or higher intelligence.

Further, some Citizen Advocacy offices have tried to conceal their identity and function from protégés and many other parties. They tried to do matching and supporting without giving the appearance of having done so. This has sometimes led to bizarre practices. Two motives have been behind this strategy. (a) The Citizen Advocacy office tried to avoid the image of being a service agency. (b) The office wanted to avoid stigmatizing the protégé, as might happen if other people came to know that the person really needed a protector, or that third parties were playing matchmaker because no natural protector had come forward. By concealing itself and its activities, a Citizen Advocacy program might get away with such pretenses when protégés are mentally limited, but not with more intelligent protégés, and particularly not with any prone to believe in conspiracies, that people behind the scenes are pulling the strings that affect their lives, etc.

Also, the more a protégé possesses mental competency despite his or her other neediness, and the more wounded such a protégé is, the more one will run into situations where that which is truly in the best interest of such a person is not what the person will want or accept. In turn, this implies that such a person is apt to vigorously object to a particular advocacy action on his or her behalf that, despite its benefits for him or her, is not in accord with his or her wishes. Yet further in turn, this implies that the role of the citizen advocate is going to be a very difficult one. In fact, many citizen advocates will simply not be able to carry on with conviction over extended periods of time when they realize that what the protégé desires is bad for him or her (perhaps even very self-destructive), and that the protégé constantly countermands or sabotages that which is good for him or her. Not merely the normative person, but even an otherwise potentially very good advocate, is eventually apt to throw up his or her hands and withdraw from an advocacy role and relationship, perhaps even with some bad

feelings, in essence saying, "Who am I to stand in the way of a person who is not stupid but who irrationally desires all sorts of things for him/herself that are bad, and who wants me to get these bad things for him/her."

In the case of the mentally disordered specifically, a number of additional phenomena or special challenges need to be kept in mind.

One phenomenon that makes Citizen Advocacy for mentally disordered people difficult is that mentally disordered people hold a great variety of beliefs as to what their condition is, and what accounts for it (e.g., Baur, 1991); and sometimes, some of these ideas are systematically generated and inculcated into such persons by organized groups of people who have, or have had, mental problems themselves. Thus, opinions among the mentally afflicted may vary as to whether any mental disorder is a narrowly-circumscribed medical or "chemical" problem, whether there is a moral element to their situation, whether they are victims of conspiracies or circumstances, whether they are victims of parental errors or even mistreatment during their upbringing, etc. These ideas are apt to shape what a mentally disordered person wants, or is willing to have done for him or herself.

As part of their beliefs about mental conditions, a usually militant minority of people who have been clients of the mental services system have developed their own alternative–and often idiosyncratic–idiom, often riddled with code words, such as "survivors" for people like themselves. Both Citizen Advocacy office people and (potential) advocates may have to wrestle with this problem.

Another reality about mentally disordered protégés is that they may live with delusions–possibly of long standing. This presents problems both to the Citizen Advocacy office and to an advocate. Should a person's apparent delusions be interpreted as such to the advocate? Is the apparent delusion a real delusion, or does the person actually have a rich relative, or has the FBI really tracked the person at some time, or are the voices heard in the person's head the voices of a radio station picked up by the person's dental work acting as an antenna and amplifier? Stranger things than these have actually happened.

One possibility (suggested by Len Surdyka) is for the Citizen Advocacy office to describe the apparent vulnerabilities of a protégé to a new advocate, present the situation as the office sees it, but also as the protégé seems to see it, and let the citizen advocate make up his/her own mind.

At any rate, advocates may find it very problematic how to respond to an apparent delusion. Agreeing with the protégé's delusions would reinforce them. Disagreeing with them might alienate the protégé from the advocate. One possibility that might work with some protégés is to agree to work only on certain specific instrumental problems that are mutually agreed upon (e.g., finding better housing, or getting or holding a job), and not deal with the protégé's beliefs. However, this could result in situations where the protégé desperately needs an advocacy to which the protégé has not agreed.

Some citizen advocates may come to believe that they would be disloyal to their protégé if they rejected the protégé's delusions. They may then begin to treat delusions as real, and act upon these false beliefs. This may not only be disastrous for everyone, but also project to the public the idea that crazy people are advocating for other crazy people–a compounding rather than an alleviation of their craziness–and which the public would think is the last thing that crazy people need.

Among other things, such advocates may demand that the Citizen Advocacy office also treat the delusions as real, and support the advocates in this. When the office does not play along, and does not provide support for an action that is based on the assumption that a delusion is real, a crisis may occur in the relationship between the office and the advocate, and the advocate may even dissociate him/herself from the office.

Another problem is that many mentally disordered people have a tendency to vacillate in ratio-

nality, and in their ability or willingness to relate to any kind of surrogate or spokesperson. In fact, those with paranoid tendencies may develop suspicions about an advocate and reject his or her ministrations, or even very presence. Those with episodes of severe disturbance may even sometimes fail to recognize a previously familiar citizen advocate or Citizen Advocacy staff member, or may assume the advocate is someone other than he or she seems to be or claims to be. A good example is the founder of the American Association on Mental Health, Clifford Beers (1876-1943). When he had a psychotic episode, he was repeatedly visited by his brother, but he variously did not recognize him as his brother or suspected that he was an impostor.

These realities make extreme demands on potential advocates, as those few Citizen Advocacy offices have discovered that have tried to serve mentally disordered people. Their successes have been relatively modest, compared especially to offices serving mentally retarded people, and their staff have commonly been stressed almost beyond human endurance.

At the same time, there is no doubt that mentally disordered people who take a rejecting or even adversarial stance toward their advocates nonetheless very badly need advocates outside the service system who, despite all the problems, endure faithfully in their presence and roles. For instance, one of the things that probably helped the aforementioned Clifford Beers to recover was that his brother kept faithfully visiting him through it all, and bit by bit, Beers gained confidence in his brother and his true identity. Without this crucial link to the outside world of reality, Beers might have continued to withdraw and cut himself off, and might have entered a life-long state of insanity and residency in an asylum, as so many people in fact have done and still do under similar circumstances.

Of course, one way to avoid some of the problems of matching citizen advocates to mentally disordered people is to concentrate on a subclass of such persons that is more likely to be receptive to the ministrations of a citizen advocate. For instance, I suspect that those mentally disordered persons who are incarcerated in institutions where they are badly treated, are very reduced in circumstances, and relatively helpless, will be vastly more receptive to the efforts of a citizen advocate than mentally disordered people who live with considerable discretions in the community. An example of one class of mentally disordered people that readily comes to mind are those incarcerated long-term in so-called forensic psychiatric units, as studied by the Georgia Advocacy Office in 1998. In fact, there is one advocacy goal that such persons are very likely to agree upon with an advocate, namely, getting the person out of the detentive setting into a less-institutional or even non-institutional residential one, possibly even as a transitional step to an even less structured setting. Of course, once released from such settings (if indeed they ever are), they may become less receptive to advocacy on their behalf.

Citizen advocates have proven to be crucially important when a protégé is of fragile health, or is dealt with by the health care system. It is then very important for the Citizen Advocacy office to emphasize to advocates the inherent value of every human life. With a mentally disturbed protégé, this same message to advocates is very important even when no life-and-death issues are on the table, but when the protégé is at risk of being severely devalued or even dehumanized because of his/her bizarre beliefs, behaviors and appearances. ᔕ

Endnote

1. I thank Len Surdyka and Elizabeth O'Berry for very helpful comments on an earlier draft.

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Wolf Wolfensberger, PhD, developed both Social Role Valorizaton & Citizen Advocacy, & authored over 40 books & 250 chapters & articles. He was Emeritus Professor at Syracuse University & directed the Training Institute for Human Service Planning, Leadership & Change Agentry, Syracuse, NY (US).

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Save the Date~Save the Date~Save the Date~Save the Date

The 6th Annual International Social Role Valorization Conference

June 10-12, 2015
Biltmore Hotel, Providence, Rhode Island (US)

http://srvconference.com/

This exciting conference runs from Wednesday to Friday, with pre-conference workshops on the Monday & Tuesday prior. If you are considering other visits before or after the conference, we encourage you to think about these two possibilities:

- Local conference organizers are pleased & ready to help arrange local study tours relevant to human services, art, architecture &/or history.
- Visits to nearby Boston, Newport, Cape Cod or New York City.

The registration fee for the conference, including meals, is $500 USD. The conference rate for rooms at the Providence Biltmore is $170 USD per night. Each room has two king-sized beds & kitchenette; the cost is **per room**, not per person. Consider sharing a room with colleagues to split the cost. Register for hotel rooms directly with the Biltmore Providence, & be sure to tell them you are with the 2015 SRV Conference: http://providencebiltmore.com/ or call 401-421-0700.

While the conference is over two years away, we understand that some of you might have financial allocation & timing reasons to register early. Registration options:

- Send a check made out to "Keystone Institute" to Betsy Neuville at Keystone Institute, Suite 200, 940 East Park Drive, Harrisburg PA 17111 (US).
- To pay by credit card or electronic fund transfer, email Betsy at eneuvill@keystonehumanservices.org.

Scholarship assistance may be available. Contact Jack Yates to get your name on a list for possible scholarships: jyates@peopleinc-fr.org or 508-468-8923.

Save the Date~Save the Date~Save the Date~Save the Date

Some Major Challenges & Dilemmas in SRV Training, Dissemination & Implementation

Susan Thomas

Background

I had first proposed a topic along these lines in November 2008, to be given at the September 2011 Fifth International SRV Conference as a presentation to be followed by a panel that would respond to and discuss the presentation. My proposal was based on some discussions that the North American SRV Development, Training & Safeguarding Council (Thomas, 1994) was having at the time. I received no response to my proposal, and so when the conference program came out but without me and this topic on it, I filed away the material I had developed for it. Then, sometime in July 2012, I heard from the conference organizing committee that they did want me to present on this, but in a day separate from, and subsequent to, the conference, and without a panel of responders. This day would be for members of the North American SRV Council, as well as those from the Australia & New Zealand SRV Group, and a few invited others, and would also include one other presentation. My prepared notes took about an hour to present then, after which there was time for only a little discussion, since another presentation followed and the day was relatively short. Because not all members of the North American SRV Council had been able to attend the SRV conference, or to stay for the subsequent day in which this topic was presented, the Council decided to discuss it at its April 2012 meeting. Based on the discussion of the paper at that meeting, I made major revisions to it and significantly expanded it. A meeting of the Council in November 2012 gave me further ideas for revision. However, the paper should still be considered a "thought paper," rather than a definitive document, and I hope it will generate both further discussion, and some action among those who teach SRV and attempt to implement it.

Readers should note that the title says "some challenges and dilemmas." I am not claiming to be exhaustive in my listing and discussion. Also, challenges and dilemmas in training and dissemination are not the same as those in implementation. And most of what I will present is in the nature of a challenge, rather than a dilemma.

In order to make the nature of at least most of the challenges and dilemmas better understood, I will first sketch three points of context or introduction.

Summary of Types of SRV Dissemination

The first point of introduction has to do with the types of dissemination of SRV so far.

As anyone who has been around the SRV movement for any length of time probably knows, SRV has been spread primarily via teaching and training events (e.g., see Thomas, 1999). These have taken many forms, including short presentations; college and university courses; what are usually called training workshops (and most of these are of the open enrollment type

that anyone may attend); invited speeches given to service agencies or advocacy bodies; service orientation and in-service sessions; etc. In recent years, there has also been increased literature on SRV, including the small book that we call the SRV monograph (Wolfensberger, 1998); the bigger PASSING book, an instrument for assessing the SRV quality of services (Wolfensberger & Thomas, 2007a); *The SRV Journal* and its predecessor *SRV/VRS: The International SRV Journal/La Revue Internationale de la VRS*; David Race's book on *SRV and the English Experience* (Race, 1999) which actually has relevance beyond England; Flynn and Lemay's book (1999) of the proceedings of the First International SRV Conference; the new *Advanced Issues in Social Role Valorization Theory* (Wolfensberger, 2012); and some smaller books and pamphlets put out by agencies that have been attempting to implement SRV. In addition, a number of people have published materials that draw on or incorporate SRV, such as John O'Brien's role assessment tool (O'Brien, 2006), Scott Ramsey's roles-based planning tool (Ramsey, 2007; Wolfensberger & Thomas, 2007b), and Wolf Wolfensberger's APPEAR book (2009). Also, articles on SRV occasionally appear in periodicals other than *The SRV Journal*; examples are Lemay's article (2006) on the integration conundrum and SRV which appeared in the journal then called *Mental Retardation*, and two recent articles by Guy Caruso and Joe Osburn (Caruso & Osburn, 2011; Osburn, Caruso & Wolfensberger, 2011) on the origins of so-called "best practices" in normalization and SRV, which appeared in the *Journal of Policy & Practice in Intellectual Disabilities*, and the *International Journal of Disability, Development and Education*. There also have been several articles on SRV, or explaining it or related to it, in other journals, such as the first expositions of SRV (Wolfensberger, 1983, 1984), including one in 1985 (Wolfensberger, 1985) in what was then called the *Australian Association for the Mentally Retarded Journal*. And in recent years, there have been at least two SRV websites (www.srvip.org and www.socialrolevalorization.com/) and an SRV blog (blog.srvip.org), as well as websites maintained by organizations that do training in SRV or that base their service practice on SRV.

More SRV writings continue to be issued, so I trust readers will not take offense if I have not mentioned some SRV publication; I was merely trying to be illustrative.

Of course, prior to SRV, there were the books *The Principle of Normalization in Human Services* (Wolfensberger, 1972) and the PASS tool for evaluating services (Wolfensberger & Glenn, 1973, 1975).

Nonetheless, despite this gratifying and growing corpus of SRV literature, a great many people, perhaps most, who learn SRV still do so through participating in some SRV training event. They may even learn it in a teaching event that uses or draws on some of the published literature, such as in a college course where the SRV monograph and/or PASSING book are used as texts, or in workshops that use the PASSING book.

Just as a little sideline, over the years, the numbers of people reached via the different kinds of teaching and training events must be in the multiple tens of thousands. For instance, the book *The Principle of Normalization in Human Services* (Wolfensberger, 1972) eventually achieved the status of a non-fiction best-seller in Canada, selling over 100,000 copies. And the Training Institute in Syracuse, NY, which Dr. Wolfensberger founded on his arrival there in 1973 and directed until his death in early 2011, has sold over 15,000 copies of the various editions of the SRV monograph (Wolfensberger, 1991, 1992, 1998), the first edition of which came out in 1991. This does not count the number of SRV monographs sold in Australasia by a separate vendor, nor of course the sales of any other books on or related to SRV.

Brief Explanation of the Concept of Model Coherency

In this second introductory segment, I will briefly sketch the concept of "model coherency" (Wolfensberger, 1998, unpublished; Wolfensberger & Glenn, 1973, 1975) as it applies to some of the challenges and dilemmas to be explained.

The concept of model coherency posits four elements to a model of human service: fundamental assumptions, the service recipients, the content given to recipients, and the processes by which the content is delivered (these processes include the service setting, the servers–i.e., those who deliver the content to the recipients, the way the recipients are grouped, the language used in and about the service, and methods, means, tools and techniques of the service). For a service to be coherent, it should deliver a content that is relevant to its recipients–in other words, something that the recipients actually need–and in a way that is valorizing of recipients' social roles. Of course, that raises big questions such as, "what is needed by recipients, what do they need more than other things–in fact, what do they need most?" Once these content questions are answered, the next elements of model coherency to be addressed are how to provide what is needed in the most effective and most role-valorizing way, in a way that is harmonious, that makes sense–in other words, coherently. These are elements of process. The answers to both content and process questions will be determined by people's fundamental assumptions about such things as human nature, the nature of a particular (devalued) condition, what is likely to work to address a particular problem, and so on; and for any of these assumptions, there may or may not be supportive evidence. Thus, some assumptions and the answers they yield may have empirical support, and others may not.

In SRV teaching and implementation, the model coherency concept is typically applied to services for devalued people. But model coherency can be applied equally to generic services that are not just for devalued people, such as an ordinary school or classroom. And of course, teaching or training events are one kind of such service to which the model coherency construct can be applied. For instance, if one were designing a college course on SRV and wanted it to be model-coherent, one could ask "what do the recipients–the prospective students–need to learn, and how would that knowledge best be conveyed: by whom, in what settings, using what methods and technologies, etc.?" In order to answer that question, and to design model-coherent teaching, one would also need to know whether the envisioned students are preparing to work in elementary education, or in physical therapy, or in psychiatric nursing, etc.

The concept of model coherency, and the questions that need to be answered in order to design a model-coherent entity, could be further applied not only to specific training events, such as a college course or an in-service training for people who work in a mission to the homeless, but also to entire training strategies or schemas, such as an entire college curriculum. For lack of a better term at present, I will refer to such broad training strategies or schemas as training emphases or thrusts, and sometimes even as training cultures. In other words, the offering of a specific training event–say, a college course, an in-service training session, or a free-standing workshop–may be a part of a larger thrust of training that is composed of many such college courses, many such in-service training sessions, many such workshops, and perhaps additional elements as well. In designing an entire training thrust so as to be model-coherent, one would need to determine what is the purpose or intent of the entire training thrust, of which a specific event is only one part. What do the recipients of the entire training thrust need, what would be the most effective ways to deliver that, who should give the training, and what would make for harmony or coherence among the elements of the training thrust or training culture?

Brief Summary of the Relevance of Non-Programmatic Issues & Considerations

We now come to the third introductory or contextual topic.

Whenever we analyze services, as by conducting a PASSING evaluation, or analyzing their degree of model coherency, we find so often that what gets done in services is derived not primarily from considerations of what recipients need and would be role-valorizing for them (which is at the heart of model coherency, and of the concept of service relevance), considerations which in SRV language are referred to as programmatic concepts. Instead, so much of service practice is derived from what we call the many non-programmatic dynamics that affect and even drive services. These non-programmatic considerations include: what the law forbids, requires or allows; what servers are available, and what they are trained to do and like to do; how much money is available, and for what; political pressures, such as to please a powerful lobby or to gain influence with a powerful party; and historical inheritances, such as a building that the service agency bought long ago. (The difference between programmatic issues and considerations and non-programmatic ones is explained in much more detail in 3- and 4-day introductory SRV training workshops, and in as yet unpublished material on model coherency [Wolfensberger, unpublished].)

There are three things that make the issue of non-programmatic considerations a both difficult and important one in human services.

1. First, many people in human services have not been taught to distinguish between programmatic questions of what would really benefit recipients, and non-programmatic ones. And not having been taught this difference, people in human services often confuse the two and even equate the two; for instance, they may think that if the law requires something, then what it requires must be good for recipients, and if the law forbids something, then what it forbids must be bad for recipients.

2. Second, and unfortunately, most non-programmatic issues act as constraints on doing what recipients need, rather than as facilitators thereof. That is, more often than not, the non-programmatic considerations get in the way of building and delivering a coherent and relevant service model, even though at least theoretically, they could facilitate such. For instance, at least in theory, what servers are trained to do and like to do could be well matched to what recipients need in order to fill more valued roles. But in actuality, what servers are trained to do–and especially, what they want to do–often turn out to be not what recipients need, or need most. For instance, servers might be medically trained and like to practice their medical skills, but the people they serve may not be sick, and/or it may be harmful to their image to be surrounded with medically-trained people who convey images of disease and contagion–in fact, recipients may very much need to be surrounded with images that are unambiguously ones of life, health, strength, vitality, etc.

3. And third, there tends to prevail much unconsciousness about all this. For instance, servers may be totally unaware that what they are doing is driven not by what recipients need but by legal mandates, or political influence, or historic accident ("the way it's always been done"), or the available setting. Even if a service did many things primarily for non-programmatic considerations, at least the situation would be less worse if this were honestly acknowledged, because then, if an opportunity arose to improve on things, this opportunity might be recognized and seized upon. But such consciousness is very rare.

Four Challenges & Dilemmas in SRV Training, Dissemination & Implementation

Now we are ready to look at some challenges and dilemmas in SRV training, dissemination, and implementation in light of these three introductory sections.

Tension, Even Mutual Antagonism, Between Different SRV Training Thrusts–Their Underlying Assumptions, Costs, Immediate & Long-Term Benefits, etc.–All Affected by Non-Programmatic Considerations

In the SRV movement, over time, different training and dissemination emphases and thrusts have emerged. One is aimed at a wide dissemination of SRV ideas: trying to reach as many people as possible, to spread the word about SRV in many different quarters, to many different fields, to people in many different roles, such as direct service workers, advocates, family members, service policy-makers, members of devalued classes, and so on.

A second training thrust that has emerged is aimed at developing a cadre of people whose knowledge of and competence in SRV are very deep, and who can teach it very well to others.

One way of contrasting these first two thrusts is to say that the one is more broad and wide, the other more narrow and deep.

Another, though smaller, kind of training thrust has been aimed at particular groups of people, such as family members of impaired people, or at direct care workers in a particular agency or locale. However, this kind of training can be thought of as a particular expression of either the first or second thrust. For instance, an effort to spread SRV knowledge widely in a particular service agency could be an attempt at broad dissemination within that agency, while an effort to develop a number of people within that agency who are highly skilled in SRV could be an attempt at the development of deep competence.

Of course, the training emphases or thrusts are not mutually exclusive. In other words, there can be elements of broad dissemination, and of the cultivation of deep competence, in a single training strategy or thrust.

The first challenge or dilemma has to do with the fact that some functions are mutually antagonistic to each other, meaning that certain functions do not easily co-exist within a single entity, and that one tends to drive the other out. For instance, in organizational theory, it is well-known that the functions that make for organizational stability are in tension with–antagonistic to–those that foster innovation and organizational renewal. I will now examine some of the differences between the broad and wide, and the deep and narrow, SRV training thrusts, and in doing so, some of the advantages and disadvantages, benefits and costs, of each–especially in comparison to the other–will be noted. Also, I will try to point out how elements of these training thrusts can be mutually antagonistic with each other.

Earlier, I mentioned that one basic component of model coherency is the underlying assumptions of the model, and one major difference between the two training thrusts may be in their assumptions as to what is needed. As an example, two assumptions that would underlie a training thrust that aims to foster deep competence in SRV are (a) that people who are very knowledgeable about SRV, and who are competent to pass on that knowledge in all its depth, complexity and nuancing, are needed to continue propagating SRV; and (b) that without such people, SRV would eventually fade away, or at best survive as a vague, watered-down concept in some particular service practices. As an example of b, people may have the idea that what a service setting is called matters somehow and for some reason, but without any clear overarching idea or context for why a service setting name is something to pay attention to–because it affects the image of the people who use that setting, and of others like them, and because such images in turn affect attitudes, expectancies and roles.

Certainly assumption (a) is actually consistent with the facts–in other words, it does have empirical support, because any movement needs strong leadership to gain acceptance, and to endure, and this leadership is not the same as what we may call the rank-and-file who may do all sorts of valuable work, but are not in leadership roles.

There are two factors that are known to play a huge role in the success or failure of any enterprise. One is the quality of its leadership. Developments can become almost impossible to resist or withstand if they are promoted by even a small number of skillful leaders. We can witness this daily in all sorts of proposed changes in society, including what are fairly radical changes: if these changes are proposed by leaders who are skilled in attitude change and other change agentry, they are very likely to be adopted. Among the necessary qualities of leaders are that they possess solid knowledge about whatever is at issue–in our case, about SRV and its implementation. In other words, they have to possess a knowledge that is deep, not just superficial.

A second factor known to play a big role in the success or failure of a movement is if a critical mass of decision-makers in a body (a neighborhood, an organization, a field of service practice, etc.) adopt whatever is at issue. And this critical mass can be surprisingly small: capturing roughly 10 to 20% of the decision-makers is usually enough to guarantee the diffusion of the development to the remainder, and its adoption by them. Again, we see this all around us: a proposed change in a societal norm may originally start out being embraced by only a small proportion of the populace, but if the embracers are in positions of decision-making, if they are people to whom others look for leadership, then the change is likely to be adopted, at least over time.

These two assumptions (a and b above) about the need for expertise in SRV are only examples of the assumptions that would underlie a training strategy that attempts to develop SRV competence. But they illustrate that assumptions are at work; and further, it is easy to see that those assumptions would probably not underlie a training strategy that aimed at broad and wide SRV dissemination but not depth of SRV knowledge.

However, as I said, and as the evidence supports, good leadership is required in order for innovations to be accepted. Now let us tie this to the issue of SRV implementation, and to the idea of tension or mutual antagonism. In Dr. Wolfensberger's presentation on "SRV and Change Agentry" at the Third International SRV Conference in Calgary in 2003, he challenged the SRV movement to pay more attention to the lessons of the field of change agentry, and to apply these lessons to SRV. For instance, he suggested then that those who want to see SRV implemented should: at least on occasion teach in a way that points to interesting implementation; work to develop leaders of a type other than teachers; sometimes concentrate teaching on a particular small target body (such as a group of active advocates, or a particular service agency), and build up demonstration models, rather than scattering teaching over many locales, service agencies and domains; publicize SRV training events in a different, and more appealing, way; engage more in persuasion tactics outside of training workshops; try to recruit specific allies high in organizational hierarchies; jump into crisis situations, and exploit the opportunities that they offer; and make certain that SRV is promoted as SRV, rather than disguised as something else. (An enlarged version of that presentation, and of these ideas, is now chapter six in the book on *Advanced Issues in Social Role Valorization Theory,* Wolfensberger, 2012.)

The implications of all of this to the different SRV training thrusts mentioned earlier, and to the possible mutual antagonisms between them, are several. One is that, generally speaking, developing people with deep competence in SRV–whether that competence is in teaching and dissemination, or in implementation–is much more difficult, much more costly in many ways, than spreading the word about SRV broadly and widely. Also difficult is implementing many of the change agentry lessons just cited, such as recruiting long-term allies and developing services that can be models of SRV implementation. The inculcation of deep competency in people about anything requires much harder training than giving merely a surface knowledge. For instance, to

become a competent brain surgeon, one has to undergo much longer, more difficult training than just watching a two-hour documentary on brain surgery, or even taking an introductory course on brain surgery, even if the documentary is well done, even if the course is well-taught, and even if viewers of the documentary and participants in the introductory course do learn something from these about how to do brain surgery.

Also, whenever the difficulty of something increases, there is a concomitant decrease in the number of people who are willing to undertake it. More people will be willing to devote a short or occasional amount of their time to learning about or practicing a sport than will be willing to devote every weekend, or even every spare moment, to becoming world-class in that sport.

In regard to SRV training, there are parallel interplays between duration and occasions of training, and proficiency. For example, more people come to shorter training events than to longer ones, and more people come to easier training events than to more challenging ones. As a particular instance, consider that in college, word quickly spreads that a particular course is "an easy A," and registration for that course is apt to be higher than for a course that is reputed to require much hard work from students.

Right away, we can see that at least elements of the wide and broad training thrust are apt to be easier and seem more popular, and therefore to be in some ways more rewarding to carry out, than the narrow and deep one. And to relate this to the idea of mutual antagonisms, it is well-known that what is easier to do tends to drive out what is harder to do. This means that there will be a tendency, even if not always fully actualized, for the easier and less demanding forms of teaching and dissemination of SRV to supplant, and even drive out, forms of teaching and dissemination which are more difficult and demanding.

A further difficulty in developing people with deep competency–be it in training or implementation, or both–is that not only would their period of training have to be longer and cover more challenging material (as we noted the period of training for a brain surgeon would have to be and do), but some of the opportunities needed to develop competency might only be able to be offered rarely, not nearly as frequently as the trainees could benefit from it–and again, this could be due to non-programmatic constraints. For instance, a brain surgeon-to-be might benefit from conducting brain surgery every day of the week, for several weeks and months at a time, in order to become really skilled at it: practice makes perfect. But in a certain locale, there may simply not be enough people who need brain surgery, or who need a specific kind of brain surgery, to be able to offer such surgery opportunities every day of the week for several months running.

In our case, some opportunities and experiences necessary for people to develop their SRV competencies might optimally be available on a much more regular basis–for example, a PASSING assessment every month, and maybe PASSING trainings of different types and different levels of difficulty, in order to expose participants to a very wide of services, and in such a manner that they can see the relevance of SRV to them. But it may not be possible to recruit the leadership, or the participants, or the financial resources, to be able to offer PASSING assessment trainings every month. Similarly, expertise in implementation is gained by implementing SRV in a wide range and variety of circumstances, with and "to" different people, in the face of different non-programmatic constraints, and such experience can only be gained over time, and probably slowly.

Apart from and on top of these constraints to availability of necessary opportunities, there is also the challenge of making training that is needed not unnecessarily difficult for those who need it. For instance, given the non-programmatic constraints, how can we make the training that aspiring brain surgeons need in order to acquire the competency that is minimally necessary for them to qualify at brain surgery no more difficult than

necessary, recognizing that even under the best of circumstances the acquisition of such competency is not going to be easy?

Of course, even where depth of SRV knowledge is the aspiration, not every party undertaking the training would necessarily acquire the same depth of knowledge, nor would they necessarily aspire to the same level of competency, nor do they necessarily need the same level. For instance, someone might be the most knowledgeable person about SRV in a particular agency, someone else the most knowledgeable in a specific locale, yet another the most knowledgeable in an entire service field.

Another non-programmatic consideration is what the people doing the serving know how to do and like to do. In our case, what do the teachers or trainers of SRV like to do? And is what they like to do consistent with what is needed by the recipients of SRV training, or not? If what SRV teachers and trainers are good at doing and like to do is not what is needed to either convey deep SRV knowledge, or to spread SRV knowledge widely and to many kinds of people in many different roles, or to implement SRV–or at least to implement it in certain circumstances–then the trainings undertaken by these teachers are not apt to meet the needs of their trainees. In regard to implementation specifically, both thrusts of SRV dissemination so far have tended to be dominated by “getting the word out” about SRV, with comparatively less dissemination of how to implement SRV in specific service situations, even though there is a great deal in both the oral teaching and the writing about SRV that has to do with implementation, and much that can be learned from the experience of those who have attempted to implement SRV with greater or lesser success. For instance, as to both oral teaching and writing, at the conclusion of the standard 3- and 4-day introductory SRV workshop, in the SRV monograph (Wolfensberger, 1998, 82-102), and even in early explanations of SRV (e.g., Wolfensberger, 1985), there is a suggested sequence of implementation of SRV for any specific party. Similarly, the 2009 book on identifying aspects of a person’s appearance that could benefit from enhancement (Wolfensberger, 2009) is eminently practical about implementive measures that can be taken in this very important area of personal image projection.

In regard to the conduct of training specifically, there is one additional non-programmatic consideration that plays a role with some people, though not all, and in some locales, though not all. It is when the people who conduct the training depend for their livelihood on income from these training events. Not all people who are teaching SRV do; for instance, someone who teaches college courses may be salaried, even tenured, faculty at that college. But many SRV teachers and trainers are “independent consultants” or “free-lance trainers” who earn a living by doing training events and consulting on implementation efforts. Obviously, this puts them in a situation where it is in their interest to do things that are popular, well-attended, bring in more income, generate more invitations to do more such popular things in the future, and possibly events that are easier to develop and conduct; and it is not in their interest to do things that are not popular, not well-attended, not generative of good income or of future invitations, and possibly take quite a bit of unsubsidized time and effort to develop and conduct.

This financial conflict of interest is universal; we can find examples of it in virtually every field (the legal profession, medicine, business, politics, etc.). And a universal about this universal is that the vast majority of people who are faced with these kinds of conflict will resolve them in favor of their own interests, even if this resolution is not the most adaptive one. For instance, what if what recipients need is a kind of training which is less popular, less well-attended, less generating of income? What if they need to hear the SRV message, and learn how to implement SRV, in a way that the trainer or consultant does not like to do, perhaps finds difficult to do?

And further, what if the people who make these decisions about what people need, and what they will do to address these needs, are unconscious about being driven by this motive, and are unable to be honest about it, i.e., to say "I am doing this because it is popular and brings in more money, even though it is not what is really needed"?

While there are certainly differences and even mutual antagonisms between a broad and wide training thrust, and a deeper one, it is most adaptive for both to co-exist, for a number of reasons.

1. One is that it is often in the conduct of broad and wide dissemination that specific people get identified who might be good candidates for the deep and narrow, more intensive, more costly training. This argues for conducting a lot of broad and wide SRV dissemination, via publications and teaching events, and doing so often, punctuated by a smaller number of more challenging trainings to promote deep competency.

2. At the same time, without the continuation of the training that is oriented to forming people who are exceptionally knowledgeable in SRV, the leadership will not exist that (as explained earlier) is necessary to keep SRV dissemination and implementation going.

3. Also, if at least part of the reason for developing people with deep competency in SRV is to insure the perpetuation of SRV in human services, and the implementation of SRV in human services, then those who are deeply competent in it have to go out and in fact disseminate it. At least some of them will disseminate it broadly and widely.

4. Broad and wide dissemination is also of great importance to the implementation of SRV, because the opportunities for putting SRV into practice (i.e., implementing it) are vast–they exist wherever there are people who are devalued, or at risk of devaluation, by others. Also, there are people who are not themselves going to be implementing SRV but who are going to be expected to support its implementation in some way–for instance, as taxpayers funding public services, as board members of service agencies. If such persons were to become at least somewhat familiar with SRV (as via the broad and wide dissemination thrust), then their support for role-valorizing measures is more likely to be forthcoming.

5. There is feedback among the implementation of ideas that get disseminated in training, and the training itself, and the shaping of those who do such training. That is, as ideas get implemented, people who conduct training learn about hidden benefits and pitfalls that they may not have identified previously; they learn what things need emphasizing or clarifying, perhaps because these things get easily misunderstood, and what things people seem to have little difficulty with; they learn what non-programmatic constraints are rearing their heads at a certain time, or in certain places, to make the implementation of at least certain elements of SRV particularly difficult; and so on. And these things are then incorporated into the training itself.

6. There is always the danger of elitism and some version of distantiation from what people call "the real world" if teachers and their teaching are not intimately intertwined with practice.

There may be additional reasons as well, but these at least illustrate why neither training emphasis should drive out the other, though it is the natural tendency for the shorter, less demanding, less in-depth, cheaper and more popular kinds of training to drive out the more difficult ones. That both types of training should co-exist has also been one of the messages that members of the North American SRV Development, Training and Safeguarding Council have been trying to spread for many years now, even though specific persons may decide to devote themselves mostly or entirely to trainings in one of the two emphases and not the other.

Competence in SRV is Not Sufficient for Either the Dissemination of SRV, or the Adaptive Implementation of SRV

A second challenge or dilemma that confronts those who would like to see SRV taught

and implemented is that competence in SRV, no matter how deep, is not sufficient to the dissemination of SRV itself, nor to its implementation.

Competencies for dissemination. As to dissemination, people who do SRV training need skills of teaching and writing, of delivery of content, of understanding and relating to one's listeners or readers, to mention only a few, above and beyond their knowledge of the content of SRV.

Competencies for implementation. In terms of the adaptive implementation of SRV, and the rendering of high quality human service, knowledge of SRV alone is also not enough. Ever since the principle of normalization was formulated, and then later reformulated as SRV, there have been dilemmas as to how to teach it, how to conceptualize its implications for oneself once one has understood it, and how to evaluate its implementation in a human service. This is a dilemma that is shared with many other complex phenomena (SRV's complexity is one of the things which necessitates at least some people being very knowledgeable about it, more knowledgeable than others, as covered in the previous section). Such complex phenomena may very well have to be taught and learned in a way that is different from the way in which they are applied, or even from the way in which they eventually get embedded in a person's conceptual framework. After all, not even an understanding of each separate SRV theme, nor an understanding of some of the interactions and feedbacks formed by the themes, exhausts the implications of SRV which would come up in an implementation effort. (The themes that are used to teach SRV are: the reality of unconsciousness; the conservatism corollary and positive compensation for disadvantage; the importance of mindsets and expectancies; the role of interpersonal identification; the power of imagery and image juxtapositions; model coherency, and the related concepts of relevance and potency; competency enhancement and the developmental model; the power of imitation and modeling; the power of role expectancies and how role expectancies are conveyed; and personal social integration and valued social participation. These are all elaborated in standard 3- and 4-day introductory SRV training, and briefly described in Wolfensberger, 1998, 103-127.)

Other competencies related to serving upon people. Also, there is a very wide range of additional skills needed in the conduct of service. These include what are sometimes called "clinical skills," such as–depending on the service domain–knowledge of child development, understanding of the neuromuscular system, knowledge about deafness or blindness or autism or dementia, knowing what mysterious or rare symptoms are apt to mean, etc. But beyond such clinical knowledge and skills, there are yet other areas of knowledge that may be relevant for certain kinds of service, such as how to set and stay within a budget for a household or an agency, how to cook and clean, how to operate a table saw, how to recruit work contracts, how to persuade potential opponents or supporters, how to positively reinforce desired behaviors and avoid even unintentionally reinforcing undesired ones, how to turn an invalid in bed, etc.

Competencies above and beyond both SRV and service. Then there is just plain common sense and good judgment, not to mention foresight and wisdom, for making good decisions. For example, where what would be optimally role-valorizing for a party is not presently attainable, what is there that is good and beneficial that can be achieved? What is defensible even if far from ideal? In light of current constraints (the kinds of non-programmatic issues mentioned earlier), what can one live with? PASSING can help in making such decisions, because different SRV implications have different weights in PASSING, with these weights indicative of their relative importance, and so–other things being equal–one could opt to pursue that implication which is more heavily weighted (and therefore more important) over one that is less heavily weighted (and therefore less important), in situations where both implications cannot at present be achieved. But PASSING is only

a tool for making judgments; it does not itself supply good sense.

There is also the challenge, or the competence, of being able to distinguish SRV from ideologies, values, passions (see Thomas, 2011, and chapters four and five in Wolfensberger, 2012). A person may be able to distinguish them theoretically, but in their own teaching and implementation efforts may neither be clear, nor be able to say "here is where I'm making a decision about SRV or its implementation based on my own values." We are probably even less likely to be clear, and to be able to admit, when it is our passions that are driving us on an issue.

Also, there are two very important skills that at least at one time the broader training culture of which first normalization and then SRV was a part had explicitly tried to teach. One is skills of critical analysis, as can be taught via the application of PASSING, where users have to parse whatever is being analyzed, differentiate what is good and what is not good about it, determine whether a shortcoming is "merely poor" or exceedingly harmful, and whether a positive practice is "merely good" or excellent, and then make an overall judgment. Of course, such analytic skills need to be applied not just to services but to other things as well.

The second skill that the normalization- and SRV-related training culture once explicitly taught is self-evaluation and mutual critique, including a mindset of openness and non-defensiveness, e.g., about our ideas, products and practices. While this is partly a mindset, as noted, there are also elements of knowledge and skill to it. For instance, there are ways of conducting self- and other-evaluation that increase the likelihood of its being useful, there are known ways of reducing defensiveness to feedback, etc. Both the mindset and the practice of self-evaluation and mutual critique are important for many reasons; among them are that they help to combat pride, they can help to avoid at least some big mistakes, they contribute to a culture of innovation, and they help stave off objectification, bureaucratization, and even ossification.

Challenge posed by the fact that competency in SRV is insufficient for SRV dissemination and implementation. The challenge associated with all this can be fairly clearly and easily spelled out: the SRV training culture has aspired to teach SRV, and only some parts of the SRV training culture have aspired to teaching skills of critical analysis, both self- and other-evaluation, and the maintenance of low-defensiveness. Only some people in the SRV training culture have aspired to teaching skills of SRV implementation. Yet both people who end up deeply competent in SRV, and those who have only a passing knowledge of it, may not possess other needed skills, and this constitutes a limitation on how far and how well they will be able to implement even that SRV which they know. For instance, imagine a service manager who knows all about image and competency enhancement, and who is creative in conceptualizing realistic valued roles for service recipients–but who consistently overspends and cannot see to it that service settings are kept clean. Or imagine generation after generation of new service workers who, through their exposure to a wide dissemination of SRV ideas, do appreciate the importance of valued roles for those they serve–but who have no or very little clinical knowledge of the impairments of their recipients. For example, as regards very severely impaired service recipients, SRV-trained servers might be very attentive to image enhancement and to ascribed or attributed roles for them. But the servers may be ignorant as to how to pursue competency enhancement for such persons so as to work towards competency-contingent roles for them; or they may have very unrealistic notions about what competency progress is feasible for such persons, or is feasible as the next step, etc.

This could conceivably be addressed by those college, university and other service worker preparation programs that incorporate SRV teaching. But there is only a small number of colleges and universities where SRV is explicitly taught, and

even there it is not necessarily well-integrated with the instilling of clinical competencies.

As regards self- and other-evaluation and critique, one of the places where this is still seen as important is in the North American SRV Council. Yet as was noted in a presentation by Raymond Lemay at the Fifth International SRV Conference in Australia in 2011, a large number and wide range of presentations are offered at the SRV conferences, but without any analysis and critique of them. So at least this opportunity to both practice and learn critical analysis of SRV issues and decisions is thereby lost to the SRV movement.

Also, as Dr. Wolfensberger noted in one of his presentations to the Third International SRV Conference in Calgary in 2003, the SRV movement as a movement has not done so well in attending to the masterful implementation of demonstration models (again, see chapter six in Wolfensberger, 2012), in part because additional, non-SRV skills are needed to do so

The Extension of SRV Into New Service Territories, New Geographical Areas & New Cultural Territories is Fraught with Potential Errors

Both this third challenge, and the last one I will present, have to do with what at least the North American SRV Council has been calling the "development" of SRV, meaning the evolution and elaboration of the theory itself.

One such challenge has to do with trying to extend or expand the applicability of SRV to locales and to fields beyond those in which it originally developed. As most readers know, SRV grew out of normalization, and normalization originated in the service field of mental retardation, and in the locale of Scandinavia. The first expansion was geographic: normalization was brought to North America, first by one of its Scandinavian inventors (Bengt Nirje) at the invitation of North American service reformers, and then its dissemination there continued largely through the efforts of Dr. Wolf Wolfensberger and those whom he trained. Then normalization began to spread to some other English-speaking lands, and then, via Francophone Canada, to some French-speaking lands as well.

The second expansion occurred when Dr. Wolfensberger formulated his version of normalization (Wolfensberger, 1972) as being applicable not only to mentally retarded people, but to any people in societally "deviant" status, and eventually to anyone in devalued status in their society. Thus, for example, normalization could be applied to mentally disordered people, to physically impaired people, to the poor, and to members of devalued racial groups, as well as to the mentally retarded. Later, when Dr. Wolfensberger reconceptualized his version of normalization as Social Role Valorization (Wolfensberger, 1983, 1984, 1985), he retained this broad applicability. However, despite this expansion, and despite the fact that much teaching of first normalization and then SRV interpreted them as broadly applicable to all societally devalued classes, still the great majority of participants in normalization and SRV training (and probably of readers of the normalization and SRV books) have been people in the field of impairment, and the majority of those have been in the field of mental retardation specifically.

The challenge associated with this expansion (in both training and implementation) is that in trying to get SRV into other fields where it would also be applicable–poverty, for instance, or services to refugees and immigrants, or criminal justice, and even the field of mental health–SRV proponents may be anywhere from naïve to prideful about what they do know, and what they need to know, in order to be accurate and credible regarding the interpretation and application of SRV in these domains. Pride is especially apt to enter in about what the SRV proponent does not know. One of the propositions underlying SRV is that there is much universality to the realities of devaluation, negative role-casting and role-valorization. If these propositions are true, and if what is posited as universal is, in fact, uni-

versal, then to that degree SRV must be applicable in other fields and locales, and some of those applicabilities will be obvious. An example of identifying the obvious applicabilities can be found in chapter seven of Wolfensberger, 2012, where implications of SRV to criminal detention are outlined. As another example, let us look briefly at applying SRV to immigrant refugees. It is obvious that whenever immigrant refugees arrive in a new land where the culture and language are not their own, they are apt to end up in devalued or at least marginal work roles, typically because of what is a local competency impairment (their inability to speak the language of the new land), perhaps combined with other devalued characteristics (such as ethnic identity and/or appearance, and perhaps native customs), even though they may have held very highly valued competency-contingent roles in their native land. Thus, it is equally obvious that if one wanted to role-valorize such immigrant refugees in a new land, it would be important to attend to enhancing their competency with the language of the new land, and to seek to capitalize as much as possible on their past valued roles. As well, one would try to practice consciousness of the things that immigrant refugees who are not fluent in the language of their new land would naturally be likely to do, and if these would contribute to their devaluation, then one would try to avoid these. For instance, people tend to congregate together with those who speak their language–but a congregation of refugee immigrants who speak a different language, and perhaps look different and have different customs and practice a different religion to boot, is likely to be subjected to distantiation and devaluation by the majority population. In this example, we can see that someone who knows SRV would easily be able to know some things that would be role-valorizing or role-degrading even without specific knowledge of the culture and background of the immigrants.

But, there may also be all sorts of subtleties that the SRV proponents are not aware of; nor may the SRV proponents in a domain of service to which SRV is new be knowledgeable about the history of this domain, all its non-programmatic constraints, its current "hot button" issues, etc. So the challenge is how to promote SRV in these other areas without overstepping one's own knowledge and competency and therefore making mistakes that could harm the dissemination and acceptance of SRV, and devalued and marginal parties to whom it would be applied.

As regards the expansion or extension of SRV into new locales, there have also been recent efforts to spread SRV into lands where neither the English language, nor the Anglo culture, have been dominant. Such efforts require much, much preparation, and optimally would be undertaken by people who are both fluent in the native language of the new locale and deeply familiar with its native culture. Others ought to go with fear and trembling into such lands. Ideally, the bringing of SRV to a new culture would be done by what we can call a bridge culture composed of people who are natives of the "new" or "SRV mission" land, who would first spend much time acquiring SRV competency in a place where SRV is already thoroughly known and well-taught, and then try to make SRV inroads when they return to their own land, perhaps drawing on others for consultancy. Yet such a bridge culture almost never happens. One reason is because it is time-consuming and expensive, and the SRV movement has been short of such resources–yet another non-programmatic constraint. Other reasons that people may be tempted to go quickly, and with insufficient preparation, to territories that are new to SRV are because it is seen as an opportunity that one "cannot afford to miss," and/or because an invitation comes from a party one wants to please, and/or because the plight of some devalued group in this new locale is so wretched. Also, one of our colleagues who has been involved in the transfer of SRV to non-Anglo cultures pointed out that it may be seen as very glamorous to go to other lands to teach, and much less glamorous

and glorious to do the work of teaching SRV, and especially implementing SRV, back home. Some parties may even desire travel and adventure, and/or to be seen as a "world expert." Thus, there can be both noble and generous motives for such expansion, as well as baser ones, and regardless of the nature of the motives, the transfer of SRV to new fields and new locales is going to be affected by non-programmatic considerations.

Also, searching analysis and critique should accompany such expansions, yet these expansions may be done with very little of this, perhaps because the expansions are led by solo flyers and/or by people who do not see the need for such.

The Continued Development of SRV in the Absence of Its Inventor, Theorist, Foremost Writer & Teacher

The last challenge I want to present also has to do with SRV development, and is a relatively new one, namely now that the originator of SRV has gone (Wolf Wolfensberger died in February 2011), how exactly will SRV change and mutate? For instance, if someone has ideas about a new definition of SRV, or a new twist to the definition, how should that be introduced? How should such changes be judged to be improvements or perversions? As noted earlier, the easier tends to drive out the more complex, and in our contemporary society, what is new also tends to supplant what is old, so if someone invents a simpler formulation of SRV, that newer version may be embraced in preference to the older and more complex definition, regardless whether it is a valid or more valid formulation. If someone thinks they have come up with a better idea than SRV, will they try to drive out SRV or will they go and start a new movement? After all, as Dr. Wolfensberger said, he "sociologized" and broadened the Scandinavians' version of normalization as he taught it, but his version of normalization was never accepted by them (see Wolfensberger, 1999). On the one hand, if a theory does not develop it will die, as some of our SRV colleagues keep reminding us. Therefore, some suggest "let a thousand flowers bloom, even if some of them are dandelions." In other words, let many variations and interpretations of SRV come to birth and live, so that the SRV culture thrives. But at the same time, ideas (including theories) can be so widely and variably interpreted that the original idea is no longer recognizable in the descendants. For instance, when normalization was a new concept, it was subjected to a great many misunderstandings and outright degradations and perversions in a short period of time, as extensively documented in a 1980 chapter "The Definition of Normalization: Update, Problems, Disagreements, and Misunderstandings" (Wolfensberger, 1980). In fact, with normalization, it was almost "a thousand flowers bloomed, and 90% of them were weeds." Indeed, it was in part in response to this painful experience of encountering, and having to refute, one misunderstanding or misinterpretation of normalization after another that two things happened: (a) that SRV was invented, and (b) that a set of standardized teaching materials was developed for the conduct of those introductory SRV training workshops that were intended to be in-depth, for people of good minds, and who had the interest and capacity for SRV teaching leadership (Thomas, unpublished). This tension between on the one hand preserving, or wanting to preserve, a set formulation and explanation of a theory, and on the other hand variation and innovation with the theory, possibly even to the point where the variations are so different from the original as to constitute an entirely new theory, illustrates once more the concept of mutual antagonism and tension covered earlier.

The North American SRV Council has as one of its purposes to serve a function of consideration, deliberation, and even judgment of proposed new SRV ideas. And at least members of that Council believe that the Council as a body–working together, deliberating even at a plodding pace, and discerning–will be able to come to reasonably good decisions on such matters. But people out-

side the Council might not agree, and the Council has no "power" other than making known its opinions and conclusions, as well as the rationales for its conclusions. Also, bodies such as the Council are virtually never perceived to have the same credibility and perceived authority as single individuals who went before them. (This perception is apt to exist regardless of the actual merit of the decisions made by individuals or collectives, but the perception does affect how any decisions perceived to be less authoritative would be accepted.)

At the moment, at least to my knowledge, no one is looking to revise SRV, though because the human service field as a whole is enamored of whatever is a new craze, we must expect that any number of things will be advanced as superior to SRV merely because they are newer than SRV. Also, at the moment, at least those who believe strongly in the validity of SRV and its tremendous power to bring the good things of life to those to whom it is applied, are looking to continue to disseminate and implement SRV (including dissemination via teaching and writing) for as long as possible because SRV is so valid and powerful. How long this momentum will be maintained depends to some extent on the development of skilled SRV teaching leaders who are both able and willing–even committed–to continuing to disseminate SRV, and teaching others to do so (that is the deep intense training emphasis, mentioned earlier). Also, to some extent it depends on the continuation of an SRV writing culture, and on the composition of major works–not just articles--on SRV, and on their broad dissemination (that is the broad and wide dissemination thrust). Among the things that the SRV movement desperately needs to have writing about, and dissemination of, is reports, stories, how-tos, etc., of the implementation of SRV, and lessons that can be learned from such implementation. Some of these reports of implementation might even meet the criteria for controlled research studies, which might give SRV greater academic credibility and standing, though I at least am not confident of this.

Conclusion

In addition to the four challenges and dilemmas that I have presented here, I can conceive of yet others in SRV training, dissemination and implementation. For instance, as I explained in an earlier article in this journal (Thomas, 2012), I believe it is important that SRV be situated in a true picture of its societal context, service, and human context, namely as subservient to values, ideologies and passions, and as not capable of defeating either powerful societal dynamics or human nature. This obviously presents a challenge as to how to teach SRV, what to include when one is teaching about SRV and what not to, what else to teach that is above or beyond SRV and how to interpret it, etc.–and of course all of this is also affected by considerations of who one is teaching to. It also presents challenges to SRV implementation, because the societal, the service, and the human context will all affect what SRV measures can be implemented, and how far, and for or with whom. A long-existing and still existing challenge is the recruitment, training and keeping of newer and/or younger people in SRV, for both its dissemination and its implementation.

However, it is only the four challenges or dilemmas elaborated above on which I had prepared thoughts for my initial presentation, and on which I have written here.

Once more, I offer this material as a thought paper, not any kind of definitive pronouncement. If nothing else, I hope these ideas have been consciousness-raising and thought-provoking, and that those who see the validity of SRV might now be alert as to how we can help each other to address these challenges and dilemmas in ways that will benefit the SRV movement, and through it, the many devalued people who are our concern. ☙

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Implementing Social Role Valorization Theory–It Is Not About Changing the World

Raymond Lemay

> *"The world is going to hell in a wheelbarrow, and this is not going to do retarded people any good" (Wolfensberger, 1994).*

> *"The optimist proclaims that we live in the best of all possible worlds, and the pessimist fears this is true" (James Branch Cabell).*

Introduction

I have been asked to respond to Susan Thomas' thought paper (Thomas, 2013) that appears in this issue of *The SRV Journal*, but I will also survey her comments in a previous piece (Thomas, 2012) about "SRV in the Larger Societal Context." Thomas addresses the state of Social Role Valorization (SRV), the human service system and indeed the world. These two papers by Susan Thomas hold together as a kind of urbi et orbi assessment (state of the city and the world), and are in keeping with a number of positions taken and stated by Dr. Wolfensberger over the years, including in his many workshops on "How to function morally, coherently and adaptively in a world that is disfunctional, including its human services," as well as in his articles on 'the signs of the times' (1989) and "How to comport oneself in an era of shrinking resources" (2010). The writings of other authors reflect similar positions (cf. Grant, 1969; Lasch, 1991; and McKnight, 1995). I will be drawing on two presentations I made at the 5th International Social Role Valorization Conference held in Canberra, ACT, Australia in September 2011 (Lemay, 2011a *&* b).

SRV: Urbi et Orbi

Thomas (2013) lists 4 challenges to the training, dissemination and implementation of SRV (Wolfensberger, 1983; 2013). The first is her perception that a broad and shallow dissemination approach will displace a narrow and deep training strategy that is essential for the training of trainers. In other words, she worries that getting the word out might interfere with creating a competent leadership cadre. I should point out that no evidence is provided for any of this. We have only minimal information about what is going on in terms of dissemination, and we really do not know whether dissemination is actually interfering with training and vice versa.

Her second challenge reminds us that competence in SRV is not sufficient for either the dissemination or the adaptive implementation of SRV. However, the literature on training and implementation is not surveyed here, which is unfortunate, as it could provide grounding to an important discussion that, to my knowledge, has not occurred in SRV circles. Teaching SRV in new territories and cultures is a third challenge that might lead to the development of strategies and decisions for which teachers and trainers might be unprepared. And finally, she notes the major chal-

lenge of how will SRV continue to develop now that its originator and foremost developer, Wolf Wolfensberger, has passed away?

These challenges and accompanying discussion are likely sobering, but at least they speak to the issue of implementing SRV, and do not seem to suggest that it should not be done.

In her 2012 article, Thomas shares with us a number of "hard things" (p. 34) about the state of the world, the future prospects of human service, the people who depend on such structures, and SRV's "place" in all this. Possibly overwhelmed by the many positive stories told by other presenters at the Canberra 2011 conference (and previous ones), she writes:

> *One danger is that the horror stories may get overlooked, forgotten, repressed into unconsciousness because they are unpleasant, and because we like to 'look on the bright side' and not be pessimistic. With the glory stories, we also are in danger of being self-deceptive about shortfalls (p. 27-28).*

I'll admit to being puzzled about this fear, because my experience of SRV conferences and events is that they do not typically overflow with good news. However, Thomas' article is something of a plea for us not to be naïve. Thomas lists six predictions, or observations, that we should keep in mind as we seek to teach and possibly implement SRV. Her first point is that horror stories will always outnumber the good stories. It is hard to know what to make of this statement about quantity and proportion that lacks data and references. The second point notes that "a post-production, service-based economy contains dynamics that work counter to liberation of devalued people from their devaluation" (p. 28). But hasn't it always been thus? The Industrial Revolution was clearly exploitative of the lower classes. The medieval guilds excluded, and there were many poor people in the Middle Ages, not to mention at all times and in all places. The third point is that many devalued people are at grave risk of being made dead. Fourthly, joining many other critics, Thomas posits that our current way of life in developed countries is unsustainable and that the inevitable economic collapse will be particularly bad for devalued people. Her fifth point is that it is likely that the current fiscal constraints on services will continue and even worsen. And finally her sixth point is that SRV is constrained by the messiness of the world and the people who live in it, and thus subject to ideologies, values and passions. Given the tone and content, Thomas likely fears that her words might end up being a bit discouraging, and she closes her article with the reassurance that though there are other approaches, SRV is as sound a strategy as one can find to address social devaluation: "However, merely because these things can be learned and found outside of SRV is not in itself any reason to leave SRV, to cease to teach and disseminate it" (p. 35).

But I fear that the final reassuring words at the end of these two articles are simply not enough to encourage continued action. For instance, to what end should one engage the human service system if it is on the verge of collapse, and if it (the system or "empire" as some refer to it) does much more harm than good?

This article serves as a response to many of the points made by Thomas, and made earlier by Dr. Wolfensberger. I am by temperament more of an optimist than a pessimist, though I do have my moments, and I have spent my whole adult life working in the professional human services domain; these two points might discredit me and will at the outset explain my somewhat different read of the world, the human service system and SRV. However, this is not just a simple glass half full versus half empty difference that I am suggesting here. I think that the problem of Thomas' two papers is that they give the readers no good reason to implement SRV–they are not calls to action and provide little of the hope necessary to engage in action.

Are We Living in a Special Time?

Something has to give, something will give. Perhaps many things will give. What will happen then may be too big for us to be able to imagine, but we do get glimpses when things give on a smaller scale, as during natural disasters, wars and other catastrophes. What happens to devalued people then? How far will all their rights, self-determinations and various "best practices" take them then? In many such catastrophes throughout history, we have seen that devalued people get abandoned, left to their own devices, even killed outright.

As I said, the indicators are all lined up that at least one something very bad will happen. Should we not prepare for it, and especially, should we not try to prepare so that those who are most vulnerable, who always suffer most when bad things happen, are seen to? Specifically, which valued roles will be most protective of people then, and therefore which should be given priority, when the good things of life that are available are very few? (Thomas, 2012, 30).

There are a number of issues that intersect here, and that Thomas suggests need to be taken into account if one wants to seriously entertain implementing SRV. I find myself in quiet agreement with some of the points that are raised, though I find that much is missing from the analysis; for instance, strong predictions are made about many of the bad things that could happen in the future or even are happening now, but time frames are missing. That things will get worse is in fact a safe prediction, based as it is on the second law of thermodynamics–Wolfensberger's quote at the beginning is a common expression of this. However, much of what we know about the universe since the Big Bang, the brief history of humanity, and the growing complexity of human organizations all stand at odds with the second law (Rubi, 2008). Though we should expect the insights of thermodynamics to be right in the end, time frames are notoriously hard to fathom and events hard to predict; the question of course is when and how quickly? And in the meantime, for how long shall this run last? Is there still room for new efficiencies and effectiveness of processes? Who knows? These insights and debates are not peculiar to SRV thinkers and writers but are quite mainstream, even in the mainstream management literature where one can read Jim Collins (2011), an eminent management guru, who writes:

> *The dominant pattern of history isn't stability, but instability and disruption. Those of us who came of age amidst stable prosperity in developed economies in the second half of the 20th century would be wise to recognize that we grew up in a historical aberration. How many times in history do people operate inside a seemingly safe cocoon, during an era of relative peace, while riding one of the most sustained economic booms of all time? For those of us who grew up in such environments–and especially for those who grew up in the United States–nearly all our personal experience lies within a rarified slice of overall human history, very unlikely to repeat itself in the 21st century and beyond (Collins, 2011, 193)*

The point is that SRV practitioners or theorists can claim no special knowledge here, and in a sense such knowledge is irrelevant to the narrow issue of whether or not to implement SRV, or any other service reform for that matter. Indeed, the "running down" of any system and its dysfunction are further reasons for implementing reforms in an effort to stem the tide and possibly reverse its course.

What seems to underlie these two articles is a suggestion that the challenges today are qualitatively different than they were in the past, in the sense we are living in a special time of dysfunctionality and (near) collapse. Societal collapse, suggested by Thomas in 2012, can of course come very quickly; after all, in our lifetimes we have seen the collapse of the Soviet Union over a

two-year period–it had not been predicted and it happened remarkably quickly. However, the thing about this collapse is that it was unpredictable, a feature of the complex nonlinear world that we live in. Moreover, it's important to note that Russia has not disappeared, and the communities that made up the Soviet Union have not reverted to primitive social structures. There's no doubt that the social, economic and political upheaval that occurred (and in some places continues to evolve) was (and is) especially difficult for the poor and for people dependent on the human service system, such as it was, such as it is. But life was also quite harsh before; for most, the situation now is likely the same as before.

But at the end of the day, given the scope of what is being predicted, how can one really prepare? It's not just the rights and best practices that will be ineffective, but it's quite likely that many protective roles will simply be inoperative. People who typically predict and prepare for catastrophe are likely to engage in many strategies and most of these are ones of retreating from the world, and engaging in the creation of intentional communities. How does one (why should one) teach SRV to a human service organization if we are on the brink of collapse?

SRV & the Societal Context

We must take into account the world as it is (and we should speculate as to its future prospects), but all of this is independent of SRV–non-programmatic if you will–and is of importance to any of the approaches, methods and schemes that humans can think up. There is nothing in any of this that could inform us on the desirability or feasibility of SRV-inspired reforms, or how more or less effective they might be. Indeed, we should expect that in such complexity and dysfunctionality, the need for reform or at least some change would be paramount; there is much to be done and much to be improved.

Wolfensberger (n.d.) has extensively discussed systems complexity and dysfunctionality, and has warned of the dangers of trying to fix that which is inherently unfixable. Many thinkers and authors who have weighed in on this issue have concluded that the best approaches to system complexity (including so-called 'risk management') are relational (interactions between people) rather than instrumental or procedural (Senge, 2006; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001; Buckingham & Coffman, 1999). This seems coherent with the growing debate in American psychology, about what works in therapy, that has found that relational factors (called "alliances") are much more important than the service processes or techniques that some spend careers mastering (Wampold, 2001; 2007). There is some agreement (not a consensus, however) that the world and humans are not perfectible, though the hubris of many might seem to contradict the insight. But change, improvement and reform are best viewed as processes and actions rather than endpoints, and they will unlikely lead to perfection or utopia. Nobody in the circles I run in has a copy of *Walden Two* (Skinner, 1948). Indeed, it's not so much utopian thinking that is the problem nowadays, but the risk management strategies that lawyers, accountants, policymakers and bureaucrats have forced upon the unsuspecting citizenry in order to keep at bay many of the catastrophes and other bad things alluded to by Thomas. The successes of technology, but especially the ubiquity of legal process (it is called due process after all) as an ersatz justice, and the successes of the guilds of accountants and lawyers have inspired all manner of checklists, procedures and reporting requirements to keep disaster at bay. It is not the utopians we should worry about, but the accountants and lawyers. Surprisingly this was not one of the bad things alluded to by Thomas in either of her articles. We will come back to this a little later on.

Ubiquity: The Mother of Necessity

We might agree that the world is in decay. We might agree that there are many, many things wrong with it. But

there it is. It is the world in which the valued and devalued find society together and apart. As for the human service system, it is part of the world. It is highly structured and highly formalized, and it will persist and endure, if only because its great mass and weight gives it immense inertia. Unless some cataclysm totally destroys our present social structures and institutions, state-sanctioned professionally organized and formally delivered services are going to be with us for a long time and this service system will capture, if you will, many a client, and most devalued and many valued people.

The post-production economies have resulted in a professional human service system that keeps a huge class of society in perpetual "clientage," as Wolfensberger and Thomas (1994) have called it. What we know of the post-primary production systems suggests that the service system feeds on clients, society needs devalued people, and the business of America (and of the Western democracies) is now human service. Moreover, the professional-bureaucratic human service system, in its capitalist, socialist and communist incarnations, is the model to emulate for developing countries. One need only read any of the United Nations' varied pronouncements on children, or people with disabilities to confirm this (Lemay, 1994).

We cannot ignore the human service system nor should we. Nor should we hope to fix it in the sense of making it perfect. We'd be lying to ourselves and lying to others and, in any event, it would probably be a profoundly immoral act–a waste of time–or at the very least misguided and naive. Nevertheless, the very ubiquity of the formal service system makes adaptive response a necessity. We cannot ignore this world where a significant proportion of people find employment, and where the great majority of devalued individuals find refuge, no matter how dismal. Even people who engage in the personalism advocated by Wolfensberger (n.d.) will be unable to practice it in a vacuum. They will have to meet the service system head on because it is inescapable; it has become the air that our social structure breathes. Informal society takes the professional service system for granted. Our generation is not the first to be totally socialized to such a way of living. Ivan Illich (2005) has called the transformation of personal responsibility (informal service) into institutional (collective) service "the corruption of the best is the worst" (*corruptio optimi quae est pessima*). Illich also points out that this battle was lost some 1600 years ago.

Indeed, part of the challenge is that informal society has now come to consider formal and institutional structures as entitlements. In Canada, public expenditures for the formal system of human service (education, health and social services) has gone from 52.3% in 1990-91 to 62.1% in 2008-2009–370 billion dollars cdn (Statistics Canada, 2009)–and taxpayers want their share, whether it is good or bad. (Perversely, equity seems to have become more important than effectiveness, or maybe it was always thus?). Proposed and real cutbacks generate a great deal of controversy and public strife–particularly in the informal realm. Some families and some intentional communities will be able to live separate and apart from this massive social welfare infrastructure, but with increasing difficulty. There is common agreement, at least in certain segments of the intelligentsia, that the human service system as it stands is unaffordable. Wolfensberger's (2010) wise counsel on "how to comport ourselves in an era of diminishing resources" should of course be taken seriously. That the human service system will be transformed over the next two decades (as it has radically changed over the last five decades) is likely a safe prediction, but what it will become is anyone's guess. Interestingly, another question not addressed by Thomas or Wolfensberger is what role the purveyors of SRV might play in all this, and how SRV might be a useful framework around which to develop more cost-effective human service strategies, for instance, which promote solutions that mobilize

informal community and family-based interventions with the formal human service system in a subsidiary support role. The training and implementation of SRV tends to occur at a clinical or programmatic level where current structures and government requirements are taken for granted, though likely bemoaned as "non-programmatic" complications. However, SRV theory's ecological implications (Wolfensberger, 2012 b) provide much material and guidance for acting at the macro-societal level. The question then becomes, should it be attempted or is all for naught? And if it is attempted, do we call it reform or simply tinkering? Does it matter, and in the meantime can one stand idly by?

The Formal Versus Informal Debate

With the formal human service system increasingly characterized as a Leviathan, there is a danger of romanticizing informality, as if it necessarily produces happy endings and positive outcomes. Over the years, I've encountered innumerable situations where there are blatant conflicts between the interests of parents, other family members and dependent members of such families–and not only in child welfare (my field of endeavour for 32 years), but overwhelmingly in the so-called voluntary sector of service. I've encountered many children ejected from their families for a variety of reasons, but where because of guilt or justification, parents will refuse the idea of placement in a home-sharing situation, in a foster family or with a relative; "if our family can't do the job, then no family can" is the sentiment I often heard expressed. Providing employment and independent living situations for many adults with developmental disabilities can be very difficult because of well-meaning but over-protective families.

Wolfensberger (2003) in his book to families of children with significant impairments provides good advice for parents who are at risk of compounding the challenges faced by their offspring. Indeed, low expectations are an often encountered problem at all stages of a child, youth or adult's development. Eric Emerson, in a recent talk (2011; see also Emerson & Einfeld, 2011), suggested that 5 to 15% of adults with developmental disabilities have serious behavior problems, and that in many cases this could be related back to indulgent or poor parenting (instead of organic or phenotypic causes).

This should not be altogether surprising as the parenting literature has documented the relatively poor parenting skills of most parents in Canada (Chao & Willms, 2003) and the USA (Baumrind, 1989). Parents of children and young people with special needs are not a special case of parenting–children with disabilities are not selectively born to the best parents and the best families. Families are part of this very same society that gives us the human service system, and overall it seems to produce quite mediocre parenting. Tellegen and Sanders (2013), who show that children with special needs are particularly sensitive to poor parenting, document how parenting training (provided by professionals) can improve child outcomes and will likely prevent many adult difficulties.

In any event, families and the informal realms of life are in the same universe and reality as the formal systems that are so dysfunctional; if it is in and of the world, it is likely dysfunctional. Chesterton (1991) commented that "the defence of domesticity is not that it is always happy, or even that it is always harmless. It is rather that it does involve, like all heroic things, the possibilities of calamity and even of crime" (p. 84). Indeed, one only need remember the recent history of the parent movement, and the creation of ARCs and AMRs and many of the now bemoaned poor service models that were therein developed and are still with us today. Recently, in Toronto, a group of parents of young people with autism announced the building of a new institution for their autistic children (Baluja, 2011). These parents, with no help from the official formal system (but likely with the connivance of many professionals) are choosing bricks and mortar over in-

formality. Michael Kendrick's (2011) suggestion that service plans and money should be handed over to parents and families, for the sake of an ideological commitment to "empowerment," seems thus a bit naïve and beside the point. Indeed, he acknowledges that:

> *It also makes clear that while empowerment around service governance can be obtained, this does not always ensure that the resultant service necessarily is going to be of high quality, nor does it assure that the person's needs will always be met by the resulting service arrangement (p. 67).*

This is hardly the kind of strategy that meets the challenges posed by Thomas. At the end of the day, the real issue is quality, and more exactly client (service recipient) life outcomes. It is hard to imagine that an oppressed and poorly served developmentally handicapped individual will find consolation in the fact that his circumstances have come about as the result of "empowerment" or that his family has decided that it is in his best interest. The parents who created ARC services and the more recent example of families setting up a new institution were and are empowered. Of course families should be involved, and service recipients engaged, in exercising as much autonomy as possible, but the outcome has to be at the forefront of considerations. And that is where SRV comes in. It is about outcomes: the good things of life and the transaction of valued social roles. It provides clear and unambiguous goals, surely difficult to reach, but tangible and understandable. Where empowerment as described is merely procedural–it attempts to divide the activity and decision-making (mostly it seems to be about divvying up the money) between informal and formal realms–SRV proposes that we instead focus on how the person with a disability is spending his days, and how to close the experiential gap between devalued and valued role identities.

Einstein, no slouch when it came to theorizing, commented that "Perfection of means and confusion of goals seem–in my opinion–to characterize our age;" in essence, capturing the problem of procedural mindsets which forget purpose and goal. There is no useful purpose in trying to choose between the formal and informal realms because they march in lockstep together. As individuals we live and breathe in both worlds. It sometimes seems that SRV aficionados pine for an era of medieval hospitality when being of service was unambiguous. I am quite sure that medieval hospitality had its high points, but it is unlikely that it was all positive and successful. In any event, the world has become much more complex.

But it is not only a question of systems or of confused goals and increasing complexity, but it is also the drama of divided loyalties. Paul Ricoeur, the French philosopher, in an interview commented on the complexification of society and its impact on individuals and their roles.

> *As we move towards increasingly complex societies, conflicts are bound to multiply. Very concretely, this means that each of us comes to wear so many masks and occupy so many roles that there is no **master-role** that dominates and helps to make sense of it all … We are beings with multiple commitments and we are continuously obliged to negotiate with ourselves these multiple belongings and loyalties (Abel, 2012, p. 32. My translation, bold added).*

I think that one insight to pull from all this is that the world, the service system and even SRV must not distract us from our personal responsibilities for family (elderly parents, disabled siblings or children), friends and others. We must exercise fidelity to those who depend on us.

Devaluation & the Lessons of Bill F.

In 1989 the journal *Mental Retardation* published Wolf Wolfensberger's "Bill F.: Signs of the times read from the life of one mentally retarded man." This article is as an indictment

of the human service system. Some of Wolfensberger's conclusions are worth reproducing here because they do speak directly to the issue of implementing SRV, and how this might change the human service system.

> *Some may say that Bill's life was atypically bad for retarded persons, but we know better. The kinds of things that happened to him happen to innumerable others, though there are also innumerable variations, and an infinite creativity, in the perpetration of atrocities on socially devalued people. Nor is the issue of mental retardation the crucial one; the same realities apply to a broad spectrum of people at the lower end of societal valuation. What is particularly noteworthy in Bill's case is that unlike many devalued people, he did have several friends from the privileged and competent sectors of society, but the assaults on devalued people are so intense that often even efforts of several such defenders are not sufficient to prevent vast harm from being done. In one extreme case that we have encountered, a moderately retarded young man, dumped out of an institution, had at least a dozen competent associates in the community; and yet his problems, and the attacks on him, were so numerous that the efforts of all of these associates were absorbed to the point where they became stretched to exhaustion and still he only escaped into, at best, a tenuous marginality.*
>
> *Why is it that the professional literature in our field almost totally fails to reflect this aspect of the phenomenology of so many retarded people? Has the prevailing cultural insanity established a schizophrenia in which the phenomenology of the professional/scientific sector has little overlap with that of the people from whom it derives its identity and economic existence? (p. 372).*

How prototypical, in fact, was Bill F's life is only a secondary issue here. We might all agree that such experiences and outcomes are much more likely for people caught up in the human service system. But is Bill F.'s story a "sign of the times," or a story for all times and places? Bill F. was born into a very different service system than the one he ultimately died in; none of it ended up doing him much good. Moreover, his story does not only condemn the human service system for failing him, but also family, friends, neighbors and "innocent" bystanders. What is cautionary about stories like those of Bill F. is that they stand in stark contrast to the certainties and triumphalism of government, the social sciences and the professional human service system. We should of course be skeptical about the promises and claims made by researchers, theoreticians and policymakers. Indeed, there is a blooming cottage industry of very respected researchers and scientists who spend increasing amounts of time debunking the certainties and triumphalism of their colleagues and research institutions. The claims of dramatic effectiveness or change are to be discounted. Indeed, researchers and theoreticians increasingly agree (Brean, 2011; Fanelli, 2010; Ioannidis, 2005, 2008; Lilienfeld, 2007; Montcrief, 2008; Utall, 2001) that complex problems (and we should include in this category human problems) are hardly assailable through simple linear direct effects, and that we should be skeptical of any approach that claims anything more than modest effect sizes. It would seem that improvement where it might arise will likely be incremental, and that high quality will be exceptional and rare.

We can all, however, easily imagine different outcomes. This comes partly from our experience and knowledge of individuals in similar circumstances who have achieved different outcomes. At the 2011 SRV conference held in Canberra, Australia, I briefly presented Edward Woolacott's life (Lemay, 2011b), suggesting that because of normalization and SRV, such outcomes have possibly become more frequent. (I'll acknowledge that I

have no data to substantiate this claim, though I will try to address it as I briefly discuss PASSING results.) Mr. Woolacott, now in his 60s, after having lived some 30 years in an institution, is able to live a fulfilling life as a furniture refinisher. He is living with a good friend in a modest house in a lower middle-class community. In his life story, it is the professional human service system that made his current life circumstances possible; inspired by normalization, he was helped to reconnect with his family and he enjoys some of the good things of life. In keeping with his valued though modest place in society, his life conditions and experiences are as typical as possible. There is nothing extraordinary about Mr. Woolacott's life, indeed, his story is rather mundane, except that it stands in stark contrast to the story told of Bill F.

Thus, is Bill F.'s story a cautionary tale about how not to trust the human service system? Or is it the strong reminder that devaluation is ever present and that SRV-type initiatives are evermore needed to attempt to improve human service outcomes? Wolfensberger often pointed out that SRV would never be the measure of devaluation, but he maintained a certain hope, and never meant that SRV should not be implemented (Wolfensberger, 2012a). In a sense, the task at hand is to increase the likelihood of the rather mundane outcomes of a Mr. Woolacott and diminish the possibilities of tragedy such as the life and death of Bill F. As Mr. Woolacott moves to retirement his family and the community, and the professional services that support it, must continue to be ever vigilant and not let down their guard; what is SRV's (and our) role in all this?

Doing Things Right, or Doing the Right Things?

So what does SRV have to say about doing the right things for Mr. Woolacott and others? Thomas (2013) reminds us that there are four elements that make up a human service and these need to fit together in a model coherent way (Wolfensberger & Glenn, 1975; Wolfensberger, n.d.-a); these elements include "fundamental assumptions, the service recipients, the content given to recipients, and the processes by which the content is delivered." Part of the problem, as mentioned above, is that human services are becoming increasingly procedural–doing the right things–(Lemay, 2011c), where funders contract to purchase certain standardized processes to meet certain assessed needs, and where accountability is tied to demonstrating compliance with prescribed requirements. Risk management and procedural equity (the citizenry gets the same thing wherever they might live) are some of the justifications for this.

For instance, the Ontario government (in Canada) prescribes over 9,500 requirements (Commission to Promote Sustainable Child Welfare, 2010) that local children's aid societies must then report on. Individually, many of these requirements are on the face of it quite commonsensical; but taken in totality they are simply Kafka-esque. Such schemes force organizations, managers and employees to focus on their own activities and how they comply with prescribed standards (procedures), rather than look upon service recipients to see how they are doing (outcomes); such systems are about process efficiency–doing things right–rather than effectiveness–doing the right things–which could require varying and indeed changing the procedure to increase the likelihood of positive outcomes, never losing sight of the goal or "content." Barlow (2010), for instance, suggests that every intervention should be treated as a "single case experimental design for studying behavior change" (p. 15) where ideographic data feeds back into the ongoing treatment. As an intervention progresses, the interventionist must gauge the impact on the client and, "quite naturally, will hypothesize why and adapt the treatment accordingly" (p. 19). This is quite reminiscent of Wolfensberger's (1995) "If this then that" description of SRV modalities, but with an added feedback loop that assesses the outcome.

Persons (service recipients) and their situations vary considerably and it is unlikely that standard-

ized procedures could adequately address such variation; moreover, it is notoriously difficult to determine which part of a procedure (if any) is the causal agent that brings about this or that change (Wampold, 2001). Moreover, there is little that we do that has much of an evidence base (Lemay, 2011c), and even when we are dealing with a so-called "evidence-based practice," much is made about fidelity, when the emphasis should be on outcomes; when process issues become more important than content, we are faced with a fidelity of process versus loyalty to client dilemma.

SRV's emphasis on the goal of increasing access to the good things of life (what we could also call objective well-being) through valued social roles (Wolfensberger, 2013) is clearly about service recipients, and it seems that in many if not most cases, programs tend to underperform. If professionals, volunteers and family members are motivated by wanting to make a difference, then there is usually enough information on the poor outcomes of service recipients to cause concern and dissatisfaction. Many view PASS (Wolfensberger & Glenn, 1975) and PASSING (Wolfensberger & Thomas, 2007) results as a testament to the poor performance of the human service system. Certainly the experiences many of us have had through PASS and PASSING assessments provide much information to feed dissatisfaction. The aggregate results of such evaluations (Flynn, Lapointe, Wolfensberger & Thomas, 1991; Flynn, 1999; Flynn, Guirguis, Wolfensberger & Cocks, 1999) seem to be disheartening. However, it is possible to read the aggregate results of PASS and PASSING assessments in a number of other ways. For instance, the aggregate results constitute norms for comparison purposes; they are an average of all assessments (total scores) and the range of all assessments falls both below and above the average: there are some good (level 4 and level 5) and many bad assessment results (levels 1 and 2), and many more that fall into the top of level 2 and within level 3 results, which is termed "the expected level of performance." Both PASS and PASSING are demanding metrics. Level 5 results are ideal though attainable, but the reality is that, on average, most program total scores will fall between level 2 and level 4, and improvement, where it occurs, will likely be incremental and slow; going from level 1 to 2 or level 2 to 3 are improvements, and a developmental outlook on assessment results seems like an adaptive approach to program improvement. Level 5 results will be rare, but program improvement need not be. Elsewhere (Lemay, 2001), I have commented on similar assessment outcomes in private for-profit businesses where a variety of authors found only a few organizations from around the world that measured up when using demanding metrics: indeed, mediocrity is the rule and excellence is rare.

If there's one thing, however, that comes out loud and clear from PASS and PASSING assessments, it is that community services are somewhat better than institutional ones. Thus, SRV related tools seem to indicate that there has been improvement for an important portion of individuals with developmental disabilities, at least in countries where PASS and PASSING have been used. Reviews of deinstitutionalization research confirm this (Lemay, 2009). Overall the results might be disappointing and we can easily imagine better, but over time there has been improvement and, given the demands of the assessment metric, there is still much room for more improvement. At least for persons with developmental disabilities, the overall situation is now better than it was, and some of this can be attributed to normalization and SRV (Flynn & Lemay, 1999). This, I believe, is a fair reading of the results, such as they are, that gives a different argumentation for taking up SRV, and program evaluation: it will make a difference (to follow up the opening arguments, and just for the pleasure of stating it: SRV where applied seems to buck–at least temporarily–the second law of thermodynamics).

Optimism & Hope

Ultimately, the reason one would want to teach SRV is to change/improve the outcomes of individuals who receive hu-

man services. In such a scheme, dissemination seeks to create discontent with the status quo, or as Wolfensberger (2012a) put it, “Creating or Fueling Discontent with the Prevailing Situation, and Offering SRV as a ‘Hope’ ” (it is the subtitle of a section of chapter 6, p. 320). Indeed, it is discontent, or what Luecke (2003) calls dissatisfaction, that first motivates change, but that must quickly be replaced by the belief that something can be done, what is technically called “hope.”

> *… change agentry still needs one other dynamo to rally the discontented people, and that is something that might be crudely called ‘hope,’ by which I here mean rather narrowly the belief that if one actually engages in relevant action, there is a reasonable chance that something positive can be done about the situation with which there is discontent. Without such hope, most people sink into apathy, and some commit acts of despair, which can take the forms either of assault toward others or self-destructive behavior (Wolfensberger, 2012a, p. 323).*

But later, likely fearing that we will misunderstand, he adds,

> *That is why I want to clarify what I said earlier about ‘hope.’ I said that in this context, it consists of reasonable prospects of being able to implement some SRV measures, and to thereby be of greater benefit to needy people; it does not mean the prospect of rolling back a societal decision to embrace death (Wolfensberger, 2012a, p. 346).*

But then who would think it would or could? Of course, we must not get carried away; but one of the reasons that normalization was so engaging was its optimistic view of human development:

> *The developmental model takes an optimistic view of the modifiability of behavior, and usually it does not invest the differences of the retardate with strong negative value. Retardates, even if severely retarded, are perceived as capable of growth, development and learning (Wolfensberger, 1969, 81. See also Roos & McCann, 1977).*

The developmental model is also one of the core themes of SRV, and speaks to the expected outcomes of people who receive human services–they should do better, indeed do well. Hope and optimism, it seems, are not necessarily inconsistent with embracing SRV.

There are Tremendous Possibilities

We learn from mistakes and tragedies, but it is the success stories that tell us what is possible. These good stories confirm that in the human service system, one will find amongst the clients and amongst the paid staff (and amongst the many community folks intertwined with the system), some very good people, some very courageous people, people who want some direction and guidance, and people who might be willing to do things better. Wolfensberger (2002) speaks to this issue when describing the Nebraskans who actively participated in moving services to people with developmental disabilities “out of the darkness and into the light” (Schalock & Braddock, 2002). It is possible to engage these good folks, and even parts of the service system, in a discourse that might lead to some improvements. As a minimum, the outcome might be that individual professionals and even organizations might permit, support and even encourage personal-informal involvements with devalued persons. However, not discoursing with, or retreating from, the professional service realm reduces the likelihood of improvement.

On the one hand, SRV training can serve the lofty purpose of providing individual moral actors with adaptive strategies for doing good within a complex formalized service system. These service workers can make lives better and may even save

lives. We should not begrudge the clients of these workers the possibility of a better life (the good things of life). After all, the goal of SRV–increasing the likelihood that devalued persons will have access to the good things in life–is rather mundane. Nor should we begrudge individual human service workers the possibility of salvation, for the notion that the human service system might actually be a system for maintaining devaluation through clientage is certainly, at least at the outset, fairly shattering.

Moreover, there is that possibility of reform, albeit on a small scale. It is well known in business–and should be no less true in human service–that some organizations (Collins, 2001, 2005; Collins & Hansen, 2011), or parts of organizations (Buckingham & Coffman, 1999) will know moments of excellence where–because of vision and leadership and because of very good people–they will be remarkably successful in providing that which is best. Sometimes these moments will last a few years. Other times they might even last decades. It seems that the inertia of goodness is never as great as the inertia of terrible service. Nevertheless, for a while, the individuals served by these organizations are served very well indeed. L'Arche, the religiously inspired residential service network for handicapped individuals, is sometimes and in some places a prime example of this kind of human service excellence. ENCOR (a model community service system for handicapped individuals in eastern Nebraska) was another such service where many of the reforms structured in the 1960s persisted well into current times, even though the vision and the ideological commitment were long gone. Islands of excellence, if you will, in a sea of decay. After all, even the dictionary makes clear that excellence is rare. Teaching about the possibility of such once in a lifetime small moments of excellence should be very exciting. These service "models" might never catch on, but for a while very good things can happen to people for whom it might mean the difference between life and death. It is, of course, the operationalization of the Myth of Sisyphus. In a sense, this strategy suggests "reforming" the human service system one person at a time, one program at a time, and one agency at a time. We'll never get it done, but why not try with that first person, program and agency? And if we do get it done, it will have to be done again by the next generation. And if we do not achieve reform, even in one agency, we will have tried; an activity that has validity in its own right.

There are a lot of people engaged in the human service enterprise and it seems simply stupid not to engage such a system, and especially such a mass of individuals. There is a need to aggressively discourse with the human service system, to once again interact with it in a productive way, though not in the hope of systemic reform–utopia; we must outgrow that impulse and forever tame the beast. But SRV (and PASSING) provides wise counsel and useful strategies to those who want to take it up. We must find those who want to hear it and we must teach them well because by this, we will be able to assist a few persons who might otherwise live lives of profound devaluation.

Dissemination Versus Training

But the word is not getting out. Thomas (2013) surveys a variety of dissemination activities, but though it might be incomplete, it is clear that the word is not getting out. Normalization was a movement, but SRV, though influential likely because of its author, is still just an inkling. I would like to suggest that part of the problem stems from an overly-guarded training strategy that has prioritized the training of trainers (a narrow and deep approach to training–the "harder" part of training) over the dissemination of SRV (a broad and shallow activity–and the easier thing to do):

> *...it is well-known that what is easier to do tends to drive out what is harder to do. This means that there will be a tendency, even if not always fully actualized, for the*

> *easier and less demanding forms of teaching and dissemination of SRV to supplant, and even drive out, forms of teaching and dissemination which are more difficult and demanding (p. 20).*

Indeed, Thomas writes of dissemination as if it is in competition with training and the development of an SRV leadership capable of perpetuating the SRV training model. But I am not at all sure that the tension suggested by her actually exists; dissemination is not only training, it is a much broader endeavor that includes talks, publications, research, teaching, reports and advocacy. Dissemination, seen from the perspective of implementation (the ultimate goal), is how people get their first taste of an idea, and it is what gets them to pursue the idea. Dissemination might be, as Thomas suggests, broad and thin, but that thinness does not make it unimportant: it is in fact an essential component, the beginning of the change process–and it must be much broader or more frequent than training. If there is a training strategy (the trainer formation model, or TFM of the North American SRV Council could be viewed as the framework for such a strategy), I see very little evidence of a dissemination strategy. That is not to say that there is not considerable SRV activity around the world. However, the activity, such as it is, is varied, disparate and very localized. Today, there are no national, provincial or statewide SRV-based dissemination strategies or initiatives anywhere in the world, despite the fact that SRV has been referenced in a number of policy positions in various jurisdictions.

Indeed, in sum total, there are relatively few such activities going on in the world. But there is a training leadership strategy, at least for the North American SRV Council, where, in its Credentialing policy it affirms:

> *One of the major concerns of the above Council has been how to establish a **self-perpetuating training culture** that will bring forth a steady flow of people who are highly knowledgeable in Social Role Valorization (SRV), and who will conduct what the Council calls Track A SRV training events that recruit, train and screen people who will do the same thing in turn (i.e., recruit, train and screen yet other people) for* highest level SRV trainership *(p. 2, bold in original, plain text emphasis added).*

The Council has worried about two things: leadership and safeguarding training by ensuring that people interested in gaining recognition as SRV trainers do so through the use of very limited and highly demanding training events, referred to as "Track A." Of course, others are free to do otherwise. The North American Council is a small entity, but it is influential, not the least because the originator of SRV–the founder, so to speak–was a member and some of his closest associates are still involved.

But there is no equivalent attention paid to the problem of getting the word out, of systematically disseminating SRV. Indeed, the so-called Track A events are mostly attended by people who have little interest in pursuing SRV leadership or trainership. For such people, it is likely an inappropriate event, given its conceptual arduousness, to first hear about a theory that should initially energize and inspire. Wolfensberger (2012) has pointed out that normalization was much better received than SRV in part because people were avid to hear about alternatives to the dying institutional paradigm, but it is also likely that in the early 1970s, the normalization message was simply more accessible than current SRV training has become.

It is problematic to think in terms of dissemination and training as separate and that they can be at odds with each other. Indeed, they are best viewed as simply different moments of the change agentry process. The purpose of dissemination is change and the rationale for change is dissatisfaction with the current situation. Initial-

ly, what people must hear is that the good things of life and the valued social roles that give access to them are a potent response to devaluation; everything else (as has been said of the Bible) is commentary. Dissemination needs to create a sequence of discontent, then hope, and ultimately excitement. There will be no need of training and trainers if no one is interested in implementation, or if people come to believe that implementation is a fool's errand.

It has long been commented on that SRV and PASSING as methodologies and as a movement have been considerably hampered by a lack of institutional structure to support dissemination and application. A number of times, Wolf Wolfensberger suggested that the heyday of normalization coincided with the years of support from the Canadian Association for the Mentally Retarded (CAMR), the National Institute for Mental Retardation (NIMR-Canada), and the considerable support provided by a number of local ARCs in the USA. Such support led to a number of initiatives, some of which were national, that inspired much deinstitutionalization activity, led to considerable efforts of implementation and a number of large evaluation projects using PASS. Normalization was very much a worldwide movement in a way that SRV has not yet been able to replicate.

Conclusion: SRV is Important & It Should Be Implemented

Thomas, in a tradition established by Dr. Wolfensberger, has addressed important and high level issues, though as I have pointed out, the interpretation and implications of the "facts" are open to some debate. The problem with much of this article, and Thomas' two recent contributions (2012, 2013) to this *SRV Journal*, is that these are at best only obliquely related to Social Role Valorization theory or implementation.

In all of this, Thomas never says not to use SRV: indeed, she suggests that it should be tried. The problem with what she states is that it does not seem to provide good reasons to try. Indeed, with all the "hard" things we are told, and the bad stories we should take in, there is not much in terms of hope that is conveyed. What to do is important, but why one should try is no less critical.

SRV is important (Kendrick, 1994; Flynn & Lemay, 1999), but SRV is not about changing the world, society or even, for that matter, reforming the "human service system." SRV is best viewed as a useful–practical–way of addressing a number of important problems: for instance, countering the effects of social devaluation on individuals and groups, and the improvement of service recipient outcomes, are two broad objectives that readily come to mind. The possibility of achieving such objectives–even partially–at a small scale (for some people or groups, at some places and at some times) should be a good enough reason for implementation. In any event, researchers are increasingly suggesting that we should be skeptical of any approach that claims more than modest effectiveness (Pereira, Horwitz & Ioannidis, 2012), and that is also likely true of SRV.

Service recipients and their families may enter into human services grudgingly and even unwillingly, but most other people enter into the professional human services hoping to make a positive difference. But then everyone gets caught up in a vicious cycle of self-referential procedures (as described above) where we tend to lose sight of the service recipient, all the while becoming engrossed in complying with funder requirements, regulations and legislation, or improving technical expertise. SRV provides a different way of perceiving human service realities through the high contrast lens of social devaluation–and the harm that it causes–and then points in the direction of the good things of life obtained through valued social roles as a way of addressing some of the harm, and possibly reversing some of the devaluation. Not surprisingly, with these new glasses to peer through and a new map to give direction, human service workers, volunteers and others will quite

suddenly remember why they got involved in the first place, and families and service recipients what they want out of the experience. The heady insights that come with many SRV events are the impetus for the deepening of one's understanding and then trying to implement some of the ideas–in order to make a difference. It is after all what got many of us involved, and we should not begrudge SRV event participants the initial excitement, indeed hope, that some of these ideas can provoke–because they will, if implemented, make a difference.

The purpose of teaching SRV must be implementation; disseminating, teaching and training are simply initial steps (Fixsen, Blasé, Naoom & Wallace, 2009; Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2006) in what will be a long and arduous process. With Thomas, I think that SRV expertise is insufficient for implementation. Indeed, "implementation science" (Fixsen, et al. 2009) is a much more serious and arduous enterprise than mere training, and if we want to accompany employees, managers, families and service recipients down that long but fruitful road, we need to husband and hone all of that initial excitement and motivation for the long haul of implementation.

I would suggest that we need to revisit this theme of the implementation of SRV in future issues of *The SRV Journal*, and that we need to turn to some of the mainstream literature on training and implementation science mentioned above. But with Susan Thomas I'll suggest that a good place to start is Wolfensberger's (2012a) chapter 6 of his posthumous book *Advanced Issues of Social Role Valorization Theory (Issues of Change Agentry in the Teaching, Dissemination and Implementation of Social Role Valorization*). In his conclusion he states that:

> *My guess is that such strategies, being valid, will almost certainly bring some successes. More people would implement SRV on a personal level, there would probably be more scattered implementations of disjointed elements of SRV, there might be some services that evolve into at least temporary demonstration status … (p. 345).*

But one should also take stock of Schallock and Braddock (2002), *Out of the darkness into the light: Nebraska's experience in Mental Retardation,* including Wolfensberger's chapter "Why Nebraska?" in which he writes:

> *There is much consolation in the Nebraska phenomenon. We fought a relatively clean fight; there were wounds but no corpses; and when I meditate upon the spectacular and rapid successes of a small group of reformist leaders, I hear a lilt of poesy that I associate with the democratic process in a secular, pluralistic republic. Finally, there is a lesson of the profoundest significance to the nation: If rapid, radical change can be brought about in Nebraska, then it can be done in any state! (p. 52).*

I'd also commend to the reader Elks and Neuville (2007), "Implementing Social Role Valorization across a large human service organization: Lessons & learning," one of the few SRV implementation articles I could find, where some of the challenges are described.

Thomas and Wolfensberger point to the lack of an institutional base from which to move and support SRV development and implementation. There is a special need to develop a much more robust strategy for SRV implementation if we hope to see it implemented successfully–hopefully, many will contribute to such a literature and such efforts.

The uptake and implementation of SRV will likely best occur if people think it is different and hope that its application will make a difference. The state of the world, and indeed of the human service system, is at least initially irrelevant to such considerations. SRV is not about changing the world, but it is for some people a way of finding a better place in it. ☙

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Reply to Raymond Lemay's "Implementing Social Role Valorization Theory–It Is Not About Changing the World"

Susan Thomas

My paper in this issue of the *Journal* entitled "Some Major Challenges & Dilemmas in SRV Training, Dissemination & Implementation" was originally presented as a relatively brief 'thought paper' at a meeting following the last SRV conference. At that conference, I also gave a presentation (only about 30 minutes) that was published in the June 2012 issue of this *Journal* as "Situating SRV in the Larger Societal Context." Since Lemay's paper is introduced as a response to these, I am very glad that my own thoughts have so stimulated the thoughts of at least one other person, and I hope that all the papers together will generate yet further thinking and discussion–and action as well. The analysis and critique of ideas, and in a public forum, is an intellectual discipline that can greatly contribute to refining an idea, finding its weaknesses, perhaps strengthening it, etc., and I hope we will see more of this about SRV and its implications.

However, there are many subjects Lemay discusses that go far beyond the few ideas I put on paper in those two articles, including some on which he takes issue with someone–but since I am in agreement with him on many of the things he raises, the opponent cannot be me. As one example, I agree with Lemay that conflicts of interest exist everywhere, including in informal services and within families, and that it is at best naïve to look to informal services and personal relationship commitments as any kind of utopian and/or widespread solution to the problems of devalued people. These arrangements too have their own disfunctionalities, but disfunctionalities that are different from those that adhere to formal, organized services in a post-production economy. Where we may differ is which set of disfunctionalities to usually prefer, and on what basis. But nowhere in either of my two papers did I say, or even imply, that informal services could solve the problems of devalued people or of human services, or that people concerned with the welfare of devalued people should "give up on" working in the organized service sector. Thus, Lemay's paper should not be seen as merely a response to my own, nor should it be read as implying that all my own positions are different from all of his.

I very much concur with Lemay that we need to pay serious attention to issues of SRV implementation: where is SRV being implemented, how can others learn of it and from it, what does the research and literature have to tell us about how to increase efforts at implementation and their likelihood of success, what are the obstacles to implementation and how can they be removed, how can implementation efforts be subjected to analysis and critique, are there especially promising fields or niches for implementation, what can successful efforts at implementation offer to the teaching and training culture, etc.

As noted above, I look forward to similar discussions of a topic–or, as Lemay did, of a large

number of topics–by multiple people (writers, speakers, servers, family members, etc.) in future issues of this *Journal*, and at future SRV conferences. ☙

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On a Role

Marc Tumeinski

The primary purpose of this ongoing column continues to be to explore the key concept of social roles: in regard to learning and teaching about roles, as well as in light of working to help societally devalued people to acquire and maintain socially valued roles, with an eye towards greater access to the 'good things of life' (Wolfensberger, Thomas & Caruso, 1996).

In this column, I take an introductory look at the sociological concept of role salience, sometimes called role centrality or role commitment, to see what it is, how it might bear relevance to Social Role Valorization (SRV) teaching and application, and what questions it might raise.

What is Role Salience?

Definitions vary, but sociologists generally describe role salience as the degree to which a particular social role is important or central to a role incumbent, i.e., the greater the salience, the greater the importance of the role to the person in the role (Callero, 1985, 203; Thoits, 2012, 362). Why is role salience significant? Role theorists propose that the more salient a particular role, the more likely it is to influence a role incumbent, in various ways:

• A highly salient role is more likely to influence a party's behavior (Jackson, 1981, 139).

• Social roles which are more salient generally have greater potential to help a role incumbent develop or sustain a positive sense of self (Thoits, 2012, 362).

• The more salient a role, the more likely it is to influence how a person perceives: him or herself, other people, relationships, physical and social settings, opportunities, what is desirable and what is less desirable, etc. (Callero, 1985, 205).

• Observers may be more likely to define a role incumbent in terms of their most salient roles–Jimmy's dad, Jane the restaurant owner–and as a consequence, others' expectations may be more strongly shaped by an incumbent's more salient roles (Callero, 1985, 205). This underscores the important link made in SRV between a person's roles and others' perceptions (Wolfensberger, 2013, 59).

• Some authors propose that the more salience a particular role has, the more likely it is that any stress related to that particular role will bring about role strain (Simon, 1992, 26), a topic discussed in the December 2012 'on a role' column. Consider, for example, the stress of losing a role of full-time worker or a role of spouse.

These points are clearly relevant to the framework of SRV. Note however that role salience is not necessarily limited to *valued* social roles. For example, a role incumbent may personally value

quite highly one of his or her roles, and yet the role may still be significantly societally devalued. I will return to this point.

Degrees of Role Salience

How might we informally measure the degree of salience of a particular social role, whether valued or devalued? Stryker offers a few relevant considerations (2007, 12-13). For example, we might ask to what degree is the person emotionally committed to the role? How many valued relationships are tied in with the role? What would the person be willing to give up in order to hang on to the role? And so on.

What can influence the degree of role salience? According to Thoits (2012, 362), such influences could include:

- intrinsic and extrinsic role-related rewards;

- prior or ongoing investment of time, effort and even material resources into the role by the role incumbent;

- external reinforcement of the role by others; etc.

Salience therefore is not a yes or no quality, or all or nothing, but rather can be thought of as exist-

A Note on the Word 'developmental'

Social Role Valorization theory emphasizes competency enhancement, understood broadly, as one of the essential avenues toward gaining a societally valued role (Wolfensberger, 2013, 85). Competency includes integrity of body and mind, social competencies, skills, habits and motivations (Wolfensberger, 2013, 93). Competency enhancement is key in SRV training and implementation for many reasons, and builds on various foundations, including the realities that the development of competencies is natural for human beings, that competency is highly valued in today's culture, that greater competency helps a person to be able to carry out a greater number of social roles, and so on (Wolfensberger, 2013, 94-95).

Wolfensberger laid out his understanding of the developmental model as incorporating important assumptions, such as that all people have the potential to grow and develop, no matter how old or impaired. He also highlights the processes that undergird a developmental model approach, including settings, schedules, tools and equipment, groupings, and helpful teachers or 'servers' (Wolfensberger, 2013, 136-139). One of the key insights in teaching and/or implementing SRV is the link between competency enhancement and social roles–not only *how* certain roles require certain competencies, but that *having* certain roles can help a role incumbent to become more competent.

Definitions of the word 'development' commonly include elements such as: the process or fact of developing, a gradual unfolding, bringing out from a latent or elementary condition, growth, expansion of latent capabilities, gradual advancement through progressive stages, a state of vigorous life and action. One of the important points which I draw from these definitions centers on the idea of development as a *process*. It can be helpful for teachers and implementers of SRV to think about competency enhancement and the developmental model as an ongoing, organic, evolving process; rather than a static step, or a limited series of static steps, or all-or-nothing.

The linguistic roots of the word development mean to unwrap or disentangle. This is intriguing, and may bring to mind certain SRV points, such as the SRV measure of extricating someone from societally devalued roles, which Wolfensberger points out can sometimes be accomplished by helping someone to grow in competency (Wolfensberger, 2013, 117).

Source information from the Oxford English Dictionary

ing across a spectrum from more to less salience. Given this, to what degree can servers (paid, unpaid) influence how a role incumbent perceives the salience of one particular social role, either valued or devalued? This bears relevance on the role goals laid out within SRV (Wolfensberger, 2013, 107-121). For example, if the role goal is to help extricate a party from a devalued social role, and the devalued role happens to be highly salient for that party, this raises the stakes and adds an additional factor to consider. If the decision is made to still pursue this role goal under these circumstances, then what might servers do to reduce or minimize the salience of the devalued role (NB: even while simultaneously pursuing other role goals)?

Or, if the role goal is to help a party enter a (new) valued social role–and it is not a role that the party is open to, has high regard for, or is motivated about–is there anything servers can legitimately do to help increase the potential salience of the role to that party? And so on.

Relevance to SRV

In terms of SRV teaching and application, role salience is a key factor, but not the only one of course. Another key factor, already mentioned above, is the societal value which a particular role is accorded by a society or culture in general, or by a smaller sub-culture or sub-grouping.[1] This factor presumes to a certain degree a broad societal and cultural consensus on the value of particular social roles, e.g., that the worker role is highly socially valued, that the role of menace is highly socially devalued (Wolfensberger, 2013, 46, 49; Thoits, 2012, 363). Some would disagree with this understanding or its implications, but life experience and sociological study seem to bear it out. Within this framework, we might consider role salience to be a personal, more subjectively[2] experiential assessment, and the societal value of a role to be a probabilistic, larger-scale, more objective assessment.

In SRV training workshops, this question of role salience often comes up, e.g., 'But what if a person likes a devalued role? We can't just take it away from them!' To be clear, this is not only a question relevant to the concept of role salience. It may also demonstrate a common (and often ideological) misunderstanding of the core content and thrust of SRV.[3] Yet, an understanding of the concept of role salience, and how it is distinct from–though perhaps related to–the societal value of a role, may help in teaching SRV and PASSING, and in responding to this and similar questions or concerns.

Note too that in relation to this point, the SRV concept of role avidity (Wolfensberger, 2013, 63-65) may come into play, e.g., a relatively minor role may grow in salience for someone if that person has few or no other (societally valued) roles.[4]

Given the above factors, it is certainly worth considering the potential implications of what happens when role salience and the societal value of a particular role generally match, and what happens when these do not match or do not match well. In the former, the SRV question may be how to sustain this valued role, or perhaps even enlarge its scope (Wolfensberger, 2013, 109), while staying within the context of the culturally valued analog (Wolfensberger & Thomas, 2013, 30-31). In the latter case, such a tension or conflict does not of course indicate a gap or weakness of SRV theory, but rather the inherently complex nature of the human being, and of our societal structures and relationships. At the very least, comprehension of role salience can help servers to identify such tensions when they arise, take steps to at least understand where they come from, and perhaps even address them to greater or lesser degrees.

Questions

The sociological concept of role salience raises many thoughtful questions to reflect on, especially in light of SRV teaching and implementation. A few examples follow, though this is by no means an exhaustive list. These questions may be instructive for: students in university classes studying aspects of SRV, members of SRV study

groups, participants in agency training events, etc. We also encourage readers to submit their questions, examples and elaboration of this concept to the *Journal*.

• Is there any variance regarding role salience in terms of the different role domains described by Wolfensberger (Wolfensberger, 2013, 50; cf. Cinamon *et al*, 2008, 352)? Is there variance of salience *within* a particular role domain, and/or *across* several role domains? For example, are some role domains more likely to encompass roles with potentially higher salience than other domains, e.g., are work roles more likely to be highly salient than leisure roles? If so, which domains, under what conditions, and why? Does this vary with age? What about across cultures? What implications might this have for applying SRV? For example, how might this impact on one of the guidelines for SRV implementation described by Wolfensberger; namely, identifying particular roles to valorize or change (2013, 109)? Should servers prioritize the more highly salient roles, and/or roles from particular domains, and/or more highly societally valued roles? If so, under what conditions? When might it make sense programmatically to pursue efforts to valorize less salient roles, and/or roles of smaller bandwidth? And so on.

• Are positively valued (as opposed to societally devalued) social roles more likely in general to become subjectively salient roles? If so, under what circumstances? Are there exacerbating as well as mitigating factors involved? Is this true across all role domains or is it more true in some domains than in others? How might this vary in different societies and/or sub-cultures?

• How might role salience for a particular role increase or decrease for a role incumbent? What factors might contribute to such change, e.g., age (Cinamon *et al*, 2008, 357), income level, geographic location, etc.?

• From the perspective of the role incumbent, are there typically any distinctions in terms of role salience between roles entered by choice and roles entered by imposition (Wolfensberger, 2013, 48; cf. Thoits, 2012, 361-362)? If a valued role has been imposed upon a role incumbent, is that role more or less likely to become salient for the role incumbent? What about if it is a societally devalued role that is imposed? Is there any distinction in terms of the perceived salience of *chosen* or *imposed* roles, from the perspective of observers?

• Do salient roles tend to be big roles, i.e., roles with large bandwidths (Wolfensberger, 2013, 51-52)? If so, under what conditions?

Concluding Note

Role salience can be a helpful concept for both SRV and PASSING trainers to understand and be able to teach, as well as for those working to apply SRV as a means of helping societally devalued people acquire and hold onto societally valued roles, with an eye towards greater access to the 'good things of life.' The sociological concept of roles, as currently incorporated within SRV and PASSING, has a wealth of concrete implications in terms of training, evaluation and implementation. Much work has been done on this, and much more can be done, building on Wolfensberger's initial framework while incorporating contemporary research. How can existing SRV circles around the world continue this work? This is one of our challenges, and one I hope that our readers will continue to take up. ∽

Endnotes

1. My use of the concept and language of sub-culture or sub-grouping from a sociological perspective–to describe a smaller group sharing ideas, beliefs, practices and/or values which are distinct from the larger culture of which it is a part, and which may or may not be at variance with it–is descriptive, and is not a value judgment.

2. Though some might read this usage of subjective as value-laden, it is meant descriptively, i.e., 'subjective' meaning related to the experiences of an individual person.

3. This is a complex topic which cannot be adequately addressed in this column.

4. My thanks to Susan Thomas for pointing out this additional connection to SRV theory.

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Training Notes

Joe Osburn

EDITOR'S NOTE: *The following is a brief note on using examples in leadership-oriented Social Role Valorization training.*

Background Considerations

SOCIAL ROLE VALORIZATION (SRV) is disseminated and implemented in different ways by different parties in different countries around the world. In North America, the SRV Development, Training and Safeguarding Council exists in part to safeguard the quality of SRV dissemination, as its name implies. One of this Council's major strategies is to credential[1] individuals whom it deems qualified to oversee and conduct leadership-oriented introductory SRV training workshops, or what the Council sometimes calls "Track A" events.[2] In turn, such training events are a primary means of teaching SRV as an overarching multicomponent theory to participants who do or potentially will occupy leadership roles in relation to further SRV dissemination and implementation.

The considerations and guidelines contained in this brief note on the use of examples in SRV dissemination are directed mainly to Council-credentialed SRV trainers' own use, but also for other individuals being mentored and prepared to assist them as presenters at SRV leadership training events, particularly those individuals who are relatively inexperienced at presenting SRV in a training format. However, these notes also have much relevance to other types of SRV teaching, including, for example, that which is conducted as part of a university or college curriculum.

'Track A' SRV training workshops attempt to convey the full complex content of SRV theory, though at an introductory level, mainly via presentations geared to people with 'college level minds.' This level of training is thus pitched at a relatively highly demanding plateau of learner engagement and developmental growth expectation.

Dr. Wolf Wolfensberger, the 'inventor' and primary conceptualizer of SRV, developed teaching materials for use by Council-credentialed SRV leadership trainers in order to help assure highest quality SRV training at this level. The content of these training materials is rich in concepts that have broad applicability to all wounded and devalued people, and encompass many specific circumstances of service to them. In order to aid or enable workshop participants to more fully grasp these ideas and concepts, it is important that these be illustrated effectively and concretely via germane examples that epitomize or typify the point(s) being illustrated. In fact, the (above-mentioned) SRV training materials are replete with such examples illustrating the vast majority of points contained in SRV theory.

However, it is also highly desirable that SRV trainers (especially those credentialed by the SRV Council) not simply rely totally on those SRV training materials in their teaching of SRV, but rather they should make these materials 'their own.' An

important step in this internalization process is for SRV trainers, both seasoned and new, to incorporate their own examples into their presentations. For instance, presenters may: (a) provide their own examples for points in the materials that do not already have examples, (b) add their own examples to others already provided in the materials, and/or (c) substitute their own examples for ones provided. In any case, presenters should carefully consider the guidelines noted below.

Guidelines for Presenters' Decisions About Incorporating Their Own Examples

1. An example, in this context, can be anything that illustrates or elaborates an SRV teaching point. It can be: spoken or viewed (i.e., read or projected on a screen) or both; a symbol or image, such as a picture, photograph or cartoon; a copy of an article, a document, a poem; a quote, a vignette, a case history, a fable or parable; a reference to a real person (e.g., a family member or service recipient) or an event, or object or fictional character; an apothegm, aphorism, adage, allegory, analogy and, actually, almost anything.

2. Most important is that an example should be unambiguous, and unequivocally pertinent to the point being illustrated. In other words, the example should be fully suited to the SRV point it is meant to make or illustrate. This means both that it fits the point precisely, and that the connection is obvious or at least clearly drawn.

3. Relatedly, presenters should take care to deliver (tell) their example in a way that makes clear how it relates to the point it is meant to illustrate. Many good examples are not necessarily immediately obvious to trainees; thus the presenter needs to make an explicit connection of the example to the point.

4. The example should be explained or delivered as concisely as possible.

5. Relatedly, the example should be commensurate to the importance of the point, i.e., the presenter should not illustrate a two-second point with a ten-minute story. Rather, the obverse would be a more worthy goal, i.e., to illustrate a ten-minute point with a two-second example.

6. The presenter needs to consider whether and how the example will affect the timing of the module as well as the workshop as a whole–another reason for conciseness (point 4 above).

7. An example must be well-placed within the workshop, and thus also within a particular presentation module. This is because many examples may apply to more than one point within a workshop module, or even to one or more other points in different modules. Thus, if such an example is used, it should go in the module where it best fits and with the specific point where it will render the most pedagogical value. (Note that this guideline too, like numbers 1 and 2 above, has to do with the issue of fit.) This guideline also implies avoidance of using the same example more than once in the workshop (although it may be appropriate at times to simply refer back to it).

8. As a general rule, when presenters substitute their own example for one in the training materials, it should be at least as illustrative and compelling as the one it replaces. However, other things being equal, a slightly less compelling personal example might do nearly as well in many cases simply because it is personal and can perhaps be conveyed by the presenter with more self-assurance and credibility than the provided one.

9. Personal examples emanate from presenters' own experience and therefore are very amenable to being delivered 'off the cuff' without script and often virtually without notes. However, this does not relieve presenters of the responsibility to prepare and rehearse their presentations, including delivery of their own personal examples.

On the contrary, the conveyance of personal examples should be carefully thought through, honed and practiced beforehand, especially to keep it concise.

10. To the extent possible, presenters should try to use examples that their probable audience will find: (a) timely in terms of contemporary societal, local or human service issues; and (b) relevant to their own experiences and interests. These could be imagery-related clippings from a local newspaper; vignettes about experiences of families with handicapped children, if such are expected to be among the participant audience, or about serving elderly people; quotes from publications or people from the same fields represented by participants, etc.[3]

11. Another caveat for presenters is to be aware of the temptation to use or substitute their own example primarily because they have one; in other words, just because the presenter can come up with an example does not necessarily mean it ought to be used.

12. The presenter should consider how much benefit an example actually adds to a point, asking him or herself "does this point really need an example to illustrate it?" Some points are already quite adequately exemplified in the training materials; others are so self-explanatory that using an example may simply be redundant and possibly time-wasting.

13. It is extremely important that examples are actual and true. They should neither be 'made up' nor re-fashioned to fit the point, nor unduly embellished, e.g., via 'poetic license,' though selective emphases are often warranted.

Adjunct Recommendations

1. Aspiring SRV teachers should emulate veteran ones in their habit of staying alert to and 'collecting' phenomena that lend themselves to use as examples in their SRV training. They are everywhere!

2. Most veteran SRV trainers hold some 'surplus' examples in reserve for potential use as appropriate in their teaching. Such opportunities commonly arise when responding to questions or comments from participants at the conclusion of presentation modules. These unscripted responses can be excellent teaching moments, and having a good 'unused' example to offer can be what be what really makes or seals the point for participants. ☙

Endnotes

1. See "A policy statement of the North American SRV Development, Training & Safeguarding Council about the legitimization or 'credentialing' of SRV trainers" (rev. April 2009).

2. This type of SRV training is explained in Thomas, S. (October 2009). The concept of Track A & Track B training, & differences between them. Unpublished manuscript.

3. Helpful guidelines related to this recommendation are given in "Instructions for any user of the introductory SRV workshop training package, and especially for senior trainers at SRV events" (pp. 23–24). These explain that senior trainers (should) spend part of their preparation time before each training event tailoring their presentations to the particular audience, time and place of the event.

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Care Ethics–L'Arche, the World & Down Our Street: A Personal Reflection

David Race

Introduction

On 7th September, 2011, Mark Smith, a lecturer in Social Care at the University of Edinburgh, led a workshop organised by L'Arche (UK) at the Edinburgh offices of the local L'Arche community. Attended by nearly one hundred people–from L'Arche itself, including visitors from Ireland; from Camphill in Scotland, and from local agencies–the day with Mark raised some significant issues, especially with regard to the tensions between the 'market' of welfare provision, with its associated 'managerialist' tendencies, and the attempts by organisations such as L'Arche and Camphill to base their dealings with people with learning disabilities on a shared set of values.

Shortly after that seminar, together with my wife Debbie and 26-year old son Adam, who has Down's syndrome, I travelled to Canberra in Australia to attend the fifth international conference on Social Role Valorization (SRV). SRV, as a successor to and reconceptualisation of the idea of 'normalization,' has had a significant effect on services in a number of countries, most of which were represented at that conference. It was also the first conference without the originator of those ideas, Wolf Wolfensberger, who had died earlier in 2011, and for whom there were many tributes given, up to and including the conference. We were attending the conference, whose theme was 'realising the good things of life,' to meet up with old friends from the SRV network, and also to give presentations, one from Adam and Debbie on the power of sibling relationships, and one from me on the relative ability of 'stories' and 'theories' to affect change in the lives of people with learning disabilities through the way in which services are carried out. I had also, at the previous conference in Ottawa in 2007, presented an overview of a book I had written about services in seven of the countries that had been most influenced by SRV (the UK, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden) and looked to see what, if anything, had developed since that book's publication.

One further set of events which feed into these reflections was the fact that Debbie and I have, since February 2011, been offering short breaks to adults with learning disabilities via what is known as 'adult placement.' Such schemes, operating in most Local Authorities (LAs), are either run by the LAs themselves or by an independent agency, and involve recruiting and supporting people who are prepared to take adults with learning disabilities into their own homes, either on a full-time basis, or, as with us, for short breaks. Once recruited, adult placement carers are given an approved training course by the co-ordinating agency (approximately ten sessions on various topics) and then registered, via their scheme, with a national body, the National Association of Adult Placement Schemes (NAAPS). The co-ordinators then match

the adults looking for a placement with carers, and they are taken into the carers' homes, sometimes for many years in the case of full-time placements.

The reason for this lengthy introduction is to give a context for the reflections which follow, in particular the key issue that seems to me to be raised by all three events, namely the major tensions between the organisation and financing of publicly funded services for people with learning disabilities, and the sort of values-led intentions of care ethics, SRV, L'Arche and adult placement. The reflections are therefore grouped under the following themes, namely 'the professionalisation of caring,' the 'market place of welfare' and 'w(h)ither values.'

The Professionalisation of Caring

Reading the collected letters of Jean Vanier recently reminded me just how radical was the notion, in the 1960s, of somebody who was not a trained professional deciding to take people with learning disabilities into their own home. Also, however, even from the beginning, Vanier dealt with, and sought the backing of, 'professionals' in the learning disability world. At that point, of course, these were largely medical people, psychiatrists, psychologists, etc., who led the various forms of institutional care. This was equally true as L'Arche expanded into the industrialised countries of Canada, the USA, and the UK, but much less so in what was then called the 'third world' of India and Pakistan.

In his workshop, Mark Smith also referred to this period, when he talked of his early time in child care in Strathclyde, where qualifying as a residential social worker, still a relatively new 'profession' compared to the older medical professions, was seen as not only a professional training but also as a vocation with some 'moral force' behind it. Vanier's letters talk of his meeting with Wolf Wolfensberger in the 1970s, and the common ground they shared on providing an alternative to institutions, but also on the importance of individual personal relationships and mutual risk-taking and learning to enable growth. Wolfensberger, in fact, reviewed in 1974 one of the earliest books on L'Arche, 'Enough Room for Joy' and said, amongst other things, the following;

> *For a person who has taken an entirely professional-technical approach to human services–the way most professionals tend to do it–it comes as a major surprise, and quite often as an existential shock, to recognise the intrinsic validity of one of the main tenets of the movement of L'Arche: that the superficially weak member of society may, in fact, be really no weaker and no different than anybody else, that we all have profound weaknesses, profound immoralities, etc. ... and that the apparently non-handicapped person can receive as much from the apparently weak ones as they may receive from him.*

Debbie and Adam's talk in Canberra also referred to this reciprocal element of relationship with people with learning disabilities; Debbie talking about her sister who had Down's syndrome, and Adam what he got from, but also gave to, his three brothers. Similarly, in a keynote speech to the SRV conference, George Durner, L'Arche International Formation and Training Coordinator, made much of the importance of the development of mutual trust that he felt was the key to relationships, and thus the key to L'Arche communities, and how it was generally harder for the person without learning disabilities to be vulnerable in the relationship, and to trust the other.

Relatedly, what came out of our induction into, and then practice of, adult placement, was that the professional service system could not really get a handle on its roots in the offering of relationship. Much as incredulity at L'Arche communities existing without paid workers, in the early days, had come from the 'professional' world, so the notion that people taking others into their own homes for adult placement are not just another form of

'staff' is hard for social workers and their managers to grasp. Again, as Mark Smith pointed out, even something as fundamental as taking someone into your own home has become embroiled in the culture that has grown up in professional circles of enforcement of 'rights' and 'protection' through 'codes' and 'regulation.' Many contributors to a daily session at Canberra, namely the telling of personal stories, were people with disabilities and/or their carers talking about how they had moved towards the 'good life' despite the efforts of professionals, rather than because of them. Leaders of agencies also talked about their difficulties in including training and development of staff in the key SRV issues of positive relationships and valued social roles for people amidst all the plethora of mandatory training in 'health and safety,' 'moving and handling,' etc.

All of which is not to deny the need, as Vanier did not, for specialist help in certain areas of people's lives, but what it seems to me to illustrate, as Mark Smith put it, is that the balance of 'professional practice' within the caring system as against a personal commitment, always dominated by the former, had changed over the years to the point where the former was assumed to be the norm, but was clothed in the language of 'valuing people' and 'personalisation.' The key difference, he pointed out, and as all the various examples quoted above suggest to me, is that personal commitment has been subsumed under the reality of managerial accountability, and this leads on to the next theme.

The Market Place of Welfare

In the introduction to my book on the seven countries, I note the changes in the welfare state in the UK from when I entered the field, in 1973, to the present day. Looking through the whole range of how services are provided in the seven countries, I also noted that change in those thirty-five years had been the greatest in the UK. The USA, Canada, New Zealand and Australia had always had a service system based on independent agencies being commissioned by the state (or by more local governments) to provide the majority of services, whereas the two Scandinavian countries had always operated as a full welfare state, with services provided by local government employees. The UK, by contrast, had gone from a similar system to the Scandinavian one, to one much more like those in the US, with Local Authorities (LAs) or Health Authorities, in their various forms, now largely in the role of funders, or commissioners, of services from the independent sector.

Mark Smith noted a similar move in the UK service world in general, with the neo-liberal views of the Thatcher governments, not really altered by New Labour, meaning that residential care, amongst other services, had gradually become a 'commodity' to be provided by competing traders in the market of welfare. Judgements of the quality of care then became, in his words, strikingly reminiscent of Wolfensberger's forty years earlier, 'technical rational rather than practical moral relations between carers and cared for.' The result of this was that the market of welfare was viewed like any other market, with the role of government largely a regulatory one, and judgements of quality based on those things that can be measured, such as are contained in the increasing checklists of inspectors. In Mark's words again, this has led to the 'moral impulse' of caring making an exit. In addition, the time of service providers, like market traders, has become spent much more in looking at what the funders want, and at the technical processes of tendering, with all the variation in resource availability that comes from central government's attitude to welfare spending.

The Canberra conference did little to suggest that this was a UK phenomenon. Research accounts presented of the 'success' of community living in countries like Australia or Canada, produced depressing results, with finance and managerialism being the dominant forces. Thus even the 'good news' stories at the conference were notable as being the exception rather than the rule.

Similarly, discussions with others involved in adult placement were rife with problems caused,

not by the recipients of this form of caring, but by the bureaucratic processes of regulation, monitoring and general suspicion that this 'non-professional' way of doing things raises. The checklists the co-ordinating agencies have to produce for their funders, the monitoring of what happens on a daily basis in people's lives, could be said to be 'good practice,' but on the whole appear to many carers to be a simple lack of trust. As Mark Smith again commented, care ethics need to go beyond managerialism if they are to represent the true 'orientation to the other' that comes from the caring impulse. 'One size fits all,' he observed, cannot allow for the range of experience, relationships and contexts that will always be needed for true caring. Vanier was under no illusions that all L'Arche communities should be the same. He speaks in one of his earliest letters of 'family placements' being in total harmony with the L'Arche communities in Trosly. Over the years, however, as a number of recent documents, including L'Arche (UK)'s own strategic plan, have noted, what fits with the prevailing policy has tended to be what has pushed the models of L'Arche communities from being a radical alternative to a form of care that is in, or even behind, the mainstream.

The other implication of managerialism is that small organizations, which includes L'Arche (UK), cannot afford (and often do not desire) the layers of management that can allow for national or regional specialists in tendering, human resources, social policy, professional practice, etc., etc. Whilst this enables them to retain, if they can survive, their uniqueness, especially if this is strongly based on a set of values such as is the case of L'Arche, the pressures of the welfare market can often mean that such uniqueness is seen as an 'expensive luxury.' Further, the increasingly variable response of LAs across the country to central government reductions in funding means that what is preferred in one part is not considered in another, let alone the differences between the countries of the UK. So where do values go from here?

W(h)ither Values

In the second part of his workshop, Mark Smith talked about 'care ethics' as something that 'goes beyond managerialism.' He referred back to his earlier notion of the 'moral impulse' and said that most research and more academic writing suggests that this impulse only occurs 'when the self becomes involved,' and thus the relationship of caring becomes one of 'interdependence,' echoes of which came in Canberra in response to Debbie and Adam's presentation. Mark said that all people in 'caring' roles, and all recipients of 'care,' bring their own 'experience, relationships and contexts,' some of which relate to training or 'professional' qualifications, but many of which don't. In addition, the dominance of managerialist concerns over priorities in training mean that it too becomes a 'one size fits all' approach, which does not go beyond the 'care of' vulnerable people. Instead, he talked of four phases of 'real caring' as a process whereby caring about someone is intimately connected with caring for them, in the sense of being 'for them, in their favour.' This, in turn, becomes a reciprocal process (again remembering Wolfensberger's comments from 1974) of taking care of each other, care giving and care receiving. Mark used the phrase 'affective equality' which he broke down into the elements of 'care,' 'love' and 'solidarity,' which of course has echoes of the L'Arche statement of being 'communities of people with and without learning disabilities sharing life.'

One form of this had come up in a previous conference in Edinburgh on 'social pedagogy' at which Mark had also spoken, and he spoke more about the notion at the workshop. In teasing this out in the final session in small groups, one conclusion was that, whether it was called this or not, the ideals of L'Arche had the same basis in a set of values as social pedagogy but, as much of the earlier part of these reflections also illustrates, the reality of the service system and managerialism restricts severely the ideals of 'real caring.'

So there is a definite sense of 'withering' values but this may, paradoxically, offer a chance to L'Arche to consider what is happening in terms of what 'game' it is our values and traditions lead us to wish to play within the modern service system. Examples from other countries, and from organisations starting as potential L'Arche communities, have emphasised the importance of developing community in a wider context than a place where a small group of people live, and the considerable number of people who are not direct care providers who wish to be involved with people with learning disabilities. Adult placement is one such possibility, though it, as noted above, is still being hemmed in to the 'professional' circle to some degree. Equally, the report of Louise Detain for the Nottingham Ark group suggests ways of developing a community model based around where people live now, rather than based around a set of buildings to which they might move. As always, as was the case for Jean Vanier in the 1960s, such initiatives are at the radical edges of the mainstream service system, but that did not stop Jean, nor should it, in my view, stop L'Arche now.

At the end of my presentation in Canberra, I read from the last pages of my book, which in view of recent events seems topical though it was written in 2006. The book had used the device throughout of describing the situation in the seven countries, including my own, by asking people the question 'What would be happening to Adam if he were here, in x country, at different periods in his lifespan?' Their answers make up the book, of course, but the conclusion seems to me to be a way of summing up these reflections on events at and since Mark Smith's workshop.

An English historian, Professor Geoffrey Hosking–addressing the Royal Historical Society in 2004 as part of a seminar entitled 'Can we construct a history of trust?'–pondered on what he saw as a phenomenon of western cultures, the replacement of faith in political and social judgments by mere quantification of money. He went on to talk about this in the English context, with reference to the earlier trust in public institutions being partly a reflection of deference within the class system, exposed as dubious by greater information and education of the 'lower classes' in the twentieth century, especially its latter half. Instead of an informed public holding public institutions to account, however, the 'emperor's new clothes' phenomenon had generated a 'blame and shame' culture, especially of politicians, educators, lawyers, clergy and even royalty, and a belief that everything can be reduced to cash compensation. This then created a 'vicious circle' where the public institutions then responded to the culture, reinforcing its perceptions of their motivations. 'The more we place our trust in institutions whose raison d'être is monetary operations, the more we reshape our social lives according to the standards set by those operations.'

Apart from the similarity to the SRV notion of 'role circularity' in Hosking's argument, my point in quoting him is to give academic support to my intense feelings regarding the change in my society in the thirty years since I became involved in intellectual disability, and thus in the society into which we have tried to support Adam to become 'included.' That the change in the culture in that period has been led, from a media perspective, by an Australian, and by a government committed to an aping of the US in a great many aspects of life, only makes the feeling more visceral. The world in which all my sons are 'included' seems a far scarier place than when I went, as a naïve researcher, to Reading University in 1973. My visits to the six countries did little to make my fears for them any the less, though the Scandinavian experience reminded me that some countries were still holding out against the globalizing tide, if with increasing difficulty.

Yet what I was left with, both on my return home and then at the end of the England chapter, was a different emotion, that of being part of a community in which Adam had many valued roles, and I guess this is the essential issue that this book has revealed. Institutions, be they the vast snake-pits of the first half of the twentieth cen-

tury suffered by people with intellectual disabilities, or the monarchy that still rules over half the countries I visited, exist because they serve societal purposes, often lost in the mists of time, and no longer logical, but still there. Ordinary lives, at the really local level, with all their variation, exist and are developed because they are about people making the best of who and what they are, and how they interact with each other. What societies can provide in terms of services for people with intellectual disabilities has a limit, which is that however 'values-led' they may be, they are an artificial replacement for a family and a community. Therein lie both my hopes and fears. The increasing alienation of societies, especially in urban areas, where, as we saw, a large proportion of the population of the countries of this book live, and the reduction of so many human interactions to a commodity to be bought and sold, tends to push families and communities into their bunkers, afraid to 'risk' communication on an open basis, preferring the arm's length 'business basis.' 'Objective professional distance' could be said to be an art of both the social worker and the prostitute, though with more illusion of caring from the latter, and the more 'businesslike' the transaction is, the less exposure to vulnerability, possibly at the heart of real relationship, there will be.

The fact that, in the great majority of good things I saw or heard about, there would be a committed person, or group of people, or small community, often including parents and family members, tells me there is an underlying human characteristic that has not yet been ground down by the commodification of human experiences. Where services, in the organized sense, have allied themselves to this characteristic, they have, in my view, both set themselves up against the tide of the 'social approaches' of most countries, but also increased the hope I have that Adam's experiences need not be as hard to find on his world tour as they appeared to be. In the end, as the Maori saying has it–

He aha te mea nui?
He aha te mea nui o tea o?
Maku e ki atu.
He tangata. He tangata. He tangata.

What is the most important thing?
What is the most important thing in the world?
I will say to you.
It is people. It is people. It is people. ☙

David Race, PhD, is an Honorary Senior Research Fellow at the University of Salford, the Chair of Values Education & Research Association in the UK, & a corresponding member of the North American SRV Development, Training & Safeguarding Council.

The citation for this column is
Race, D. (2013). Care ethics–L'Arche, the world & down our street: A personal reflection. *The SRV Journal, 8*(1), 59–64.

Announcing the availability of

A Set of Five DVDs of Two Presentations by Dr. Wolf Wolfensberger on the History of Human Services

In 2009, the Minnesota Governor's Council on Developmental Disabilities produced a set of DVDs, based on a videotape, of two one-day presentations on the history of human services presented by Dr. Wolf Wolfensberger & Susan Thomas at Millersville University in Pennsylvania. The first day is entitled "An Interpreted Pictorial Presentation on the History of Human Services with Emphasis on the Origins of Some of Our Major Contemporary Service Patterns, & Some Universal Lessons for Planning & Structuring of Services Which Can Be Learned from This History." It constitutes approximately six & a quarter hours running time.

The second day is entitled "Reflections on a Lifetime in Human Services, from Prior to the Reforms of the 1950s-70s to the Present, with Implications for the Future: What Has Gotten Better, What Has Gotten Worse, What Is the Same, & What Lies Ahead." It constitutes approximately four hours running time.

Each day consists of lecture presentations on the topic, using many overheads & slides (photos & illustrations). At the end of each day, the presentation draws out some lessons from the coverage to contemporary services.

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4a Degradation and Elimination of the Altar (11:46)
4b The Panopticon and Central Observation Stations (28:11)
5a Service "Deculturation" and Moral Treatment (17:09)
5b "Menacization" Images and Associations with Leprosy and Contagion (23:58)
6a The Association of Hospices with Houses of Detention (13:43)
6b Various Beliefs That Played a Role in Menacization (4:59)
6c Human Service Assumptions Based in Materialism (14:18)
6d Further Menacization Through "Treatments" Based on Punishments (31:23)
6e Regimentation and the Use of Military Imagery (17:07)
7a Historical Lines of Influence in the Perversion of Western Human Services (14:51)
7b Core Realities, Strategies and Defining Characteristics of Contemporary Services (31:21)
7c Some Conclusions (10:53)

DAY 2: Reflections on a Lifetime in Human Services

1 The Bad Old Days, Part One (23:48)
2a The Bad Old Days, Part Two: The Institutional Scene, Part 1 (33:06)
2b The Bad Old Days, Part Two: The Institutional Scene, Part 2 (15:59)
3 The Bad Old Days, Part Three: The Educational Scene (19:54)
4a What Has Gotten Better, Part One: The Early Reform Era (27:39)
4b What Has Gotten Better, Part Two: Normalization (12:53)
4c What Has Gotten Better, Part Three: The Rights Movement (5:55)
4d What Has Gotten Better, Part Four: Summary of Positive Developments (17:53)
5 What Is Still the Same, New Problems That Have Arisen & Things That Have Gotten Worse: Part One (12:30)
6a What Is Still the Same, New Problems That Have Arisen & Things That Have Gotten Worse: Part Two (31:18)
6b What Is Still the Same, New Problems That Have Arisen & Things That Have Gotten Worse: Part Three (23:27)
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Reviews & More

The True Meaning of Pictures. By J. Baichwal (Director). 52 minutes, 2004. **REVIEW AVAILABLE ONLINE @ www.srvip.org**

Reviewed by Emma Barken

"The True Meaning of Pictures" is a documentary that examines the work of Shelby Lee Adams–a photographer from Kentucky (US) who photographs the mountain people of the Appalachian region. The documentary focuses on Adams' interactions with three groups heavily featured in his work: the Napier family, who live in abject poverty and have lost many family members in violent ways; members of the Holiness religious sect who are snake handlers, and carry out this practice even though it is illegal; and the Childers family, who have three adult children with mental retardation. The film contains interviews with members of these groups, art critics, prominent citizens from Appalachia and Adams himself.

This film was viewed as part of a Social Role Valorization (SRV) study group meeting in Ontario in November 2012 and the following questions guided our discussion:

- Who were the societally devalued groups represented in the film?
- What socially devalued characteristics did they demonstrate, and/or were communicated by the film?
- How are these people portrayed in the photographs by Adams?
- What are some imagery enhancement points from SRV theory that are elaborated in the film?
- What SRV themes are touched on in this film?

Adams' work is controversial because many of his critics believe that he is perpetuating commonly held stereotypes of "Holler Dwellers," and is portraying his subjects in a negative light. Adams vehemently denies these allegations, arguing that because he is from the same region of Kentucky, and has ties to the Holler (i.e., hollow) way of living, he is portraying his own people in a fair and honest light. He claims that there is nothing wrong with the way he portrays his subjects, because they have been allowing him to photograph them for three decades, and support his work.

Those who take issue with Adams' work argue that he stages his photographs–using light and angles in a sophisticated way that make his subjects look menacing, dirty and unkempt. They claim that his photographs thus support 100 years of negative stereotypes of Mountain people, as seen, for example, in American television, films and cartoons.

In the film, Adams argues that he is not trying to portray his photographic subjects in any way but the way that they really are. He states that he is photographing his friends and their lives, and that if the audience or his critics take issue with his work, it is because their way of living is so very different from his subjects, and they would rather not think about the suffering of the mountain people.

This film is relevant to SRV in part because it focuses on a societally devalued class of people (mountain people) and the ways in which they are presented to the larger public–namely through photographs. The film lays out many of the devalued characteristics which surround the mountain people, and shows how multiple channels–such as personal presentation, surroundings, activities and juxtapositions–can all work together to create negative social image messages (Wolfensberger, 1998, 64). The documentary does a good job of laying out the numerous factors that go into any one photographic image to create either a negative or a positive message about the people.

Many SRV themes come up in the film, including the Conservatism Corollary (e.g., through Ad-

ams' apparent lack of appreciation for the heightened vulnerability of his subjects); Interpersonal Identification, the Power of Mind Sets and Expectancies, Unconciousness, and Social Imagery.

SRV does not tell us whether the way that Adams portrays his subjects is right or wrong, yet by applying the "if this, then that" formulation (Wolfensberger, 1995), students of Social Role Valorization can determine what the likely impacts of Adams' portrayal will be on the minds of third parties. This is a useful way to look at Adams' work, in part because it differs from the debate that he and his critics are having about whether it is right or wrong that Adams photograph his subjects in the way that he does.

The film begs the question as to what it would take to portray its subjects honestly, but in a positive light, and with a particular set of valued social roles in mind. This is a common tension raised at SRV workshops–not wanting to be deceitful about a societally devalued party, but also wanting to project a positive image of that party. SRV would challenge servers to strive for this balance, and offers many tools to help work through this question.

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Emma Barken is a Social Role Valorization (SRV) presenter & long-term member of the Ontario SRV Study Group.

The citation for this review is
Barken, E. (2013). Review of the film *The true meaning of pictures* by J. Baichwal. *The SRV Journal, 8*(1), 67–68.

Invitation to Write Book, Film & Article Reviews

From the Editor

I encourage our readers to submit reviews to *The SRV Journal* of current films, books and articles. For people who are studying SRV, looking for everyday examples can help deepen one's understanding. For people who are teaching SRV, learning from and using contemporary examples from the media in one's teaching can be very instructive for audiences. For people who are implementing SRV, contemporary examples can provide fruitful ideas to learn from. Some books and articles mention SRV specifically; others do not but are still relevant to SRV. Both are good subjects for reviewing. We have written guidelines for writing book and film reviews. If you would like to get a copy of either set of guidelines, please let me know at:

Marc Tumeinski
The SRV Journal, 74 Elm Street, Worcester, MA 01609 USA
508.752.3670; journal@srvip.org; www.srvip.org

Announcing the publication of

A Brief Introduction to Social Role Valorization:

A high-order concept for addressing the plight of societally devalued people, and for structuring human services *(4th expanded edition)*

by Wolf Wolfensberger, PhD

"A long-held rationale of those of us who teach SRV Theory is that the material helps students to see the world from the perspectives of those who receive services and supports, rather than the service provider. Time and again, we hear students describe this as the single most important aspect of taking an SRV Theory course. They talk about how they now have new, or different, eyes with which to see and understand their world. Many describe the realization that *they* first had to change in order for them to address the issues and problems of the people they were assigned to teach or help. When they changed their perceptions of another person, they then changed their expectations of this person, along with their ideas of what the person actually needs and how to effectively address these needs" (from the foreword by Zana Marie Lutfiyya, PhD and Thomas Neuville, PhD).

A high-order concept for addressing
the plight of societally devalued people,
and for structuring human services
4TH EXPANDED EDITION

Wolf Wolfensberger

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A Brief Introduction to Social Role Valorization: A High-order Concept for Addressing the Plight of Societally Devalued People, and for Structuring Human Services (4th expanded ed.). By W. Wolfensberger. Plantagenet, ON: Valor Press. 275 pages, 2013. **REVIEW AVAILABLE ONLINE @ www.srvip.org**

Reviewed by Karen D. Schwartz

The new 4th edition of Wolf Wolfensberger's *A Brief Introduction to Social Role Valorization* (SRV) is being released in May 2013. The event is noteworthy, as this latest version has been significantly expanded over previous ones. Additions include a new foreword, the inclusion of two additional papers on SRV, a much more significant bibliography of Wolfensberger's work, and a comprehensive index.

Originally published in 1991, this monograph was last updated 15 years ago, in the form of a 3rd edition. Given the fact that the text is now used fairly extensively across the globe as either a textbook or reference book in academic and applied post-secondary programs, this expanded form is likely to add further appeal to the original treatise itself.

I approach this review from three different yet intertwined perspectives–as a former student, as an instructor, and as a researcher. I was first introduced to the ideas that comprise SRV as a graduate student in Disability Studies. This introduction allowed me to consider the ways in which SRV both complimented and contradicted theories in that field.

I have used parts of SRV in teaching both undergraduate and graduate courses in Disability Studies. Because these courses have been largely academic in nature, most of the discussion centred on the basics of SRV theory, rather than the implications for human service providers.

However, it is in my role as a researcher that I have found elements of SRV to be most invaluable, as they have often become the theoretical frameworks within which I work. In particular, I, along with my colleagues, have used social and societal devaluation, negative social roles, role theory, forming social judgements and social imagery in a variety of contexts. These contexts include examining aspects of special education (Schwartz, 2013), institutionalization (Schwartz, 2010), end-of-life issues (Lutfiyya & Schwartz, 2010), and portrayals of people with disabilities in popular films (Lutfiyya, Schwartz & Hansen, 2008; Schwartz, Lutfiyya & Hansen, 2013; Schwartz, Lutfiyya & Hansen, 2005). In all of these examples, the ideas behind SRV have been shared with diverse audiences, including academics across disciplines, students and professionals (such as educators and those in medical fields). Perhaps most importantly, some of these articles have appeared in books meant to appeal to members of the general public, who might not otherwise be exposed to such analyses and arguments.

My overall intent in using SRV in these various roles is to make people aware of their often unconsciously held beliefs about people with disabilities and the way these individuals are perceived, and subsequently treated in our society.

In re-reading and considering the additions to this volume, I am especially pleased with the inclusion of the "good things of life" piece. It serves to re-focus on and reinforce the importance of consciousness-raising. Many of the "17 things" that Wolfensberger describes are obvious components to enjoying the "good life." I am thinking in particular about having a home, belonging to a community, having friends, working, feeling safe, being exposed to and taking advantage of various opportunities, being dealt with honestly, having a say in one's own life, contributing and being recognized for those contributions, having good health and, most importantly for me, being recognized as human. However, perhaps because they are so obvious and uncontroversial, we tend to assume that most if not all people have and/or experience these good things.

I do not have to think very long or hard for examples of people who do not enjoy these very

basic things. As academics, students, professionals, advocates, friends, family members, human service workers and allies, we need to be reminded of the fact that people who are devalued may be robbed of or denied these things either intentionally or unintentionally. We need to be mindful and to pay close attention to these issues.

I find the inclusion of the second article, "If this, then that," to be somewhat more problematic. This may be because the tone of the piece, particularly the first couple of pages, can be perceived as somewhat harsh and may turn some readers off. This may take away from the points Wolfensberger is trying to make. Perhaps it might have been useful to have more detailed editorial comments on the reason for including both additional pieces, and how each adds to the foundational elements of the monograph itself.

I am pleased by the fact that this volume is used so frequently as both a reference book and textbook in various educational contexts. In light of this development, the inclusion of a comprehensive index is invaluable. I cannot count the number of times I had to flip through the entire text to find the particular section or point I was looking for.

To better assist educators, future consideration might be given to including some questions or topics for further discussion at various points throughout the book. For example, some of the language used in this volume is out-dated for readers in the 21st century. Although I am not suggesting that the original wording be changed, it might be worthwhile to encourage discussion about the ways in which the language used to describe disability and people with disabilities has changed over time, why this change has occurred and the implications of using certain words over other words. Using another example, there are times when Wolfensberger's approach might be characterized by Disability Studies scholars and Disability Studies literature as falling within a more individualized or pathologized approach to disability. This presents an excellent opportunity to engage students and practitioners in a discussion about the various approaches to disability, and the implications in policy and practice of using one approach over others.

As we become more aware of and sensitive to the ways in which various group are marginalized and devalued in our society, the need to address devaluation in meaningful ways grows. It is vital that we have the knowledge and tools to adequately respond. *A Brief Introduction to Social Role Valorization* assists us in providing such a response. However, there is always the worry that no matter how seminal the work, it must be kept current. The 4th edition competently addresses that concern, and in doing so, ensures that new generations of scholars, students and practitioners will consciously turn their attention to issues that can all too often become taken for granted or ignored.

On a personal note, I will have a hard time giving up my 3rd edition, which contains a wonderful inscription from the author himself.

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Karen D. Schwartz, PhD, is a member of the Faculties of Education & Social Work at the University of Manitoba (Canada).

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A Brief Introduction to Social Role Valorization: A High-order Concept for Addressing the Plight of Societally Devalued People, and for Structuring Human Services (4th expanded ed.). By W. Wolfensberger. Plantagenet, ON: Valor Press. 275 pages, 2013. **REVIEW AVAILABLE ONLINE @ www.srvip.org**

Reviewed by Renée Ehrenreich & Elizabeth McLennan

We are both 2013 graduates of the Developmental Services Worker program at Loyalist College. We are pleased and honoured to offer our opinion(s) about the expanded Social Role Valorization (SRV) monograph, particularly from a student perspective.

These are the items we feel are most improved/most helpful:

• The text is laid out in a reader-friendly fashion and the use of a more aesthetically-pleasing font makes the work easier to navigate. This makes the [sometimes challenging] concepts of SRV easier to understand and apply to real-life scenarios. Ideally, it will make the implementation of those concepts easier, as well.

• Chapters seem more cohesive and not so densely-packed, which also make the concepts more accessible.

• The expanded definition of "devaluation" and "those who are devalued" is a welcome and important change. It is easier to understand and sets the tone for learning further concepts.

• There are several additional examples which are clear and relevant and make the concepts of SRV both easier to grasp and to apply. Such descriptive examples make the concepts less "intellectual concept" and more applicable to the everyday challenges human service workers and families face. For example, on pages 21 and 22 (The Universal Dynamics of Social and Societal Devaluation), the text defines devaluation in clear and concise terms. Furthermore, on page 26, the text explains that what we devalue as a society–poverty, growing old, illness–is a) based on what we value, societally-speaking, and b) becomes associated with entire groups within society–the poor, the elderly, the sick–and we, in turn, devalue them.

• The addition of an index is very useful and will, in our opinion, be heavily-used.

• The "About the Author" page offers a face to put with the voice behind the concepts of Social Role Valorization and allows readers to view some of Wolf Wolfensberger's other professional accomplishments/publications.

As an aside, we believe that we have benefitted enormously from having been instructed at Loyalist College's Developmental Services Worker program, where Social Role Valorization is entirely embedded within the program itself. Because of our professors' commitment to Social Role Valorization, the monograph became more of a reinforcement of facts and concepts which we were already exploring, instead of an introduction to them. Without previous exposure to Social Role Valorization, the monograph becomes harder to understand and our concern would be that crucial concepts get lost in the language of SRV.

For example, a portion of the text about role theory reads like this: "As a result of receiving these expectancy signals (cues) or even demands from the social and/or physical environment, the person is apt to behave pretty much as expected. And, indeed, the first behaviours that the subject of role expectancies emits will commonly be interpreted by observers as consistent with the role even if those behaviours are ambiguous. At any rate, the observed person's behaviour is apt to reinforce the observer's original role perception, resulting in strengthened stereotyping on an observer's part." Why not simplify things further,

with something like, "What you expect to see, is what you DO see, based on someone's actions, looks or behaviour."

That being said, we are prepared and eager to apply the concepts of SRV to the lives of those we support now and in the future and feel that this new edition will help us–and others–do so.

Renée Ehrenreich & Elizabeth McLennan *are graduates of Loyalist College (Canada). Elizabeth blogs at http://lifewith-bellymonster.blogspot.ca/.*

The citation for this review is
Ehrenreich, R. & McLennan, E. (2013). Review of the book *A brief introduction to Social Role Valorization* by W. Wolfensberger. *The SRV Journal, 8*(1), 73–74.

Rory O'Shea Was Here. By D. O'Donnell (Director). 104 minutes, 2004. **REVIEW AVAILABLE ONLINE @ www.srvip.org**

Reviewed by Linda Higgs

"Rory O'Shea Was Here" was originally released under the title "Inside I'm Dancing."

This is a comedy-drama film based on a story written by Christian O'Reilly, after he spent time with two men involved with the independent living movement in Dublin, Ireland. The title character, Rory O'Shea, is a young man with Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy, and is played by James McAvoy. The other prominent character, Michael Connolly, has Cerebral Palsy and is played by Steven Robertson. Both men use power wheelchairs. Neither actor actually has a disability, which was controversial in the independent living movement when the film was released.

The story begins when Rory arrives at an institution named Carrigmore Residential Home. Rory makes a point right away of asking for a key to the front door, and when informed that he couldn't have one, replied "Then, it isn't home, is it?" It quickly becomes obvious that Rory is a troublemaker. He wears his hair spiked, doesn't like following the rules, and doesn't like his new home. It becomes apparent during the movie that he previously lived at home but was placed in a facility when his disease progressed. His father visits him occasionally.

Michael, on the other hand, has lived in institutions his entire life. His mother is deceased and his father, who is a lawyer, has abandoned him. Unlike Rory, Michael is very compliant and well-liked by the staff of the institution, although no one there can understand his speech. He has a cumbersome communication system, consisting of staff pointing at letters of the alphabet to spell out words, and there is no indication that anyone ever takes the time to have a conversation in this manner with him.

When Rory arrives, he can understand Michael's speech patterns because he has spent time with other people with CP. Michael infuriates Rory by calling his ability to understand him "a gift," but they soon become allies in a quest for independence.

In one scene, many people with disabilities who live at Carrigmore are seen, along with staff, on a busy street corner wearing vests and holding buckets labeled "National Collection Day," in an apparent attempt to raise money for services for people with disabilities. Rory convinces Michael to take their buckets of money and go to a pub to look for women. He believes they can buy girls to drink with them, and in a sense they do. They approach two young women and offer to buy all the drinks if they will assist them to drink. In his typical fashion, he explains using the money as "It's funding for the needs of the disabled. I'm disabled, and I need a drink."

After leaving the bar, they head to a nightclub where the doormen refuse them entrance. Michael takes on the role of lawyer and, with Rory as his interpreter, cites fake code violations related to discrimination. The doormen relent and, after entering, Rory joins in the dancing. The original title of the film comes from a scene in which Rory explains to Michael (who has never seen anyone in a wheelchair dance) "inside, I'm dancing." Michael is the first to notice a lovely blonde woman dancing. Siobhan, played by Romola Garai, eventually becomes their personal attendant.

Rory applies to an independent living review board regularly for the opportunity to live in the community, but is repeatedly denied because he is deemed to be immature and irresponsible. He and Michael develop a scheme in which Michael applies and is approved. Once he is approved, they inform the board that Michael will be moving with him as his interpreter, so they are both able to leave Carrigmore.

Apartments are too expensive for them to afford, so they pay a visit to Michael's father and blackmail him to pay for a place to live. Michael

was tongue-tied when he saw his father and never spoke a word, leaving his father to continue believing him to be incompetent and incapable.

His father paid for a two-bedroom apartment with accommodations for physical access, including lights that could be voice activated, although they couldn't be activated by Michael due to his unclear speech. The two men interviewed a variety of people to be their personal attendant without success. They happened to see Siobhan on the street again and eventually convinced her to work for them.

Rory continues trying to get people to treat him the same as everyone else, going so far as to take a carful of children joy riding and accusing the cop of discrimination for refusing to arrest him.

Michael falls in love with Siobhan, although Rory warns him repeatedly that he has nothing to offer a girl like her, and that "parakeets don't mate with armadillos."

Siobhan treats the two men with respect but struggles with the realization that Michael is falling in love with her. She eventually leaves her job as their personal attendant, but not before informing Rory that having a disability doesn't give him the right to be rude and inconsiderate, and telling Michael that she was being paid to care for him but didn't love him.

This movie provided several good examples of the dynamics of societal devaluation.Wolfensberger's theory of Social Role Valorization teaches that, as a result of being devalued, people get systematically rejected, sometimes even by their own families, as was demonstrated by Michael's father.

Wolfensberger also taught us that devalued people might be cast into sub-human or non-human roles, including the role of object, which was quite clearly portrayed in several scenes at the Carrigmore Residential Home, e.g., residents were being cleaned around as if they were inanimate objects, and staff didn't speak to residents when they bathed them or provided other services. In one scene, a therapist is sitting on top of Michael, taking his measurements and calling them out to another staff member who is recording them. No one in the room speaks to Michael.

All of the residents were cast into the object of pity and burden of charity roles when they were sent out on the streets wearing vests and holding buckets to collect funds for services. The residents of the home were all subjected to de-individualization, which is characteristic of settings that have atypically large groupings. Everyone ate together; the residents, all adults, were gathered around one television in the main living space; and everyone went to art class in the facility.

Some examples of societal attitudes towards people who are devalued (as child-like and as holy innocents) that stood out to me occured during the scenes of Michael and Rory interviewing people to be their personal attendants. One man proceeded to tell them what his rules would be. Another woman indicated she would be working as an extension of Jesus. One man asked if they dressed up as animals, and was relieved when they said they did not.

Wolfensberger taught that the bad things that characteristically happen to devalued people could become life-defining. This was illustrated by Rory, who was angrily rebelling against a society that did not treat him as a valued member. Michael, probably due to the impoverishment of experience which resulted from living an institutionalized life, appeared to be content with his situation until Rory appeared and helped him begin to broaden his horizons.

Even after the two men move into the community, the movie does not show particular examples of them having valued roles. They attend a party, but only because Siobhan was invited and they went along. Michael is shy and spends time mostly inside with Siobhan. Rory entertains the children outside their apartment. Lemay (1999) speaks of "role avidity," or "role hunger," in which people are desperate to see themselves in socially recognized roles, even when they are not necessarily positive. This was illustrated by Rory when, stopped by the police, he wanted to be taken to

jail the same as he perceived an able-bodied person would have been.

The very idea that two adult men would have to appear before a board to seek permission to live in the community, in which most adults naturally live, speaks loudly to the effects of societal devaluation on those who are in some way bodily impaired. Neither Rory nor Michael had an intellectual disability, although Michael may have been presumed to have by some people due to the effect his cerebral palsy had on his speech, and yet they were unable to live in the community without permission from a system that would decide if they were ready.

The movie gives the viewer a sense of some of the reasons behind the independent living movement. It also illustrates the heightened vulnerability of severely disabled people, which Rory quickly realized himself the night Siobhan walked out, since neither he nor Michael could get themselves to bed.

The version I watched included two deleted scenes and an alternate ending. One of the deleted scenes showed Rory in a jail cell. The end of the movie was a bit of a let-down because it didn't give you any clues as to Michael's future. In my opinion, the alternate ending was much better, although it included its own contradictions. It included scenes of Michael attaining the valued role of university student, which allowed the viewer to imagine more good things in life for him.

I would recommend this movie to others, and particularly to anyone interested in observing the effects of societal devaluation. Much like relying on all team members for their observations during a PASSING workshop, one could watch this movie more than once in order to observe more than might be noticed in a single viewing.

Linda Higgs is a Program Specialist for the West Virginia Developmental Disabilities Council (US) & has long experience with SRV, PASS & PASSING.

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Announcing
Advanced Issues in
Social Role Valorization Theory

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

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About Social Role Valorization (SRV)
Social Role Valorization (SRV), a human service theory based on the principle of normalization, proposes that positively valued social roles are needed for people to attain what Wolfensberger has described as the good things of life (well-being). This is of particular importance for individuals with impairments or otherwise at risk of being socially devalued by others, and therefore of great importance for human services to them.

About the book
The first two chapters explain SRV, and give depth and background to SRV as an empirical theory that is applicable to human services of all kinds, to all sorts of people. The remaining chapters are all revised and expanded versions of presentations that Dr. Wolfensberger had given at previous international SRV conferences. The topics treated in the chapters move from the general (chapters 2, 3 and 4) to the more specific (chapters 5, 6 and 7).

The contents of the book are especially useful for people who do, or want to, teach SRV; for SRV researchers; and for those interested in implementing SRV in a systematic way, especially in service fields where SRV is new, not yet known, and not widely—if at all—embraced.

About Wolf Wolfensberger, Ph.D. (1934-2011)
World renowned human service reformer, Professor Wolfensberger (Syracuse University) was involved in the development and dissemination of the principle of normalization and the originator of the program evaluation tools PASS and PASSING, and of a number of service approaches that include SRV and Citizen Advocacy.

Book Chapters

- Foreword
- Preface
- Chapter 1: A brief overview of Social Role Valorization
- Chapter 2: The role of theory in science, and criteria for a definition of Social Role Valorization as an empirically-based theory
- Chapter 3: The hierarchy of propositions of Social Role Valorization, and their empiricality
- Chapter 4: The relationships of Social Role Valorization theory to worldviews and values
- Chapter 5: Values issues and other non-empirical issues that are brought into sharp focus by, or at, occasions where Social Role Valorization is taught or implemented
- Chapter 6: Issues of change agentry in the teaching, dissemination and implementation of Social Role Valorization
- Chapter 7: The application of Social Role Valorization principles to criminal and other detentive settings
- Conclusion to the book

The Limitations of the Law in Human Services. By W. Wolfensberger. Plantagenet, ON: Valor Press, 83 pages, 2012. **REVIEW AVAILABLE ONLINE @ www.srvip.org**

Reviewed by David Ferleger

During World War II, a young boy, Wolf Wolfensberger, became a refugee sent by his family from his own country, Germany, to become a foster child in the precarious safety of France. In 1944, age 10, he left on foot to return 100 miles "as the crow flies" to try to find what was left of his family.[1] He was a survivor. He learned to be skeptical of the ostensible trustworthiness of social and governmental structures.

That skepticism marks this posthumous publication of this 2012 revised book, *The Limitations of the Law in Human Services.*[2] For Wolfensberger, we are in the midst of "the relatively rapid collapse of almost all the social institutions that hold our society–or indeed, any society,–together."[3] He saw in the world "signs of the death of a civilization."[4]

Legalization in human services, encompassing both legislation and litigation, is for Wolfensberger, a form of what he calls "systems disablement" where "the law makes sure that no one else can accomplish anything."[5] This book takes the law to task on three fronts. First, the legal system's intrinsic (though often unacknowledged) ideology is divorced from notions of morality and therefore results in injustice in many instances. Second, litigation and legislation are extremely limited in their ability to solve human service problems or advocacy goals. Third, lawyers themselves are trained and socialized to be technicians unable or unwilling to grapple with systemic issues.

Wolfensberger accurately targets the relationship of cultural values to developments in the law. Legal rights which have no support in the culture are bound to be subverted or ignored. Those which are "moderately ahead of cultural trends," he posits, will be the most adaptive and likely to succeed. One sees this dynamic, of course, in the civil rights, women's rights and gay rights movements.

Progress in human services, I suggest, moves more slowly than that in the political arena. People with disabilities who are "clients" or "recipients" of service systems typically have little political power or other leverage. They are not historically cultural activists.[6] Change in the culture in human services necessitates change in systems which employ many thousands of individuals and which are classically run by governments in conjunction with private and non-profit enterprises. Wolfensberger eloquently describes the consequences of laws which are out of touch with cultural values:

> *The fact that those laws that are out of touch with cultural values will work poorly, at best, has certain implications to human services. One is that hardly any human service-related legal measure will or can succeed if its rationale is not deeply accepted by those who must carry out the policies based on it. For instance, a human service will never be made normalizing, or role-valorizing, or even only safe, if those who provide the service are merely attempting to follow the law, rather than having their own deep understanding of and commitment to the underlying values and rationales. In the absence of such understanding and commitment, obedience to law is just a superficial and empty motion which grinds wheels aimlessly and futilely, and which may merely result in the replacement of one non-functional technology or entire system with another. We have observed this phenomenon strikingly in the effort of many states and provinces to deinstitutionalize, when the basic values which have led to the creation of institutions still persist. In such instances, deinstitutionalization only turns into equally bad, or even worse, dumping and destruction of people in the community.*[7]

Legal change alone is insufficient; "many people may need to be educated, implementive technologies may have to be developed, ways of handling a problem in a cost-efficient fashion may have to be designed and implemented, etc." The law "at best" can "facilitate those things which then may solve or at least ameliorate a problem."[8]

Wolfensberger falters in his apparent lack of knowledge (or lack of interest) in the evolution over the past 50 years of a body of law which is both protective of the safety of people with disabilities in the human services system, and which advances the rights of individuals to move from institutions to small family-scale homes in the community. Starting with challenges to unfair commitment procedures in the 1960s and '70s, and moving to oppressive institutional conditions, the courts began in the 1980s and since to consider the issue of "most integrated" settings.[9] Unfortunately, Wolfensberger's attention is on 1976 news–the New York Willowbrook case and the Wyatt v. Stickney Alabama lawsuit–and virtually not at all on developments before or since then. He does not address the relationship between litigation and federal/state funding of community services,[10] or the course-changing U.S. Supreme Court decision in Olmstead v. L.C. (1999) and the ensuing state plans and enforcing litigation.[11] The extent to which he was insulated from current thinking is exemplified by his advocacy for what he called "small-size" community homes of "8 to 12 places,"[12] rather than one, two or three, and the lack of mention of self-determination and similar concepts, as well as supported and customized employment.[13]

Wolfensberger's focus, though unacknowledged in this work, is on people with intellectual disabilities being served by the human services system. He critiques the Americans with Disabilities Act, as benefiting mainly lawyers, and downplays its coverage of people with physical disabilities, HIV infections, and the like.[14] The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is also ignored.

No doubt Wolfensberger would have had a lot to say about the developments noted above which are not covered in this book, and perhaps he would have found that his argument still holds true. One regrets that we will not have his commentary.

Wolfensberger succeeds in summarizing conditions where recourse to the law may be beneficial. High on his list is use of legal counsel to communicate with an adverse party to persuade that party to accede to a demand. He advises that litigation should be undertaken as a last resort only in serious situations, where it has a high likelihood of success, and where non-legal methods have been exhausted. Certainly, most attorneys in the field would agree with these guidelines.

Few individuals have had Wolf Wolfensberger's positive impact on human services systems, even where that impact has been disagreed with, diluted or re-directed. Probably most human services workers today, including those implementing value-driven person-centered services, do not know his name. His provocative work, *The Limitations of the Law in Human Services*, is a timely reminder that success in systemic change at all levels requires careful attention to the delicate interface of law and culture, and the relationships between those individuals who are served and those who serve them.

Endnotes

1. Eulogy spoken by Ray Lemay (2011), *The SRV Journal, 6*(1), 11-16.

2. Cited as "LL."

3. LL at 11.

4. LL at 12.

5. LL at 15.

6. This situation is changing. There are important exceptions which must be acknowledged. For example, self-advocacy has become a force in the developmental disabilities arena. Groups such as ADAPT and Disability Rights Advo-

cates for Technology press for change regarding access for people with physical disabilities.

7. LL at 22.

8. LL at 34.

9. See my series of videos and articles, including "The Arc of Disability Rights Litigation," at the website of the Minnesota Governor's Council on Developmental Disabilities–in the section on "The Evolution of Disability Rights Litigation." See also Samuel R. Bagenstos, (2012), The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, *Cardozo Law Review, 1*(34).

10. See, e.g., the annual editions of Braddock, D.L., Hemp, R., Rizzolo, M.C., Haffer, L., Tanis, E.S. & Wu, J. (2011). *The state of the states in developmental disabilities: 2011*. Washington, DC: American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities.

11. See, e,g., Terence Ng, Alice Wong & Charlene Harrington, *Home and community-based services: Introduction to Olmstead lawsuits and Olmstead plans* (UCSF National Center for Personal Assistance Services, updated May 2013).

12. LL at 71.

13. This revised book was completed just prior to Wolfensberger's death on February 27, 2011.

14. Unmentioned are numerous other American statutes in this field: Americans with Disabilities Act, Air Carrier Access Act, Architectural Barriers Act, Fair Housing Amendments, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Telecommunications Act, Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, Help America Vote Act, Rehabilitation Act, Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act.

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A Critique of Wolfensberger's APPEAR Monograph & Some of the Issues It Raises

Judith Sandys

Editor's Note: *The following review essay concerns the APPEAR monograph written by Wolf Wolfensberger. Given what the author describes in the introduction as an "issue of values," I would recommend that readers of this review also carefully read the APPEAR text itself (see p. 6), preferably before reading this review, in order to better engage with the questions raised about APPEAR & about certain aspects of SRV. The author indicates that different people of good intentions may interpret APPEAR, & this review essay itself, differently. Thus, I would say that good critical engagement & dialogue in this case especially call for a solid familiarity with the source text & with SRV theory. I welcome submission of other reviews & commentary on APPEAR.*

Introduction

A focus on the personal appearance of people with disabilities is very consistent with Social Role Valorization, which Wolfensberger conceptualized and about which he has written extensively (see, for example, Wolfensberger, 1983, 1995, 2012, 2013). Social Role Valorization (SRV) theory contends that people who are devalued in society will be treated poorly and that enabling devalued people to have valued social roles will increase the likelihood of them having access to "the good things in life" (Wolfensberger, Thomas & Caruso, 1996). In order to promote valued social roles for people who are, or are at risk of being, devalued, one needs to attend to enhancing both the image and the competency of the person, keeping in mind that competency and image are often interconnected. How people are perceived (their image) will impact on how they are treated, and thus on the opportunities they have to develop competencies. At the same time, the competencies that a person has, in and of themselves, will affect how the person is perceived. And that, in turn, will affect how the person is treated ... and so it continues.

Recognizing the significance of a person's appearance and the lack of attention that is so often paid to this issue, Wolf Wolfensberger in 2009 authored a small monograph entitled *Observing, Recording, and Addressing Personal Physical Appearance by Means of the APPEAR Tool* (Wolfensberger, 2009), hereafter referred to as APPEAR. The monograph includes a detailed discussion about the issue of appearance as it relates to people with disabilities, along with the APPEAR "tool" of the title, a very lengthy checklist for assessing a person's appearance. APPEAR itself is an acronym for "A Personal Physical Appearance Evaluation and Record."

This article provides a brief review of this monograph and a discussion of some of the issues it raises. Central to this discussion is the issue of values and their effect on how Social Role Valorization is implemented. The statement that one's appearance will have an impact on how one is perceived and treated lies within the realm of

theory and is supportable by empirical evidence. However, the very questions we raise about appearance, the factors that we consider, the strategies we seek to implement, and the outcomes that we see as desirable, all these will be shaped by our values. And there will be times when it is difficult, or perhaps impossible, to disentangle theory and values. APPEAR represents the application of Social Role Valorization theory to one particular area–appearance–and thus, inevitably, it raises values issues. People who hold different values will undoubtedly reach different decisions about when and how appearance issues should be addressed in particular situations. Thus someone who holds different values than those reflected in this monograph may disagree with some of the interpretations or suggested actions outlined in it–even though one may fully agree that there is a theoretical relationship between appearance and valued social roles, and one believes (as I do) that addressing the issue of appearance is very important.

The Relationship Between Social Role Valorization & Theory

In a recent publication, Wolfensberger (2012, also 2013) discusses the relationship between values and theory, noting that it is "via motives and expectations that values impinge upon the scientific enterprise" (2012, 197). The questions asked, the theories formulated, the data collected, and the interpretation of that data are all influenced by the motives and values of those conducting the research. It is only when there is a sufficiently large body of empirical research, conducted by different people operating from different perspectives, that a theory may be seen to be empirically supportable. Social Role Valorization is one such theory, its major tenets supported by a large body of research from a variety of fields, most often conducted by people who have never even heard of Social Role Valorization.

Nonetheless, while as a theory, SRV is based almost entirely on empirically supported science, Wolfensberger notes that, as with other theories, its application is deeply rooted in values issues. There is powerful empirical evidence regarding the impact of valued social roles. There is ample evidence that speaks to the need to address both competency and image issues. Yet when it comes to interpretation and application, people will often disagree. Inevitably each of us is shaped by our own values, based on our social location and relatedly on our life experiences.

A central assumption in Social Role Valorization is that in order to have a valued role, one must conform to the values of the culture in which one seeks to be a valued member. It is true that in any society we can identify a number of broad values around which there is wide consensus. Thus if one asks groups of people to identify what our society values, the lists they generate will most often be very similar. At the same time, our society is not a monoculture and there are many divisions within our society. For example, the extreme polarization of the major political parties in the United States suggests that, except perhaps at a very broad and general level, there is no one central value system that binds the country. Even within mainstream society, there are competing values and, except at the very broadest level, it may be difficult to determine which values and whose values are the "dominant" ones. Along with other factors (including, for example, one's religion), where one stands on the political spectrum will have an impact on the values one holds and on the decisions one makes about many things, including how to implement SRV. Those with a deeply conservative mindset will think and act differently from those with a less conservative, or more liberal, mind set.

There is also an assumption within SRV that there will be consensus on what roles are valued and devalued within society. Of course, there is indeed wide consensus when we are talking in the aggregate or in general terms. We know, for example, that paid work is highly valued within our society and that enabling a person to have the valued role of worker is likely to have a profound

impact on a person's life. Not surprisingly, there is strong consensus that promoting work roles for disabled people is important. However, within the shared goal of promoting valued social roles in the domain of work, there are still a number of potentially competing issues. In an ideal world, we would seek to find "good" work for all disabled people, work that pays a fair wage, that contributes to the development of skills, that promotes positive relationships, etc. But we know that this is not always possible. Even when work involves pay, it may involve poor and potentially dangerous working conditions, isolation, dirty work, etc. In terms of promoting valued social roles, is pay the most important issue or is the content of the work and work environment itself more important? Despite the fact that our society clearly places a high value on work, Wolfensberger (2009) argues for the appropriateness of unpaid work in some situations. Of course, other questions need to be answered–how much pay? How bad the conditions? But at some level, an individual's personal values about the nature and purpose of work will have an impact on what that person deems most important and on the actions to take in a particular situation. While there is wide consensus on what roles (e.g., work) are valued, there may be less consensus on which elements of this role are more or less important or on the relative value of different kinds of work.

A Brief Overview of APPEAR

The APPEAR monograph is divided into two main parts. The first and longer part is a narrative discussion about the issue of appearance along with a section on the limitations of the APPEAR tool. After the end of this first part and following the list of references, is the second part, which includes instructions on the use of the APPEAR checklist and a copy of the checklist itself.

The first part begins with a brief introduction on the importance of appearance and a section outlining the rationale for an appearance audit using the aforementioned checklist. The features that contribute to one's overall appearance are many and complex, beyond the ability of most people to keep in mind. The major purpose of the checklist is to raise consciousness of the issue of appearance. The audit is designed to ensure comprehensiveness, so that no appearance features are overlooked, perhaps because it has never occurred to the observer that a specific feature might have a potential impact.

Following this is a very thorough discussion of the importance of appearance, and the impact it has on those who are perceiving and those who are perceived. The evidence that appearance matters is overwhelming. While much is said to the effect that we should not be judging people by their appearance, there is no doubt that people are constantly making judgments about other people based on their appearance. Wolfensberger explores the unconsciousness of these perceptions along with their impact. He discusses the ever famous feedback loop that exists between how people are perceived and treated, and how they respond.

In the sections that follow, Wolfensberger articulates some of the appearance "problems" that devalued people typically experience and outlines strategies for addressing these. He outlines factors to consider in determining what appearance features to focus on, how to decide what actions are appropriate, and who the appropriate people are who have "standing" to address the appearance of another person. He talks about what to do when a disabled person resists changes to appearance and what he sees as the limits to "self determination." The final section of the first part of the monograph (80-82) includes a brief discussion of some of the limitations of the APPEAR tool.

The publication concludes with a section entitled "Instructions for Use of the APPEAR Recording Form and Checklist" (93) and then the actual checklist (also available as a separate publication). The suggested process for completing this checklist is to convene a team of "auditors" who will

individually rate the person on each appearance feature on a five-point scale, where 1 is "Image-Devastating" and 5 is "Image-Optimizing" (94), after which the team will discuss each rating to reach consensus on the appropriate level.

The checklist itself includes over 200 items, called "appearance features," which are "clustered as to the body part(s) involved" (93). There are five major sections: Head, Body, Global Appearance Features, Attire and Accessories, and Other. With the exception of the last one, each section includes a number of parts, and each part may be further divided and then further subdivided. For example, the Head section is divided into six parts (A. Head & Face Proportions; B. Scalp & Head Hair; C. Ears; D. Head Posture; E. Face; and F. Facial Features Other). Each of these six is further subdivided. Thus, E. Face is subdivided into 1. Facial Skin, 2. Eyes, 3. Nose, 4. Mouth, Lips, Teeth & Tongue, 5. Facial Appearance Overall, 6. Facial Expression, and 7. Facial Cosmetic Use. Each of these is further subdivided. Nose (one of the shorter lists) includes six ratings, specifically: a. Size, b Shape, c. Cleanliness, d. Hair, e. Discharges and f. Other.

Strengths of APPEAR

Without a doubt, the monograph includes a very thorough discussion of the importance of appearance. As is characteristic of Wolfensberger's writings, this includes much interesting, thoughtful, relevant and insightful discussion. The discussion is pure Wolfensberger, rich with citations and examples. He makes a very strong and compelling case for the importance of appearance, outlining the issues that need to be addressed and explaining why. He explores the issue from all angles; as soon as one thinks of an issue that may have been omitted, one is sure to find it addressed a few pages later. He often anticipates the objections that others may raise and refutes these with typical precision. To questions about whether too much attention is being paid to appearance or whether we should focus more on changing society, Wolfensberger argues that even if one deplores the societal emphasis on appearance and wishes to change it, one cannot expect such change to occur on the backs of those who are already devalued and wounded. "Privileged people can afford to strike out against 'look-ism' by making themselves unattractive and challenging others to value them highly nonetheless. But already devalued people need all the help they can get" (93).

Much of this discussion is clear and compelling, reflecting the complexity of the issue in a clear and well reasoned manner. In terms of who should intervene in attempts to change a person's appearance, he says: "The vast majority of adults have full standing to control certain parts of their appearance on their own: how they groom, the hair style they adopt, the clothes they wear, etc. However the more a person is mentally impaired, the less likely this is to be the case" (62). In these instances, others–parents, guardians, service providers–may then have "standing" to a greater or lesser degree depending on the situation.

There may be conflicts between appearance and competency, and between appearance and autonomy. In terms of the latter, he mention "self-determination" and "choice," issues that he has written about previously (e.g., Wolfensberger, 2002). Many of us will agree that these terms–like choice, autonomy, empowerment and self-determination–have been used to justify practices that entrench disabled people in devalued social roles. Wolfensberger does maintain that there are some appearance changes which may not be appropriate, and he includes in these efforts to change racial characteristics and what he refers to as "appearance obsession."

Also noteworthy is a discussion of strategies for attending to (i.e., changing) a person's appearance, through such means as skill development, habit formation, instrumental supplementation (e.g., snaps instead of buttons), surgical amelioration (changing appearance), other medical amelioration (treating acne, braces on teeth), com-

pensation (particularly nice clothes) and concealment or masking (long sleeved shirts, hair covering a birth mark), distracting the perceiver's gaze (sparkling personality, eye glasses for people with Down's syndrome [which seem to me to be concealment]), and enhancing the context and juxtapositions (seen in nice environment, seen with attractive people).

Wolfensberger is also clear about the limitations of the tool he has developed. Intended primarily as a "consciousness-raiser" about the importance of appearance, it does not answer questions as to what features might be amenable to change, who has "standing" to try to effect such change, the moral considerations involved in implementing particular change measures, or whether an individual wants to change her/his appearance. And he states: "APPEAR is not meant to be used as an alternative or substitute to (a) common sense, (b) the cultivation of observational skills, and (c) the application of Social Role Valorization strategies more broadly" (81).

Limitations of APPEAR

Despite much excellent discussion on the importance of personal appearance for people with disabilities, there are aspects of this monograph that severely limit its usefulness and impact.

Anyone who has had any familiarity with Wolfensberger knows that he was never a slave to political correctness and, while many of us may even admire this trait in him, there are times when his wording is so contrary to current cultural norms that it is problematic. His insistence on using language that many will find archaic and offensive creates an unfortunate distraction and, ironically, contributes to a negative image of the publication itself.

Also, sure to offend is his reference to racial characteristics, when, on page 15, he refers "to being of devalued skin colour" as one in a list of "abnormalities of appearance" or "stigmata" which (along with, for example, being hunchbacked or having a visible scar) are a source of devaluation. Clearly, people whose skin colour is different from that of the dominant group are devalued in our society, but referring to such skin colour as an "abnormality" may well be perceived by some to be racist. Whatever the intent, this is a very poor choice of words.

In his writings and presentations, Wolfensberger invariably provides a barrage of examples to demonstrate the points he is making. Most often, this is a very effective strategy, laying to rest any doubts members of his reading or listening audience may have as the veracity of his claims. He employs this strategy here too and most often it 'works.' However, in some instances, one gets the sense that he is so intent on presenting example after example, that he does not always pay close attention to the other messages some of these contain. And on some occasions, the messages are very negative.

The focus of this monograph is the relationship between a positive personal appearance and having a valued social role. It is puzzling, therefore, that some of the historical examples focus on the positive appearance of some who were clearly devalued, including women in harems, court 'fools' and circus freaks.

And what about holding a beauty pageant in a nursing home? Does this really result in staff acquiring "much higher consciousness of appearance features" (71)? Or does this have a quality of make-believe that serves to infantilize or mock the people it purports to help? Indeed, the major 'problem' here is, in all probability, the nursing home itself and the social role degradation it imposes on residents. A 'one off' event seems unlikely to change very much. In light of Social Role Valorization and Wolfensberger's own critiques of nursing homes, the inclusion of this example is particularly puzzling. At the very least, it points to the danger of ignoring the larger context when addressing appearance issues.

Despite the fact that Wolfensberger has emphasized that SRV is an empirically-supported social

science theory, the discussion sometimes veers into the issue of morality. In particular, teenagers and women who dress "sluttishly" or look "sluttish" (28) are at risk of "sinking down" (28, quotations in original). Even those who "may want to display solidarity with lowly folk" are cautioned against "doing things that might make one decline morally" (28). There are many in our society who assume that women who are the victims of unwanted sexual advances, abuse or assault have done something to invite these actions and therefore are deserving of their fate. The wording here assumes a connection between "dressing sluttishly" and moral decline, and in doing so, tends to reinforce these very negative stereotypes.

And another even more serious example. Wolfensberger notes, on page 29, that there are situations where, when people wish to devalue a specific class of people, they may deliberately take steps to alter the appearance of those within this class, in order to emphasize that those people are devalued and to signal to others that it is appropriate to treat those in this class poorly. He includes Jews in Nazi Germany as one such example. This is undoubtedly accurate. However, he then begins the paragraph that follows by pointing out that "some people who have unfavorable appearance features get highly stressed over them" and "may even avoid public places, not go out at all, or restrict their social involvements and occasions." Again, this is surely the case. However, the next comment, that this is what "marked Jews did under the Nazis" (28) is not accurate and will upset many. Jews under the Nazis were certainly "highly stressed," but to ascribe this simply to their concerns about their appearance is to ignore the historical context and to create an impression that is both inaccurate and insensitive. Adding insult to injury, his comments are embedded in the middle of a paragraph that then talks about improvements in one's appearance as potentially a "breakthrough boost for ... a person's mentality and lifestyle," and about the potential benefits of a "new, elegant and well fitting wardrobe" (29). A very unfortunate juxtaposition!

The issue of subcultures: The term 'subculture' comes up numerous times in this monograph, including: "some marginal subcultures" (32), e.g., "teen age girls [who] deck themselves out in ways that suggest they are prostitutes," "young males" whose dress suggests they are into drug culture, and those who engage in tattooing, especially "of a certain type" (32); "Goth" subculture" (43); "the ideological subculture" of disabled people, that insists that impaired people be "accepted as they are" (74) and "subcultures" (75) which may value appearance features that "violate the norms of the larger society." While Wolfensberger does not specifically mention ethno-specific groups here, he does refer in this paragraph to cultures that are "non-Western," taking exception with "a post-modernist and/or politically correct idea that all cultural difference are equally valid, or even that all non-Western cultures are better than Western ones" (75). It is perhaps worth noting that in all these instances, the subgroups that are discussed are presented in negative terms.

With regard to these latter (presumably non-Western) subcultures, Wolfensberger suggests one needs to consider whether the person "will function only or exclusively within that subculture or whether the person expects to find acceptance and opportunities from the larger culture" (75). If the latter, he contends that the person will have to meet some, though not necessarily all, of the appearance standards of the larger society.

This discussion raises many issues, some too complex to be addressed here. One of Wolfensberger's signature contributions to our understanding of SRV is the "if this, then that" formulation (1995). Perhaps one limitation of this formulation is that it may encourage us to think in either/or terms even when this is not necessary. If one had to choose whether to function only within one's subculture or within the broader society, then one would need to decide whose ap-

pearance norms should take precedence. However, as Wolfensberger notes, it is very difficult in our society to function entirely within a subculture. Further, within our increasingly pluralistic society, people can almost always forge an appearance that is compatible with their subculture and acceptable to broader society. Many appearance features center around hygiene, neatness, good fitting clothes, etc., things that are unlikely to be at odds with most cultural groups. It is fine to say that if one's subculture is a gang, that presenting a gang appearance would not gain one acceptance or opportunities in society. But to apply such an argument to non-Western, ethno-specific groups is, for the most part, unnecessary. What appearance features should be discouraged? Should we be discouraging Muslim women wearing scarves, Sikh men wearing turbans? Should Black women not loc their hair? Surely we should be supporting disabled people to present a positive appearance that is valued within their subculture as well as within the broader society.

Further, our society is comprised of a multitude of intersecting subgroups and subcultures. There are relatively few people (maybe none) who belong only to "the dominant culture." As we think about crafting valued roles for people within society, we must take into account these various subcultures, rather than seeing them all as creating obstacles to be overcome.

Identity and disability: Wolfensberger seems to be dismissive of the notion of disabled people having a positive self identity as a disabled person. He says that some disabled people "have evolved, been taught or somehow acquired certain ideologies pertaining to their impairment" (78). Included in these may be a belief that the impairment is part of one's identity and explicit rejection of efforts to change it or make it less noticeable. He suggests "sensitivity and diplomacy" in dealing with such misguided and recalcitrant (my words, not his) people: we must assure them that their value does not depend on their appearance and must emphasize the "intrinsic value of each and every human." His strategy for dealing with these misguided folks is to start (his word) by talking "about clothing that is simultaneously functional, fashionable and of high quality." And he adds, "One reason why this will often elicit cooperation is that many impaired people would not have been able to access or afford such clothing without outside help." I agree with Wolfensberger's views on self-determination and choice. All too often these are used as excuses for doing nothing and standing by while bad things happen to devalued people. At the same time, we need to recognize that, as he has noted, some people have standing to make their own decisions about their own appearance. To suggest that we should somehow manipulate them into cooperating, perhaps by bribing them with resources they would not otherwise have access to, seems more than a little patronizing.

There are a number of messages hidden in these words. One is that disabled people who proclaim their identity as a disabled person are misguided or stubborn and need to be manipulated into doing what is best for them. It equates looking like a disabled person with not having nice clothes. It is to suggest that disabled people are poor and that poor, disabled people do not know what is in their best interests. Surely, if the issue is lack of access or money with which to purchase attractive clothing, shouldn't we be dealing with those issues, rather than using their poverty as a rationale for applying a service that someone has said they do not want?

The checklist: One very most visible negative aspect of APPEAR is the "checklist" itself.

Wolfensberger cites Gawande (2007) whose checklists have had "had spectacular results" (93). Atul Gawande has developed and written extensively on the use of checklists in medical practice, notably in his book, *The Checklist Manifesto* (2009). In an article in the *New Yorker*, published in 2007, Gawande talks about how he came to

develop his checklist. He credits a doctor, named Pronovost, who noted that the level of infection in his hospital, after surgery, was very high. To try to address this, Pronovost developed a checklist. And says Gawande: "He didn't attempt to make a checklist to cover everything; he developed it to tackle just one problem." The items asked the doctor whether s/he done what they were supposed to do, i.e., (1) wash their hands with soap and water, (2) clean the patient's skin with chorlhexidine antiseptic, (3) put sterile drapes over the entire patient, (4) wear a sterile mask, hat, gown and gloves, and (5) put a sterile dressing over the catheter site, once the line was in. Check, check, check, check, check" (page 6 from online article). The application of the checklist had a major impact on infection rates wherever it was implemented; and other checklists as well, for different procedures followed. Each is specific to the task at hand, relatively brief, and answerable by–a check mark! This is very different from the "checklist" in APPEAR. Asking people to rate over 200 items–not simply to check whether something is or isn't, has or hasn't been done, but to rate each on a five point scale–is not what one would typically think of as a checklist.

There is a long history of applying measurements to devalued people and few of these have had positive outcomes. Some thirty years ago, Stephen Jay Gould wrote a book entitled *The Mismeasure of Man*, in which he explored some of the ways that measurement has been applied to devalued people–including, in particular, people of different racial backgrounds, people presumed to have criminal tendencies and people with intellectual disabilities. The major purpose of these tests was to provide a so-called scientific basis for justifying doing bad things to certain people–because their brains were too small, because they didn't look right or because their score on a standardized intelligence test was too low. The validity and reliability of these tests has long been challenged. Both the underlying assumption (that what was being measured made a difference), and the actual process by which the measurements were made, have long been disproved. Thus, the measurement of the capacity of a skull (to represent the size of the brain) varied based on whether the skull was known to be from a person of a particular race and/or who was doing the measuring. And the correlation between the size of the skull and intelligence have been disproved. Despite its good intentions, APPEAR again represents a tool that will measure devalued people, in this instance focusing on appearance features. Its clinical, mechanistic approach by a team of "appearance experts" who assign numerical ratings to the various aspects of a person's appearance is reminiscent of the historical approaches that Gould (1996) recounts, suggesting a continuing wish or need to measure and judge people who are seen as different. APPEAR focuses on the appearance features of a person in a way that is very intrusive, very clinical and very distancing. While the APPEAR tool does provide a space to rate each feature positively, its real purpose is to ferret out every little blemish or difference. This incredible level of detail creates image problems of its own. Through both the process and the content, APPEAR casts the disabled person into the role of other, of sick, of being in need of appearance treatment or therapy.

Wolfensberger draws parallels between the APPEAR tool and the PASSING instrument (Wolfensberger *&* Thomas, 1983, 2007), and in some ways, the two do appear similar. PASSING uses what is referred to as a "checklist" to rate some 42 aspects of a human service. Both PASSING and APPEAR use a team of people who each do their ratings independently and who then discuss each rating to achieve consensus. Despite these similarities, there are substantial differences between the two. In PASSING, teams begin their deliberations with a long and fulsome discussion of the characteristics and identities of the service recipients, examining what they need and what they are receiving. (While the process of this "foundations discussion" has evolved over

time and become increasingly formalized, PASSING has always focused on the service and the extent to which it is responsive to the characteristics, needs and identities of people being served.) Unlike PASSING, APPEAR focuses not on a service but on one individual. PASSING has 42 ratings, APPEAR over 200. PASSING is a tool designed to enable us to analyze the various aspects of a service, to consolidate the ratings into broad, overarching themes, and to identify ways that a service could be improved. All this provides an opportunity for deep reflection and analysis, a process that is very different than the application of the APPEAR tool, which is basically a descriptive rather than an analytic tool.

Wolfensberger likens the APPEAR tool and the process accompanying it to a "finishing school." Historically, finishing schools were attended by the (perhaps not very smart) daughters of the very rich, designed to increase their marriageability, at a time when most women were not expected to get a "real" education. They were elitist institutions that emphasized very strict gender roles and kept these rich women in subservient roles. Such places have largely gone out of fashion as values have changed and opportunities for women have expanded. Finishing schools hardly seem to fit the criteria of a culturally valued analogue.

Wolfensberger suggests that the tool is designed to address the appearance features of all devalued people. To the extent that it is used as a "consciousness raiser," this may well be so. However, with regard to being used as "checklist," he notes that some people would need assistance to apply the APPEAR tool to themselves, and that others would be "totally incapable of any involvement" due to "their immaturity or the severity of their impairment" and that, most often, the APPEAR tool would be applied to such people–"a young child, a profoundly retarded person, or a person who has lost consciousness or insight" (80). And, of course, it is this very group that is the most vulnerable of all to the negative image messages that the APPEAR tool conveys.

Conclusion

Undoubtedly, this monograph includes much thoughtful and insightful discussion about appearance. However, the negative aspects outlined above reduce its potential usefulness. While those already familiar with Social Role Valorization may find some of Wolfensberger's discussion very instructive, they are cautioned to look at it with a critical eye, to reject the negative image messages it conveys, and to reflect upon valued, sensitive and respectful ways of a promoting positive appearance for disabled people. Used in this way, some sections of the monograph could well provide some helpful material for teaching purposes and for working with disabled people and their families.

I am not sure I would recommend this monograph to anyone. But I do know that I would not recommend it to anyone who was not already very familiar with SRV. The distinction between SRV and the values that underlie SRV implementation is seldom clearly understood, and readers new to SRV are unlikely to make this differentiation. Unfortunately for those among that group who may already have serious reservations about SRV (perhaps because they perceive it to reflect white, western, conservative, middle class values, or because they see it as seeking to control disabled people), this monograph is likely to reinforce these preconceptions.

The checklist itself should be ignored or destroyed (or used in teaching as a bad example). It is ironic that a tool created to promote a positive appearance for devalued people should itself convey such negative image messages about the people it seeks to help. Consistent with everything we know about SRV, the processes by which we seek to promote valued roles must themselves reflect societal norms, thereby promoting positive images of disabled people. There is a profound contradiction in using image degrading methods in the service of promoting a positive appearance. Even if, in some instances, it might be effective in promoting a more positive appearance of some

individuals, it contributes to a process of "othering" that will have a negative impact on the individual in question and, potentially, on others who are in the same class.

All these criticisms aside, there is no question that people with intellectual (and other) disabilities are very devalued in our society. Waiting for society to change so that disabled people can experience the good things in life is, as Armstrong (2007) so effectively put it, "wishing on a star." Working diligently to encourage people to present as positive appearance as possible is certainly important and has far too often been ignored.

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List of Items to be Reviewed

In each issue of *The SRV Journal*, we publish reviews of items relevant to SRV theory, training, research or implementation. These include reviews of books, movies, articles, etc. We encourage our readers to look for and review such items for this journal. We will be happy to send you our guidelines for writing reviews, or they are available on our website (http://www.srvip.org/journal_submissions.php). We are open to reviews of any items you think would be relevant for people interested in SRV. We also have specific items we are seeking reviews of. (We strive to include items which might have relevance to: SRV theory, one or more SRV themes, and/or social devaluation. If, however, a reviewer finds that a particular item is not so relevant, please let us know.) These items include:

Social Inclusion at Work. (2008). By Janis Chadsey. Annapolis, MD: AAIDD, 49 pages.

Inclusive Livable Communities for People with Psychiatric Disabilities. (2008). Washington, DC: National Council on Disability, 84 pages.

Body & Soul: Diana & Kathy. (2006). By Alice Elliott (Director). 40 minutes.

Achieving community membership through community rehabilitation provider services: Are we there yet? (2007). *Intellectual & Developmental Disabilities, 45*(3), 149–160.

Eisenman, L. Social networks & careers of young adults with intellectual disabilities. (2007). *Intellectual & Developmental Disabilities, 45*(3), 199-208.

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Hall, A., Butterworth, J., Winsor, J., Gilmore, D. & Metzel, D. Pushing the employment agenda: Case study research of high performing states in integrated employment. (2007). *Intellectual & Developmental Disabilities, 45*(3), 182-198.

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Social Role Valorization News & Reviews

Susan Thomas

The intent of this column is five-fold:

(a) Briefly annotate publications that have relevance to Social Role Valorization (SRV). Conceivably, some of these might be reviewed in greater depth in a later issue of this journal. Some of these items may serve as pointers to research relevant to SRV theory.

(b) Present brief sketches of media items that illustrate an SRV issue.

(c) Present vignettes from public life that illustrate or teach something about SRV.

(d) Document certain SRV-related events or publications for the historical record.

(e) By all the above, to illustrate and teach the art and craft of spotting, analyzing and interpreting phenomena that have SRV relevance.

Aside from being instructive to readers, persons who teach SRV will hopefully find many of the items in this column useful in their teaching.

Correction & Update

*Mea culpa. An alert reader drew to our attention that we had our dates wrong in an item in the last column in this *Journal*, namely, on p. 70 of the December 2012 issue, we said that a historical revision had been committed when a writer in Newsweek claimed that "inclusion" began with US President Andrew Jackson in the 1840s–but Jackson was president in the 1830s. Apologies for our own (inadvertent) historical revision.

*In the Dec. 2012 column, p. 66, we also wrote about South African champion runner Oscar Pistorius–who, since then, has had a dramatic fall from his high social position, being accused of having shot to death his girlfriend, and she herself having held the highly valued role of beautiful fashion model. Reportedly, athletic roles are very highly valued in South Africa, and Pistorius was viewed there as a symbol of overcoming any limitations: physical, of one's birth and social position, of poverty, race, etc. What happens to him is thus very symbolic for the whole nation. At the time of this writing, Pistorius had not yet been tried–but based on knowledge of the power of social roles, one could predict that if he suffers any negative consequences, they will be much less worse than if he had not held several valued social roles.

The Common Wounds Inflicted on Devalued People, Including In & By Human Services

*Langer, L.L. (1991). *Holocaust testimonies: The ruins of memory.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. This book interprets the oral testimonies and remembrances of victims of the Holocaust of the Jews in World War II Germany as revealing that both such persons and the memories they carry have been "ruined"in some way. He vividly documents that though the survivors of the Holocaust exhibit "resilience" in many ways, they remain deeply wounded people, truly scarred by their experiences, and that this continues as a "fester-

ing wound" (p. 92) throughout their lives. They have suffered "a kind of violence to the natural course of existence from which one never entirely recovers" (p. 136). A poet, Nelly Sachs, refers to this as the "mutilated music of their lives" (p. 38). The author also invokes the concept of "wounded time" (p. 75), which has resonances with our concept of life-wasting.

*Chang, I. (1997). *The rape of Nanking: The forgotten holocaust of World War II.* New York: Basic Books. Reissued in 1998 by Penguin Books. This is a painfully and gruesomely detailed documentation of the invasion and occupation of Nanking, the one-time capital city of China, by the Japanese in December 1937. It focuses especially on the first few months of occupation, a period called "the rape of Nanking." Indeed, rape was practiced on a massive scale, possibly unprecedented in war until that time. It is estimated that anywhere from 20,000 to 80,000 Chinese females were raped (the numbers are contested), and many of these were killed afterwards in appallingly brutal manner (p. 6). As many as one thousand females, ranging in age from young girls to old women, were raped each night (p. 154). As with the Nazi genocide of handicapped and impaired people, the number of people killed in the rape of Nanking is still highly controverted, but a reasonable estimate is that between 260,000 and 350,000 non-combatants were executed by the Japanese between just mid-December 1937 and the early months of 1938 (p. 6).

There had long been enmity between the Chinese and Japanese, but this book focuses particularly on the deep devaluation of the Chinese by the Japanese, and gives many examples of the dynamics of devaluation and concomitant harsh treatment, even to the point of direct deathmaking.

Both before and during the war, members of the Japanese military repeatedly and explicitly said they regarded the Chinese as "pigs" (p. 218), thereby casting them into the sub-human role.

In contradiction to stated military policy, but apparently with the tacit approval of both the Japanese military and government, the Japanese soldiers forced large numbers of Chinese women to serve in what were essentially military brothels, but detoxifyingly called "facilities of sexual comfort." The Japanese referred to the women in these brothels as "public toilets" (p. 53), casting them very explicitly into the role of waste/excrement/offal. In typical imperial fashion, the Japanese government denied any responsibility, insisting for decades that private entrepreneurs ran these brothels–despite the existence of documents bearing the official personal stamps of members of the Japanese high command that ordered the construction of these facilities (p. 53).

Later, starting in April 1939, the Japanese also conducted medical experiments on the people of Nanking, injecting or feeding them poisons, germs and lethal gases, thereby killing about 10 or more people each week in a closely guarded secret facility (called Unit Ei 1644), and burning them in an incinerator (p. 164). This continued all the way till the end of the war, in August 1945. The people experimented on in this facility were referred to as "lumber," casting them into the object role.

Beyond Nanking, the Japanese also practiced excessive cruelty on their military captives. Only one in 25 American prisoners-of-war (POWs) in Nazi captivity died, but one in three POWs in Japanese captivity died (p. 173).

*Barlow, J. & Kirby, N. (1991). Residential satisfaction of persons with an intellectual disability living in an institution or in the community. *Australia & New Zealand Journal of Developmental Disabilities, 17*(1), 7-23. This 20-year old study may nonetheless still have validity. It reports that mentally retarded people in an institution were more satisfied with their social life than retarded residents of community settings, who were more satisfied with their autonomy. To a retarded person, socialization with other retarded persons

beats loneliness, even if it is what one might call "included loneliness."

*Schofield, W. (1964). *Psychotherapy: The Purchase of friendship.* Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall. The very name of this book underlines that there is something culture-alien about paying for or "buying" friendship, or even buying the appearance and the functions of friendship (such as having someone who listens to one, and gives one positive feedback). This speaks to the wound of loss of natural and freely-given relationships, and the substitution of paid and boughten ones, for devalued people.

*One wound of devalued people is that of multiple jeopardy, as revealed through history in the fact that devalued people tend to get suspected, blamed and even scapegoated when bad things happen, especially things that are catastrophic and cannot be easily explained in other ways. That is why, for example, devalued people have been said to be witches, and these witches then got blamed for causing crop failures, or waves of illness. Usually, such devalued parties were then treated very badly, e.g., via imprisonment, exile or execution. However, even parties that were already dead have sometimes been made the scapegoat for bad occurrences. For instance, in the late 1800s, in the midst of outbreaks of deadly tuberculosis in New England, those who had already died of the disease were said to be "vampires" who were draining the blood of those who were still live but very sick. As a result, the corpses of the suspected "vampires" were exhumed, their hearts cut out and burned if they had not yet decomposed, and their skeletons dismembered and broken (e.g., Tucker, in *Smithsonian*, October 2012). At least this superstition spared actual living persons from bearing the onus of blame and being badly treated.

*Another example of the wound of multiple jeopardy: *Newsweek* (16 February 2009) said that foster children are at very high risk of having their "identity stolen" because their identifying information is so easily accessible, especially if they pass through many services and homes.

*In 2012, the cemetery of an old county poorhouse was dug up in order to allow a local college to build on the property. Though the remains (of 80 people) were found with coffin wood and metal handles, indicating that they had been buried in coffins, the remains were just packed up in used cardboard boxes that had contained reams of copy paper and were reinterred in these containers in a long trench (*Syracuse Post-Standard*, 30 September 2012). This is an example of the wounds of deindividualization, negative role-casting and negative imaging following people even long after their deaths.

*In addition to tardive dyskinesia (motor impairment due to drug use), psychoactive drugs can also lead to tardive dysphoria (impairment of affect–really, a permanent depression), and tardive akithisia (constant restlessness). All of these are examples of marking or branding devalued persons, and via a treatment that is claimed to be beneficial to them.

*After two homeless people were killed within just two weeks in one locale, there was much media coverage of the plight of the local homeless population, including of the "camps" some of them had established under bridges and highway overpasses. This coverage revealed the yawning chasm between the perceptions of the homeless themselves, and the perceptions of service providers, about the local shelter services for the homeless. For instance, the director of one such shelter service said "The system can be very beneficial. It can provide you with food, shelter, an apartment and public assistance." But a homeless man said "The [local shelter], that's like a prison sentence. They [i.e., other homeless people] call it the house of pain." Indeed, the shelters were described as big open rooms with beds only inches

apart, crowded, loud, and of course with many rules (*Syracuse Post-Standard*, 30 September 2012, p. A8), none of which would appeal to the deeply wounded intended beneficiaries.

*Grantham, C. (2009). *The chocolate seller on Broadway and his kids: The story of Mark Grantham.* Auckland, New Zealand: Cocoa Bean Press. This book by the father of a severely physically handicapped man tells the story of the young man's life, as well as the parents' experience. The book cites several examples of the peculiarness and non-normativeness of so many human service practices. For instance, during the son's seven years residing in a group home run by a supposedly progressive service, he was taken by staff on an outing only once. Also, the staff talked the residents into going to bed very early, so that the staff could have more free time in the evening, including to watch TV; one way they induced the residents to retire early was to draw the curtains to shut out the daylight. Also, staff would answer the phone "House One" or "House Three." The father asked why, just because they are all in wheelchairs, physically handicapped people would want to live together, and why it would be assumed that they would all get along together (pp. 88-89).

*Local churches and neighborhood centers may have small food pantries that distribute food directly, but many locales also have a "food bank," i.e., typically a non-profit corporation, though sometimes a government-operated agency, that collects and distributes food to the hungry–or so most people would think. In at least some locales, the food bank does not distribute anything to hungry people, but only to services to hungry people, such as soup kitchens, Rescue Mission and Salvation Army-type agencies, that offer some kind of meal service for the poor. Thus, hungry persons cannot just obtain food to prepare a meal at home for themselves and their families, but have to go to these service agencies to obtain meals at the service locale, and usually congregated together with many other poor and hungry people. Such food banks thereby force people into the service client role, and in a very image-degrading manner.

Similarly, in some food banks, people have to register and are only allowed to "shop" there a limited number of times a month. Further, they cannot buy what they want, but only predetermined amounts of predetermined items–these predeterminations being made by the food bank operators. Yet further, some of these predetermined restrictions are very unrealistic, e.g., a mother only being allowed to pick up six disposable diapers at a time, which her child might use up in only one day. These latter practices are examples of non-programmatic considerations driving programmatic practices.

All of these examples also illustrate addressing one need (namely for food and grocery supplies), but at the cost of creating or enlarging another need (namely, image degradation).

See also the article by Tumeinski on SRV and a food pantry in the 2004 issue of *SRV-VRS: The International Social Role Valorization Journal, 5*(1&2), 72-74.

Social Roles, Valued & Otherwise

**Newsweek* magazine devoted an entire issue (12 November 2012) to "heroes," focusing especially on people whom the editors and writers perceived in that role in recent disasters, such as Hurricane Sandy on the US east coast (fall 2012), and in the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many of the people profiled were current or former members of the military. Regardless whether one is a pacifist, or supports the aforementioned wars, the articles all illustrated important points about social roles.

One point is that numerous people who had been in the military and/or in police, firefighting, and other emergency response roles, may feel lost once they lose that role, in part because the role loss means they may no longer receive the "good things of life" that the role brought them. One such good thing of life was a strong sense of be-

longing, and especially belonging to a communality in which members took care of each other even at great cost, yet this kind of deep communality was not available through their civilian roles. (As we discuss in some teaching events, our contemporary developed society has become more and more decommunitized, which results in many bad things happening to all members of society, but especially to its most vulnerable members.) One observer said that for ex-soldiers who might have been leading troubled lives back in the civilian world, finding that their service was needed once again–e.g., as a first responder in an emergency–was "as therapeutic as any drug the VA (veterans' administration) prescribed for mental health" (p. 25).

Some of this was also attested to by one veteran in a separate article (*Syracuse Post-Standard*, 2 September 2012) who said his military role had been an entire identity, one on which other people's lives depended, and that this identity had been ripped away by his return to civilian life. He also said, "I am no longer a military officer; I'm a psychological casualty of war. I wonder, is this the role I am now destined to play?," but added "I am a father now," and that he wanted to forge a new identity around that role.

Another point: it is very easy for people to slip back into the role behaviors and expressions of previous roles; this could be for better or for worse. For example, when former military personnel assist during disasters, they may use the language of their previous military role, such as addressing others as "sir" or "ma'am." Obviously, in trying to valorize the roles of people in devalued or marginal social status, it would be important to know what their previous roles were, what role cues might lead them to fall back into those earlier roles, and whether those earlier roles were ones that would bring good or bad things of life if the person should resume them.

We also learn that the "hero" role is a rather unusual one, in that those who get cast into the hero role by others often do not see themselves as heroes–in fact, the more they reject this role descriptor for themselves, the more others may see them as true heroes.

The *Newsweek* issue was also full of ads that used the role term "hero" and that showed former military personnel in new civilian roles, such as bank employee, business analyst, nurse, and information technology specialist.

A newspaper article on "Heroes of Conservation" featured five local men, all photographed, who the writer considered "heroes" for their work to preserve the great outdoors. One such man had cerebral palsy and was shown in his wheelchair. On the one hand, his designation as a hero, and his juxtaposition to the other four, was positive–but on the other hand, he was the only one who was not shown with any equipment or outfit suggesting being in the outdoors, such as a rod and reel (*Syracuse Post-Standard*, 23 December 2012).

*One of the things that may be needed to help people break out of devalued roles is to arrange their separation from the cues of these devalued roles. (Major role cues include the physical environment, other people, activities and routines, language, physical appearance, and miscellaneous sources of imagery.) For instance, drug and alcohol addiction programs may help their recipients to break an addiction when they remove recipients from the environment, the associates, and the activities which have been associated with using. This is one reason why such programs often get put "out in the country." Yet these rehabilitated people may slip right back into using upon leaving such a program if they return to those same environments, associates, and activities.

*One military veteran with severe mental problems lived for 30 years as a homeless street person, interspersed with occasional periods of imprisonment. He now works as a certified peer counselor to homeless veterans and people with similar mental problems. He also has an apartment, but interestingly, he obtained the apartment first and

the work roles second (*Syracuse Post-Standard*, 11 November 2012). In other words, having a decent (and positively valued) physical environment stabilized him sufficiently to enable his entry into the work roles. This points to a role-valorizing strategy of surrounding people with the trappings of valued roles, and these role cues are then apt to help them enter the roles signified by the cues. (See also the item on the "100,000 Homes Campaign" in the December 2012 column of *The SRV Journal,* p. 68.)

*A relatively new way of casting the homeless into the object role is to hire them to stand in line to obtain tickets for some event, thus freeing the person who does the hiring from the tedious task. It is work for the homeless, in a sense, but also casts them into the role of "place-holder."

*Of course, the poor and homeless continue to be seen and imaged as, and to be associated with, garbage. This is exemplified by some items donated to a charity for the homeless in Gloucestershire, England in 2011: an urn containing ashes, a bag of human hair, a coffin, and dirty underwear (World Ark, holiday 2012).

*People's physical environment affects both their image and their competencies, and therefore the roles they will be enabled to fill. As to image, a realtor noted the difficulty of trying to sell the boyhood home of Jeffrey Dahmer, the infamous murderer who also cannibalized his victims: "You've gotta kinda get past the horror factor" (*Newsweek*, 3 Sept. 2012, p. 12).

As to competency, poorly ventilated spaces, rooms that are too hot or too cold, noisy, and/or poorly lit, all interfere with learning. Spaces with contrasting characteristics facilitate attention and learning. One high school student's comment captured the impact on both image and competency when he said, "If you feel valued [i.e., by the environment], it inspires you to pay more attention and work harder" (*Parade*, 12 August 2012).

An example of the impact of both competency and image is the infamous Erich Lindemann Mental Health Center in Boston, Massachusetts, built in the 1960s-70s in the "Brutalist" architectural style. True to its name, it looks intimidating and alien, with features that are psychologically disorienting and difficult to negotiate, features that "defeat mentally ill patients' efforts to orient themselves in space" (Koh, M. Architecture of insanity, *Singapore Architect,* April 2010).

SRV *&* the Elderly

*The field of residential services for the aged has finally discovered normalization (though not yet SRV), about 40 years late, and decades after Wolfensberger's Training Institute gave workshops on residential services for elderly people, including on normalizing nursing homes–workshops that were not well-received. The efforts to normalize services to the elderly by Aged Care Services (once Aged Cottage Homes) in South Australia had been pretty much ignored in North America.

Such normalized settings for the elderly are now sometimes called "green" or "new culture."

*An example of human services doing things at the culturally-inappropriate time and place was observed in a nursing home for the elderly in the summer of 2000. While all the residents were seated around the dinner tables waiting for the evening meal to be served, a nurses' aide went around and checked everyone's ears for wax build-up. Of course, this practice is also very deindividualizing, to some degree child-imaging, and in other ways image-demeaning to the elderly people. (Obviously, the service had not yet caught on to the "new culture" in services for the aged!)

*An article about the growing elderly population was almost a worst-case depiction of the aged in the menace role (*Newsweek*, 2 *&* 9 July 2012, pp. 46-49). It showed an old woman behind the wheel of a very big car about to run over a young man, said the old are "the worst drivers,"

and are about to "steal our benefits and bankrupt the country."

*Yet another negative image depiction for dementia occurred in a November 2011 article on "Alzheimer's," which showed a silhouette of a woman with a tree inside her head, and the leaves coming off the tree (*Parade* magazine, 13 November 2011).

*One reason that many elderly people become senile is because that is an expectation associated with old age, and so when an old person's mental capacity begins to decline, it is assumed that the person is merely showing signs of aging, perhaps even "has" "Alzheimer's. However, there can be other, and remediable, causes of such declines, including increased fluid pressure on the brain, which can be surgically treated with an 85-90% success rate. Yet, unfamiliar with such conditions and their symptomatology, and due to stereotyped expectations, family members and even physicians mistakenly misinterpret the cause of an older person's decline, and therefore nothing is done about it.

*Although many stereotypes associated with aging and the elderly are negative, there are actually things that older people are better at, that could be capitalized upon to both craft more positive social images of and for them, and for (new) valued social roles for them. For instance, older people are better than younger ones at the job of air traffic controller because they had become very proficient at navigating and avoiding collisions; they are also better at managing emotions, and at dealing better with social conflicts (*Smithsonian*, July/August 2012).

*Developments in prosthetic and assistive devices often attract notice only when they are high-tech and glamorous, such as titanium and computer-controlled artificial limbs. But even less dramatic developments can be competency-enhancing for even larger numbers of people, including the large elderly population. For instance, the typical walking cane is a rigid stick; in the US, almost 50,000 elderly people end up in the emergency room each year as a result of having fallen while using either a cane or a walker. But there is now a cane that mimics the human leg, with hinges like the ankle and knee joints, and multiple points of contact with the ground like the foot. It is called the HurryCane since it enables quicker movement. It may not be the best tool for every person who requires a cane (but obviously, neither is the one-size-fits-all rigid cane or stick), but is bound to improve both mobility and stability for many.

*Using a prosthetic or assistive device as a weapon can attach a menace image to impaired persons, especially if they are already at risk of being thusly seen. Yet the magazine of the American Association of Retired People (June/July 2009, p. 15) promoted use of one's cane as a defensive weapon, and tells us that there is a Cane Masters International Association (canemasters.com) that teaches cane fighting as part of exercise and rehabilitation programs. The exercise connection could be used to craft or support valued roles such as fit and toned walker, or even athlete, but minus the menace association.

SRV *&* Mental Disorder

*We are sad to note the death in October 2012 of Thomas Szasz, a Hungarian-born psychiatrist who spent his life critiquing the contemporary field of mental health, its materialization of mental disorders as diseases of the brain, and its reliance on drugs and incarceration as "treatments" for mental disorders. Requiescat in pacem.

*Kirsch, I. (2010). *The emperor's new drugs: Exploding the antidepressant myth.* New York: Basic Books (member of the Perseus Books Group). (Originally published 2009, Random House Group, United Kingdom).

This is a rather narrow book, concerned primarily with the placebo effect in the treatment of depression, and with research studies as virtually the only avenue to truth. (The placebo effect refers to the fact that a recipient's expectation and hope in a treatment lends that treatment effectiveness.) Thus, with all the existing evidence (and it is massive) that drugs for depression are no better than placebos–in fact, much of what they "do" is due to the placebo effect–and with much evidence for the placebo effect in the treatment of many illnesses, not just mental conditions, nonetheless Kirsch says that more research is needed about the real effectiveness of drugs for other conditions. In our judgment, the reliance on and faith in drugs is simply not an issue of evidence, but of a religious faith–which is why evidence can pile sky-high but still make no difference in people's expectations and demands for the power of drugs. However, the book is full of many useful nuggets, and certainly is confirming of the power of hope and expectancy. For example:

Approximately 40% of clinical trials conducted on drugs by drug firms are withheld from the public, mostly because these studies fail to show any significant benefit of the tested drug (p. 4). In other words, there is evidence of non-effectiveness, or outright harm, of drugs, but this kind of evidence is withheld from people.

Because the placebo effect is so powerful, the history of medicine has been described as the history of the placebo (Shapiro, A.K. [1960]. A contribution to a history of the placebo effect. *Behavioral Science, 5*, 109-135). Indeed, the placebo effect explains much of the effectiveness even of very extreme medical treatments, including surgeries.

The kinds of expectancy that have been found to be most likely to lead to a beneficial outcome are: confidence in the effectiveness of a treatment, expectation that the change brought about by the treatment will be substantial, but expectation for that change to occur gradually (pp. 147-148). This is very useful knowledge for anyone trying to cast a person into a particular social role: it would suggest instilling confidence in the person that the role is within their competency to attain and carry out, that this will make a big difference in the person's life, but that one should not expect that big difference all at once. (It of course would also be useful for other programs of change, such as teaching a person numeracy, literacy or other skills.) The more that not only the recipient but also the server (the "changer" as well as the "changee") holds such expectancies, the more likely is it that the treatment will be effective.

*The medical ideal of "first, do no harm" (in Latin, primum non nocere) is violated more often than one might think, in part because its criterion is poorly understood. Most people think that if a medical treatment does not make a patient's condition worse, then it meets the "do no harm" standard. But actually, more is required: the treatment must yield a better outcome than if the condition were left to run its course and the patient's own recuperative capacities were allowed to work–and these recuperative capacities are much greater than most people assume. For instance, a certain percentage of people–let us say 75%–will ordinarily recover from a certain illness that is left untreated. If a medical treatment results in a 60% recovery rate, with the other 40% being no worse off, it does more harm than "letting nature take its course," even though it does not render the other 40% worse off. Many mental treatments fail this criterion, and almost all instances of application of mind drugs fail it, since even without any treatment, more people recover from episodes of mental distress than do with treatment, and especially than do with drug "treatment." The biggest effect of the drugs is to make people life-long drug-takers and human service clients, not to mention their tolls on health, even to the point of death.

*One promising development in the field of mental disorder that appears to be concordant in major ways with SRV is so-called "open dialogue therapy" pioneered in northern Finland, and now

brought to the US under the aegis of the Foundation for Excellence in Mental Health Care. Despite its name "therapy," which implies illness and a medical model, open dialogue therapy makes a commitment to not having recourse to drugs except as a second- or third-stage fallback once other methods have been tried and given time to work, and then only if the afflicted person wants to try drugs. It emphasizes conveying to afflicted persons expectancies for their recovery, getting them (back) into school and work roles as soon as possible, and providing them with a supportive community. It would certainly be worth looking into, for those who want to apply SRV to people with mental disorders.

*Wampold, B.E. (2007). Psychotherapy: The humanist (and effective) treatment. *American Psychologist, 62*(8), 855-873. In 2007, Bruce Wampold received an award from the American Psychological Association for his applied research. Wampold proposes that psychotherapy should not be based on a medical model, but be more equated with religious and indigenous healing practices that "involve an emotionally charged and confiding relationship with a healer, a healing setting, a rationale or conceptual scheme, and procedures that both the healer and patient believe in and that involve active participation and positive expectations for change. According to this perspective, these aspects of healing practices are the critical ingredients of the treatment, whereas in medicine it is the medicine's direct effect on the biological system. What the healing practices in the latter category have in common is that they appear to be embedded in a cultural context, rely on the interaction between the healer and the recipient of the treatment, and involve an interpretation of events and their meaning" (Wampold, 2007, citing Frank & Frank, 1991).

In his scheme, mindsets (one of the ten themes in the teaching of SRV) play a crucial role, and both healer and the person seeking healing need to share a mindset that is culturally plausible in order for the healing effort to be effective. How valid the shared mindset is seems less crucial than that it is shared, and not in contradiction to cultural beliefs. In other words, what works very powerfully are shared expectancies and culturally valued analogues, just as SRV teaches.

*A residential service for people with mental disorders has engaged the people it serves in gardening and landscaping projects designed by students at a local environmental college. As would be expected, the ongoing contact with real things in the natural world, the demands of regular physical activity (digging, planting, hoeing, etc.), the contribution to beautification of the environment, and other elements of the gardener role have been very beneficial for both the mental and physical state of these gardeners. Thankfully, there is no talk–at least yet–of "horticultural therapy" (*Syracuse Post-Standard*, 14 July 2012).

SRV & Imprisonment

*Gopnik, A. (2012, January 30). The caging of America. *The New Yorker*, pp. 72-77. As reported on earlier in this column, the United States incarcerates both numerically and proportionally more people than any other country now or in the past. One commentator says we have become a "carceral state," and for many poor people–especially poor blacks–prison and the prisoner role have become their life destination, much as attending college, getting a good job, getting married and having a family, are for the non-poor. This article documents all this, and points out how prisons carry out the wound of life-wasting, as "time becomes in every sense this thing you [i.e., a prisoner] serve" (p. 72). Brutalization in the form of rape of prisoners is "endemic" (p. 73). And all of this is very unlikely to change since imprisonment serves very real, but unexplicated, purposes of social control of a devalued underclass.

Readers may also be interested in chapter seven, "The Application of Social Role Valorization Prin-

ciples to Criminal & Other Detentive Settings," in Wolfensberger's (2012) book *Advanced Issues in Social Role Valorization Theory*, published by Valor Press of Plantagenet, Ontario.

*An editorial in defense of providing a college education (at public expense) to prisoners showed one such prisoner in cap and gown receiving his diploma, and referred to him and others as "college graduates"–as indeed they are. Education is one of the few things that are known to work to reduce recidivism, and is thus one of the few truly cost-beneficial elements of imprisonment. However, it is often one of the first programs in prisons to be cut, because many taxpayers resent the fact that they and their law-abiding children do not receive a college education "for free."

**Criminal Injustice: Death and Politics at Attica.* (2011 documentary film, approx. 1 hour. Produced by David Marshall and Chris Christopher.)

This film was released to mark the 40th anniversary of the uprising at the New York State penitentiary (maximum security prison) at Attica on September 9-13, 1971. Unlike the "other" September event (Sept. 11, 2011) that most people know of, few remember this one, in which more than 40 people were shot to death, all by state troopers and on the order of the authorities, and despite the fact that the prisoners who had successfully taken over the prison and were running it were treating their hostages well. Of course, prisoners are deeply devalued, and few in free society identify with them.

The film includes original footage from the news coverage of the uprising, as well as past and current interviews with former prisoners and their family members, hostages and their family members, and negotiators and observers.

The prisoners rebelled because the prison conditions were very bad (they were being treated "worse than dogs," as some put it), but their attempts to obtain redress by going through "proper channels" had had no results. Several guards were injured in the take-over, and the prisoners allowed all of them to be removed from the prison to receive medical treatment. However, one seriously injured guard died a few days later in the hospital, and the government decided that this made all the prisoners open to a charge of capital murder, punishable by execution. Once this happened, the prisoners demanded amnesty, and negotiations between them and government authorities–which had been going well up to that point–broke down; and they broke down not because the government could not have extended amnesty, but because the then governor of New York, Nelson Rockefeller, had ambitions to be president, and was warned (including by then-President Nixon) that he would not be electable if he granted their demand. The prisoners asked him to personally come to the prison and meet with them, but he refused. Once it became clear that the government was no longer going to negotiate, it was only a matter of time until force was used: the state sent in an Army helicopter full of troops, bombed the central yard of the prison (where both the prisoners and hostages were living) with tear gas, and then the troopers started shooting virtually indiscriminately. They went looking for specific prisoners whom they had seen on the television coverage of the take-over, and murdered at least two of them, who were unarmed, in cold blood. The remaining prisoners were stripped totally naked, and herded back into their cells. Thus, for the sake of the governor's personal ambition and "face," more than 40 people were killed–and yet Rockefeller never did become president.

Once the prison was back under the control of imperial authorities, the state then lied, saying that the dead had been killed by the prisoners, and that some had been mutilated, none of which was true: all the dead, except the one guard who had been beaten by prisoners and died in hospital, were shot by the police.

Not surprisingly, the state treated the survivors of the dead prisoners in very devaluing manner,

e.g., some survivors learned of the death of their imprisoned family member only when it was broadcast over the radio as news. What is surprising is that the state treated the survivors of the dead hostage guards hardly any better. For instance, the state sent the widows checks that were drawn from workmen's compensation funds, though this fact was not drawn to the widows' attention, so when the widows cashed those checks, they were unknowingly accepting the fine print condition that went with them, namely, that by accepting these funds they agreed not to sue the state for injury. The state thus escaped all financial liability and culpability for the deaths of more than 40 people.

Several years later, the state was ready to prosecute two prisoners for crimes associated with the uprising–but by then, the families of the dead guards had hired an attorney who had discovered the facts that the state had been trying to hide, and that, if they had been brought out in court, would have undercut the state's case. So, the governor (Hugh Carey) permanently sealed all the records of the uprising and the state's response–which was the de facto equivalent of an amnesty that the state had refused to grant two years earlier, and which, had it been granted during the incident, would have probably avoided more than 40 deaths.

Just as Frederic Wertham said about the killing of the handicapped under the Nazis, that it was a "violence unresolved," so too is this one–and so are many more instances of legitimized violence against devalued people thusly "unresolved."

Miscellaneous Items

*So deeply is imitation embedded in the human that when one person observes another doing something, the neurons in the observer's brain will fire that are associated with the same muscles being exercised by the observed person. In other words, the observer's neurons "mirror" the action of the neurons of the person observed. This is one reason why we tend to feel what another person is feeling–anger, happiness, etc.–and also underlines one of the mechanisms behind interpersonal identification. As one writer put it, the border between what one person feels and what another person feels is "porous."

Further, the observer does not have to be competent at what the observed party is doing or feeling for the observer's mirror neurons to light up. For instance, watching someone skillfully use a saw will cause the observer's mirror neurons to fire, even if the observer cannot use a saw skillfully.

Yet further, muscles will involuntarily and unconsciously move in imitation of the physical poses presented in works of art. The new field of study on the brain's processing of art is called neuroaesthetics (*Smithsonian*, October 2012, November 2012).

All this argues for exposing impaired people to models of competent behavior even if the impaired person (the observer) is not yet able to imitate the observed behavior as competently, or perhaps even at all. The very observation may help to establish neural patterns that can then be built up into actual behaviors.

*When people feel they cannot do what obviously needs to be done for a party, they often feel they must nonetheless do something, and the something can sometimes be very peculiar. For instance, what homeless people obviously need is shelter, and whatever would enable them to obtain and maintain a permanent residence. But many people want to "do something for" the homeless other than providing the needed shelter. One agency offers "group bike rides to the city's homeless," not even individual bike rides, and not even the bikes themselves, but only group bike rides along with snacks (*Syracuse Post-Standard*, 18 February 2012, p. A13). However, with greater consciousness, this could conceivably be capitalized upon to craft some athletic roles for at least some of the homeless.

*It can be very instructive to collect, and then compare and contrast, items that contain some-

thing of SRV relevance. These items can be from or about the same party, such as a single service agency, or multiple parties, but perhaps they do not appear at the same time or in the same place. The following paragraphs illustrate.

A two-page advertisement for The Arc in *Time* magazine (September 12, 2011) carried a mix of positive and negative visual messages. On the one hand, three photos showed a man cooking supper at home, and two young children in school together (one with Down's syndrome), and a man (identified as "an artist") with paint-spattered overalls in front of two paintings, presumably his. All these people were identified as having "intellectual and developmental disabilities." But on the other hand, one photo showed an obviously handicapped man astride a horse, but looking as if he was about to fall off, and the activity was described as "therapeutic horseback riding"; and another photo showed twin girls with unusual faces, and in less than enhancing outfits, one of them holding a paint bottle spout down, rather than upright. As we note in SRV teaching, unfortunately, even dedicated advocates for devalued people can be insensitive to the power of imagery, and to the importance of projecting positive imagery whenever possible.

(By the way, "The Arc" started out as an acronym for the Association for Retarded Citizens, but like so many human services these days, dropped the words the acronym originally stood for, which unfortunately renders the name meaningless to those who are not in human service and impairment circles.)

Four recent items–two of them ads, two articles–from four different publications in the latter half of 2012, all depict or concern mentally retarded people, and they illustrate how expectations can be created and conveyed by imagery and interpretation. One advertisement by The Arc showed an impaired woman at work on a factory floor, dressed typically for such a worker; the accompanying text describes both the dangers of the work and the competence of the woman in doing it. Another ad for the Special Olympics shows a female (possibly a teenager) with Down's syndrome, dressed in athletic gear with a medal around her neck, and in the embrace of a woman who the text implies is her mother, thus casting the young woman in the roles of daughter and athlete. The ad also continues an advertising theme from the "real" Olympics of 2012 that focused on competitors thanking their mothers who supported them in chasing their dreams.

One article was about a mentally impaired 16-year old receiving sacraments of initiation into his faith along with his older and younger brothers. In the several photos that accompanied the article, the boy is shown in positive juxtapositions with his mother, brothers, parish priest and bishop, but the article also reprinted a handwritten letter from the boy in a childish scrawl, and with many errors of spelling and grammar. The last article about welcoming "the disabled" into the life of local churches was unfortunately titled "Let the little children come," though the article was concerned with "disabled" people of all ages; and it was illustrated with a cartoon drawing of Jesus pushing a child in a wheelchair, with heart-shaped clouds in the background.

Similarly, promotional brochures for two different services to the deaf conveyed different expectations, though the list of services they offered–residential schools, early childhood education, etc.–were very similar. One showed students reading, writing, exercising and touring an art museum, and said it offered "high expectations of students as readers and writers," both of which are valued roles of the kind that can open doors to many other valued roles. The other showed cartoon illustrations of six "tips for talking with a person who is hard of hearing."

*Williams, A. (2011). *Working with street children: An approach explored*. Dorset, England: Russell House Publishing.

This book is essentially a "how-to" set of instructions for working with children who live on

the streets because they either have run away or have been ejected/abandoned by their families. Not surprisingly, their lives on the streets are very hard, as they essentially are raised by other such children, engage in theft and violence to get what they need or want, and incur all sorts of diseases. As a how-to book, the wording is very much along the lines of "this worked for us, it may or may not work in your situation." The author's experience with such children is primarily in two African countries, in services run by a Christian organization. He places great emphasis on sensitivity to cultural differences, e.g., by westerners serving in non-western parts of the world. The approach is one grounded in the profession of social work, and on professionals (rather than volunteers) serving such children. In this respect, the author evidences naivete about the limits of paid services generally, and the field of social work in particular, to avoid and address the wounding of the people served. Also, the services he was involved with in Africa were relatively new, so they were more flexible than longer-established organizations; and because there is a dearth of services in Africa (compared to western countries), services there are not (yet) as formalized and rule-bound as they are in the developed west. This may also mean that the role-valorizing features of the service may not last long, if the service does in fact become more professionalized.

As might be expected, much of the content is interpretable in terms of social devaluation, even though there are no references to the concept. For instance, one learns of negative role-casting of such children by their families and the wider society, as well as by their peers. As an example, in one locale in Africa, such children were called by a term that means a wild, dirty, scavenging creature (p. 30). Some street children themselves gave one youngster among them a nickname which means cockroach (p. 126). And the night before a visit by a US President, 478 street children were rounded up and removed from the city streets (p. 89), as if they were garbage or otherwise too unsightly.

We also learn that street children are subjected to many other common wounds that accompany devaluation, such as different forms of negative imaging. For instance, one center for street children is described as being filthy, yet the quarters for the administrative staff of the organization were well-kept and comfortable (p. 71). Indeed, the author talks about the stigma associated with being a child of the streets (pp. 100-101). One service established an image policy that concerned, to some extent, how the service would allow the children to be portrayed, e.g., in photos. For instance, on one occasion, a photo was taken of some street children playing on a pile of rubbish, on top of which had been deposited the body of an aborted child (p. 29), and the service intervened to prevent the distribution of that photo. Also, the service adopted the practice of installing full-length mirrors at its sites, so that the children could properly see themselves–sometimes for the first time (p. 55).

There are also examples of the insecurity and lack of trust that certain wounds engender (p. 54), and of the children testing the genuineness of their servers, e.g., by repeatedly running away (p. 28), and by hostility towards relatives who had mistreated them (p. 57).

We also learn of brutalization and deathmaking. For instance, many of these children in Africa either are or become infected with HIV/AIDS. In addition, the author reports that at least in the early 1990s, few street children in Brazil lived past 18 years of age, and in Guatemala more recently, once children started living on the streets, they had a life expectancy of only four more years (p. 64).

Similarly, while there is no specific mention of Social Role Valorization (SRV), much of the content is also interpretable in SRV terms, and resonates with SRV. For instance, the book talks about the centrality of social roles in the children's lives, especially in terms of the competencies that the service tries to give to them so that they will be able to assume valued roles in their culture, such

as roles related to farming and raising livestock (p. 84). The author also reports that the service tries to give to the children valued, responsible and competency-enhancing roles within the service itself, such as member of the Junior Management Team (p. 129) and medical assistant (p. 11).

Repeatedly, but without using the terminology of SRV, the author emphasizes that services to street children should capitalize on their culturally valued analogues, e.g., in regard to the layout of classrooms, the number of children in child care homes, and the duties of children around the home (pp. 80, 83, 85). The one area in which the author's service did not emulate culturally valued analogues was in regard to punishment of the children (p. 86), and this was due to sensitivity to the children's wounds–in SRV terms, their heightened vulnerability–which could make even normative forms of punishment harmful to them.

The author also talks about how important it is for servers to identify positively with the children served; of course, interpersonal identification is one of the "themes" by which SRV is taught (see Wolfensberger, W. [1998]. *A brief introduction to Social Role Valorization: A high-order concept for addressing the plight of societally devalued people, and for structuring human services.* [3rd rev. ed.] Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Training Institute for Human Service Planning, Leadership & Change Agentry, 118-120). For instance, the staff engaged in various exercises, including role-playing, in order to "explore the world of the street child," to "put ourselves in the clothes and shoes of a specific child … In short we were asking ourselves, what was it like to be him?" (p. 29). Of course, these types of exercises could be engaged in by the servers in virtually any service.

Reunification with family if possible was the goal of the service described; if it were not possible, then efforts were made to incorporate the child into a foster family. (For some reason, adoption is never discussed. One wonders whether it is or is not a culturally valued analogue in the locales where this service operated.) In Uganda in 1997, it was discovered that 85% of children in orphanages around the country had identifiable relatives (p. 61). Thus, even when the nuclear family may not be able or willing to welcome back a child, other family members may. Any service concerned with establishing what might be called "alternate families" for children who are not with their natural family could probably also identify and pursue other relatives to offer a home to such children. (This option has recently been "discovered" and made much of in the foster care system in North America.)

This review has hopefully been an example of how one can conduct an SRV analysis even of projects that do not purport to know about or be based on SRV, and of the fact that the universals described in SRV can indeed be found in human services of all types to all types of people in all places. ☙

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